SENATE AND TREATY

Evening Post, Volume XCIX, Issue 46, 24 February 1920, Page 8

SENATE AND TREATY

FIGHT OVER THE PACT

DEFECT IN CONSTITUTION

BLAMED

BOTH FACTIONS WITHIN LEGAL

RIGHTS.

Rarely in our history has the interposition of partisan political consideration done more immediate and permanent harm than in the case of the present debate over the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles (writes Frank H. Simonds, in San Francisco Chronicle of 4th January). In saying this I do not mean to assert, as I do not believe, that either the President and his fellow Democrats in the Senate or the Republican majority have been mainly actuated by political consideration; the slightest examination of the situation as it exists at the na tional capital reveals the fact that the divergence goes far more deeply.

It is true that two • parties are represented in the division in the Senate, but' it is not less true that neither party has preserved a solid front and that, :sm the whole, the defections from the Democratic side have been more considerable thai? from the Republican, so much so that one is far more nearly accurate in describing the contest as one between the Pi-esident and the Senate, betwen the Executive and the legislative branches of Government, than as between partfes or personalities. LEGAL MACHINERY'S DEFECT DISCO VEHED.

If oiie eliminate all partisan considerations, jf one put aside all circumstances which, arise from the treatment by the President of the Senate, both in the composition of his delegation to the Peace Conference, and his subsequent course, since he returned from Paris; if one discount all manoeuvring which is the consequence of the approach of v national campaign, there remains a solid fact, the . most significant fact in the whole controversy, looking at it with any historical perspective, and that is that our machinery of Government has broken down, has been disclosed as inadequate in the presence of a great national crisis.

The theory of the makers of the Constitution, who sought by imposing a system of checks and balances, and thus maintaining an equilibrium between two branches of Government, however well it has worked for a century and a quarter in domestic affairs, has led us straight to one of the most humiliating and dangerous situations in foreign relations which can bo imagined. PRESIDENT HAD RIGHT TO NEGOTIATE PACT. What has actually happened- has been that tho President, using powers unquestionably within his grasp and right, since no one has been able to cite a single legal objection to his course, has gone to Europe. In conference with t-he representatives of other great nations hs has negotiated a treaty of peace, speaking always in the name of the country of which he was the chief executive. _ Rejection has been accomplished in the United States Senate, where the majority of the Senators in rejecting it have acted within their rights and in accordance with their constitutional duties. We have then reached a complete deadlock, and for several months the restoration of peace in the world has been postponed, to tha very great injury of all the world, because of this deadlock.

CONSTITUTION MAY BE REALLY

TO BLAME.

As the consequences of the deadlock havß been more and more clearly perceived and felt, the President and the Senate have been collectively denounced in-many .quarters," while in others the whole burden of blame has been placed, upon the President or upon the majority «f the Senate, as this disposition" of responsibility suited the various critics. Yfit little or no blame has been placed' upon the Constitution of the United States itself, which, provided no machin> cry for emerging from this situation. By contrast the situation of the European nations is obvious. When Olemenceaai or Lloyd George acted for their respective countries in Paris they acted' as the representatives, the agents, of the responsible majority in the dominant legislative branch of the French ot British Parliament. What either of these Ministers was undertaking for his country had to be known by the Commons or the Chamber—that is, throughout the negotiations ■ both men had to preserve /•he control of the majority, or they would have fallep from-power, and'disappeared from the conference automatically. ; ' ■ •. Over against this must be set the warning conveyed by the Senate in another "round robin," drafted in March, as I recall, after the President's brief visit to the United States,, and setting forth the fact that the Treaty in the shape it then was, a shape which was in part retained, would not be accepted by fche Senate. Such >a warning the President could and did disregard because he was satisfied of the rectitude of his course, and confident that if he appealed to the <;ountry popular sentiment would compel the Senate to accept any treaty which he had signed.

BOTH FACTIONS WITHIN THEIR

LAWFUL RIGHTS.

. We have, then, on this side of the water, a machinery for negotiating peace settlements which can lead directly to a complete paralysis.. The events of the last year have disclosed the fact that the President of the United. States can lawfully go to a peace conference and there, in the name of the United States, negotiate a treaty unhampered in any way by interference from the legislative branch. But similarly, when this treaty has been signed in the name of the country the legislative branch can reject it. The legislative branch cannot, however, negotiate a new treaty, while the President can, if he chooses, reject any amendments tQ the treaty and can refuse to accept any settlement which departs in any degree, even the smallest, from his own views.

So far the single logical suggestion of an escape from the deadlock comes from Senator Lodge, who proposes to carry the question to the people in the next national election. But this means postponing peace, so far as we are concerned, for a whole year.' Possibly more, for even after the election the President cannot be compelled to act, and he holds ofike until 4th March, 1921. More than this—it means withdrawing American influence from the international field all through what must be the most critical year of all. Any other proposal domes to mere' nonsense.

