INSANITY & CRIME

Evening Post, Volume CI, Issue 49, 26 February 1921, Page 9

INSANITY & CRIME

EVOLUTION IN. LAW

FAMOUS "RULE" CHALLENGED

The old probiem of the criminal responsibility of the insane has been raised anew by v^hat took place, during the trial of a man for murder, at the Central Criminal Court last week, re-maj-ked the London Daily TtiSegraph editorially recently. ' Sir Robert Arm-strong-JoneE, who wsa called for the dafence, gave witness that, after a. careful medical examination of the prisoner, he was satisfied of his insanity, and while under cross-examination he expressed his disagreement with what is known to lawyers as "The Rules in Macnaughton's Case." In his summing up, Mr. Justice Darling, who possesses the admirable-y but highly controversial—faculty of epigram to an exceptional degree, observed, with reference to this remark, " We take the law of England from the King's Bench, and not from Harley-street; from the House of Lords, and not from Wim-pole-street." That sonnds at first hearing an emphatic and effective vindication o£ the majesty of the law above that of medicine, and a vigorous assertion of the principle that the last word —in case of controversy between the two professions —will lie with the' courts, as, indeed, it. obviously must, so far as any individual prisoner is concerned. Bufc nothing could be more misleading than to suppose that the two professions are engaged on independent lines in working , out rival theories of the criminal responsibility of the insane. The very opposite, of course, is the fact. Legal theory on the subject is continually subject to revision not in the light of Us own discoveries, but in the light of the advances made by medical research, and what is known as 'Macnaughton's rule haa no •more finality and fixity than other rules which it then superseded. Harleystreet, therefore, and Wimpole-street need not—and will not—be unduly perturbed at Mr. Justice Darling's epigram. They know that in the long run it is they, and not the House or the King's Bench, who will shape the guiding principle. Many people, no doubt, are asking, "Who was Macnaughton and what is his Rule?" Macnaughton was not, as might easily be supposed, either a learned judge or a learned doctor; he was a. man with a grievance who, in 1843, murdered Sir Robert Peel's private secretary, Mr. Drummond. He harboured the delusion-that. Sir Robert Peel had done him grave injustice, and so took revenge by shooting the unfortunate private secretary. He was defended by Mr. Cockburn, afterwards Lord Chief Justice, on the ground that he, was partially insane, and was acquitted, Chief Justice Tindal putting the specifio jquestion to the jury whether Macnaughton was capable of distinguishing right from wrong in respect of the act with whioh he stood charged. The' doctrine of partial insanity, and its formal acceptance by the judge, at the' trial, was followed by an important debate in the House of Lords, which formulated a ( series of questions and put them to the general body of judges, and it is their reply which constitutes what is known as "Macnaughton's Rule," or, more accurately, "The Rules of Macnaughton's Case." ' ,

Those rules have held the field for three-quarters of a century. But it has not been an unchallenged field. There have always been those who questioned their accuracy and their adequacy. It is to be remembered^ however, that they marked a clear advance. Previously the general theory had been that before a man'could be acquitted on the ground of insanity-it must be shown that he was "totally . deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing no more than an infant, or than a brute or wild beast." No doubt this sweeping theory was very considerably ' mitigated by individual judges, according to the cases which came before them. On some occasions it was laid down that the real point was whether a man was sane when he committed the crime; on others the criterion was whether tho criminal had at the time sufficient capacity to distinguish right from wrong. It will be seen, therefore, that the judges were groping for a formula or a criterion more consonant with the facts of human experience ajid more humane towards the unfortunate criminals. The virtue of Macnaughton's Rule was that it established the principle that the' test of criminal responsibility is knowledge of the nature of the particular criminal act committed, and that delusion is a valid plea- for acquittal only when the fancies of the deluded person would have been ground for acquittal had they been facts. But the defects of this principle are ■ tolerably obvious. Sir Robert ArmstrongrJones objects that many persons "definitely realise the nature and quality of an act, and yet suffer from sudden insane impulses (through a defect of will-power) which are irresistible, dominating, and' compulsive." That is certainly true, but it ia to be observed that it would be no less true if the word " insane" were omitted. In that case, however, crime would seem to be a matter >of will-power rather than of' mental power, and the inquirer finds himself plunged_ helplessly into the bottomless abyss oi the controversy whether the human will is free' or is determined. Accordincr to the text-books, the rules in Macnaugbton's Case, to which Mr. Justice Darling seemed to refer as though they were imprejrnabJy established, have been skilfully manipulated ,from time to time by judges humanely bent upon extending to prisoners the protection which, in their opinion, they deserved, but from which a strictly literal interpretation of the rules would have debarred them. And perhaps it is not reasonable to expect anything like an exact formula which can be applied to such matters as will-power and mental disease. The doctors evidently lean strongly towards tho side of revision and extension. They know that the clean-cut boundaries which are so dear to the' heart of precisians simply do not exist in these regions, and that the legal passion accurately to buoy these turbid channels cannot be gratified without doing grave injustice. But we should be sorry to think that there was any profound disagreement between the two professions, and, in any event, whenever the question actually arises in a court of law, it is rarely that the judge and jury find any real difficulty in determining, from the facts and from the demeanour of the prisoner, whether they should; find him criminally responsible for his act.