Evening Post. MONDAY, AUGUST 16, 1920. LABOUR'S "HOLD-UP"

Evening Post, Volume C, Issue 40, 16 August 1920, Page 6

Evening Post. MONDAY, AUGUST 16, 1920. LABOUR'S "HOLD-UP"

London newspapers' complaint that the demand of the British Labour organisations upon the, Government is an "incongruous " demand not to do something that tho Government had not proposed to do, is in part true. Mr. Lloyd George did not propose to take the offensive against Bolshevik Russia; even in the case of violation of ethnological Poland by the Bolsheviks, he did not propose to do more than to defensively assist the Poles with munitions, not with troops; and the French militants alleged—notwithstanding a British denial—that Mr. Lloyd George's moderation was due to a desire to appease the anti-war Labour section. In these circumstances, therefore, it did appear that the refusal of the Labour organisations to be appeased placed them in an incongruous position— the position of shouting no-war threats to a Government that obviously was doing it? beat to keep out of war. But that view of the position does not take into account the length to which the Labour organisations were prepared to go, and have since gone. A perusal of the resolution published in the cablegrams to-day shows that the demand is not only for no -war, but for " recognition of the Soviet Government and the establishment of unrestricted. trade relations between Britain and Russia." As the resolution makes no mention of Poland, it appears to mean that, whether Poland lives or dies, the British Government is commanded to recognise the Soviet Government a,nd to trade, which steps would evidently prevent the sending of any form of military aid, material or otherwise, to the Poles. For the incongruity of carrying on diplomacy and trade with the Bolsheviks, and at the same time materially assisting Poland against them, is obvious.

While Mr. Lloyd George has already gone a long way towards meeting the no-war cry, it is difficult to see how he can possibly obey the orders of the Labour organisations—or of their empowered executive, the Council of Action —in the matter of recognition and. trade, or withdraw the British forces that are ready to blockade Russia, or give " absolute guarantees " that in no contingency (as, for instance, the subjection of Poland) (will Britain's armed forces support Wrangel. To take sectional orders on those matters would not only undermine the whole East European policy— placing all the political in the hands of the Bolsheviks—but would be al degradation of Government, Notwithstanding Mr. Hodges, the extreme terms of the Labour resolution/backed by the strike weapon, do constitute a challenge to Parliamentary government,(which includes Cabinet, government) and represent a sectional usurpation of the country's constitutional powers. Mr. Hodges is probably correct in his statement that tho success of the Council of Action— insofar as it has been successful—"is due to the spirit of opposition to war." But the resolution goes much further than opposition to war. It dictates official friendship with the Bolsheviks, and even Republican America is barring that, and is fighting determinedly against recognition of the Soviet Government. Shall Britain, under the " stancl-and-deliver " 'challenge of the direct 1 actionists—and of otherwise sane Labour men who appear to be politically aligned with the direct actionists for supposed tactical reasons—embrace a socalled republic that will not tolerate a general election, and that is too Red for the republicans of the United States? If the British Labour organisations think that the popular spirit of opposition to war will carry them i;ss far as that, they may bis mistaken.

The difference between Britain und France centred in France's recognition of Wrangel being regarded ns the military munitional support of Wrangel, irrespective of whether the Bolsheviks do or do noi- Hive Poland just terms. But Paris now cables that "it is officially explain-

c.d thut tho French , recognition of Wriingui (loon not 'moan runduring military iitmintancn." If no, tho principal ofttcmsllih) cftUKO of friction disappears. An unconditional .military oupport of Wrnnßel id tinucccptatilo to Britain, and, riolwithnUnding tho burst of FrnncoAmericnn offtinnivoncßs, would almost raiiiunly not bo participated in by tho United States. Therefore, it is not surprising to hear that, ingtoad of a "lonely furrow" course of action by France, thorn is to be "a. reviftion of French policy." Possibly tho Wrungel movo in Paris wns designed to raise a clatter, to teat Mr. Lloyd George's position in Ijj'h own country, and to draw America, into a more open avowal of anti-Soviatifim, Having accomplished this Inst, the Wrongel move may now be officially explained away; but meanwhile it has helped to develop Labour's direct action policy in Britain, Franco, and Belgium. And, as already oxplained, though tho temporary effect of "direct" action on East European diplomacy is important, tho permanent effect on British constitutionalism may bo fundamental.