EUROPE NEGOTIATED IN BEST OF

FAITH.

Now, sc much for the past and the present, but even they are only a small part of the whole, Europe negotiated with the President in good .faith, as the representative of the United States. He told them without hesitation that the things he asked for represented the voice of America. They believed him. He told them also that whatever opposition there might be in the Senate, an appeal to the American people would ensure the passage of the resolution of ratification. He believed this' his European audience believed him, and most, if not quite all, of the Americans abroad at the time confirmed this statement.

It is clear that technically the cry now coming from Europe that t]bo Uxu>

ted States has repudiated an engagement already entered into is not accurate. It is equally true that technically the countries with whom the United States negotiated the peace treaty should have been able to discover the anomalous situation which enabled our legislative branch to reject a treaty negotiated by the executive, and even more, to discover that the legislative branch contemplated doing just this. But the truth is that in order to take effective .notice of this, the European representatives would have been forced to join battle with the President of the United States, who held and would for two years continue to hold control of all Government. departments, whose voice would settle the continuation or abandonment of such aid as Europe was receiving and needed. HOSTILE POWERS IN EFFECTIVE • DEADLOCK. The strange situation in our Government with respect of treaty making, compelled Europe to-take sides, to negotiate with one or two equally influential elements actually hostile and each possessing the power to negative the treaty, but only one able to act positively so far as negotiations were concerned. Europe did this, not without reluctance, in some quarters at least, and the result has been a deadlock and a postponement' of real -peace for more than six months.

Now looking to the future, what reception will the next peace delegation sent from America to Europe have, or the next delegation sent to negotiate any treaty or agreement? It must come from the. President, as his power to negotiate' treaties is unquestionable. It may well set sail when the Senate is controlled by an opposing political party, or it may in conformity with the views of the President subscribe to agreements which are repugnant to the whole Senate or a majority thereof without regard to party. In such case what will become of the treaty, the agreement? Will not ( Europe, once burned, shrink back from a new danger? It is a fact that the French, through Clemenceau, actually consented to certain modifications of French policy in the matter of the Treaty of Versailles because President Wilson declared that such modifications were necessary to obtain an American guarantee of French security for the future.

■CLEMENCEAU HEEDED PRESI

DENT'S VIEWS!

Specifically, Clemenceau, against the advice of Foch, against-the wish of many Frenchmen, .resigned the Rhine as a military barrier, because President Wil-. son.offered in exchange guarantees of French security found within and without the League of Nations covenant. So France paid in' advance; she had to make a physical surrender of policy, of title, to acquire what she regarded as an American pledge to pay in the future. She got the President's pledge, but she lacks the countersignature of the Senate, and the discount she has in return for her resignation of title is valueless. But her resignation of title is written into the Treaty of Versailles. Now in what spirit Wl the French be forced to negotiate with the next American delegation, come to her shores or met elsewhere ?

What results, then, is an obvious discrediting' of American negotiators in advance of their arrival at any. peace conference, any . world assemblage. They can pledge nothing, promise nothing, for their country. They do not, or at least they need not, have any relations whatever with the Senate, which will decide the fate of the Treaty. Their voices thus are destitute of authority. Is it not plain that such a situation carries with it patent disadvantages and even potential dangers? . ,

CHECK AND BALANCE DEEMED

ESSENTIAL.

A system of checks and balances may be essential to preserve liberty in domestic affairs, but it carries with it the certain possibility of anarchy in foreign affairs. If it be regarded as unwise to permit the Presisdent to go abroad and undertake engagements on behalf of this country, subject to no legislative retraint, ought not the legislative branch, then, be permitted to name at least a majority of the members of any international delegation, to name them from its own ranks,and thus to remain in immediate rkelation with the Treaty makers ? The alternative is to give the President absolute power; but in the present temper of the nations it is plain such a revision of the Constitution is unthinkable. Yet some revision certainly seems necessary, when one recognises that the peace of the world has been almost indefinitely postponed owing to the absence of any official or body capable of breaking the deadlock between the President and the Senata. Possibly some way might be found, in case of a deadlock, to throw the whole matter into the House of Representatives and lets it break the tie.

FOREIGN RELATIONS PLACED IN

JEOPARDY.

_ We cannot expect to fare well in foreign negotiations while this defect prevails, for the costs to European countries of their first adventure with American treaty-making on a large scale have been almost prohibitive. It will not suffice to blame the President for doing what he had the right to do. Nor will it do any good to criticise the Senate; its rights are at least equally clear, its duties no less enjoined by an oath of office. The likelihood that the Senate will in the future prove as jealous of its rights^ and as vigilant in the defence of what it conceives to be American interests is unmktakable.

It is plain, then, that no summary solution of the present Washington deadlock is possible. We may get peace and a treaty, but we have touched new questions which will not be answered by any compromise now. Unity in command, in foreign relations has become almost as necessary, for us as it was for tile enemies of Germany twenty months ago.