H.M.S. HOOD

Evening Post, Volume XCIX, Issue 34, 10 February 1920, Page 15

H.M.S. HOOD

BRITAIN'S NEW DREAD-

NOUGHT

A LIVELY CONTROVERSY

SPEED OR ARMOUR?

Writing to the San Francisco Chronicle from London on 15th November, Clair I Price'says:—H.M.S. Hood, the greatest! I fighting ship in the world, has just been launched, and the old question, of the j usefulness of great surface men-of-war pops up its head again. The discussion is I particularly acrimonious in connection with the launching of the Hood, for the recent books of Lord Fisher and..Admiral Sir Percy Scott,.both of whom are leaders oi that school of naval thinkers who believe the surface ship obsolete, have ! brought the subject well to the fore again. Additional interest is lent to the Hood, in view of the fact that she is the first capital ship in the Royal Navy to be built since the battle of Jutland on 31st May-lst June/ 1916. Doubtless she embodies in her construction some of the lessons which the British Navy learned from that instructive action. It will bo of interest to compare the Hood with the U.S.S. New Mexico, our greatest'man-of-war, and also with some of the Hood's .predecessors in the British Navy. . Here are the figures:— JI.M.S. H00d.—41,200 tons; length, 860 feet j speed, 31 knots; eight 15in, twelve s£in, four 4m gunsj armour, 12iii. ' ■ U.S.S. New Mexico.—32,ooo tons; length, 624 feet; speed, .21 knots; twelve 14in, fourteen Sin, four 3in guns ;■ armour 14in. ' H.M.S. Renown (1916).—26,500 tons; length, 750 feet; speed, 32 knots; sis 15in, seventeen 4in, two 3in guns; armour, 6in. H.M.S.. Royal Sovereign (1.916).— 25,750 tons; -length, 580 feet; speed, 23 knots; eight 15in, fourteen oin gnnu; armour, 13in. H.il.S. Queen Elizabeth (1915).— 27,500 tons"; length, 600 feet;. speed, 25 knots; eight 15in, twelve 6in guns ; armour, 13in. H.M.S. Tiger (1914).—28,500 tons; length, 660 feet; speed, 30 knots; flight 13£ in, twelve 6in guns; armour, 9in. Doubtless there is some connection between a fourteen-.inch armour belt and a twenty-one-knot speed. Does it pay, in j these days of ihigh speed, to sacrifice I knots to armour? It is obvious that to pile on armour cuts down speed. You must take your | choke. If you pile on armour so heavily that your man-of-war can only waddle along at twenty-one knots doubtless you are protecting your crew, but are you fitting yourself to destroy your enemy? And the business of-war; it must be re- , aiembered, is not the safety of the crew, but the destruction of the enemy. If the Navy-Department is constructing battleships for the purpose of protecting crews there are those who say that the crews might" as well stay home in bed, where their lives would be far. better protected than at sea. There are, too, those who say- that speed is the best armour; that if youaro: able to outrun your enemy,the less armour you are weighted down with the better. This school of naval constructors would brand the thirty-one-knot Hood with its twelve-inch armour. belt as a crime. They find their type of ship in the Renown, with ite thirty-two knots and six-inch armour belt. With six inches of armour it 'takes 112,000 horsepower- to push the Renown to thirtytwo knots, whilo 144,000 horse-power is required to shove the Hood, with twelve inches of" armour, up to 31 knots. . . These are matters that I do not pretend to judge, but the country ought to know at ones whether a sliip, stripped of armour to make thirty-five knots, is feasible, and if feasible, what advantage, it would offer under conditions of actual warfare. It is quite possible that such a ship would be lost ; in its first action with a powerful enemy. Presumably, however, we are not building battleships for use as seamen's homes. . We are building them for the purpose of destroying the enemy. If a thirty-five knot, or oven faster ship, without the handicap of heavy -armoured protection, is ablo to destroy two' or more of the enemy's ships before she goes down, she will have served the purpose for which, presumably, the Department constructed her. All this, of course, supposes tliat we are still in the era of surface craft. It lias nothing to do with the claims of f.hose who insist that the future of naval warfare lies with submarines and a.ir- v craft. I have sat through half the night in the ward-room of many an American warship, and listened to junior officers argue that submarines and seaplanes alone would make the United States impregnable, and that to invest millions in one-fight battle-ships is throwing; money away. These officers say that the deveioument of the submarine has only just begun, and that air-cratr., launched at sea from fast carrier ships, are inexpensive, able to fuel up in a half hour, and not compelled to toddle along at the speed of a slow freight train. . This, also, is a matter which Ido not pretend to judge. Presumably the Department feels that thefuture of sea warfare lies with the surface ship, or it would not have committed ! itself to the New Mexico. It wouM, howeve,r, be,interesting to know on what ground, the department is basing its surface-ship policy. The great defect of most capital ships —i.e.. their vulnerability in the face of torpedo attack and mines—has been supposedly, remedied, in the case of the Hood by the adoption of the bulge or blister hull, and by a comprehensive system of bulkhead subdivision. In this respect it is in line with the trend of naval construction, which, tends to transfer a ship's'protective equipment from above the water-line to below'it.