THE SHARP WEAPON

Evening Post, Volume XCIX, Issue 10, 12 January 1920, Page 2

THE SHARP WEAPON

U-BOATS IN#HE WAR

WARLORDS GIVE EVIDENCE

HINDENBURG-L UDENDORFF

POLICY.

Dr. Heinrieh ]?. Albert, German UndeSecretary of State, and formerly commet. cial attache in the German Embassy a> Washington, predicted in 1916 with uner ring accuracy the decisive effect Amen ica's entry into the war would have. A report which he made at that time to tb German Government read on- 18th ' Nov ember before the sub-committee of th< national assembly investigating war ,re sponsibility, gave clear warning, of th< feelipg in the United States of America' * efficiency, of her financial power, and a her intense leanings toward the Entente and declared that, in case of America", participation "neutral nations would sidi with America, the psychological efrec would be felt at once; it would be , national misfortune and Germany wouli be defeated." Dr. Albert asserted then that Amerie could raise several army corps and that slu would energetically support the allies witl huge loans; that the Lafayette flyin. squadron, -'that dangerous branch of wartare," would, without doubt, be vaslh strengthened, and that America's trans portatiou would be efficient and capablf ol increase. Field Marshal yon Hindenburg, who wa the star witness of the day, had befon him the task of answering six question; which were prepared. beforehand by thi subcommittee. Among other things hi said that Germany did not desire war am that Germany's defensive strength froa the very start was unfavourable., It was the lack of co-operation between the arm-j and "interests at home" which had influenced the defeat of Germany. In all great decisions, Ludendorff ano he were of one mind, said Yon Hinder burg. They had worked hi full accord from 29th August, 1916, to the end. "We considered unrestricted submarine war imperative immediately wo entered the su premo command," said the field marshal When 1917 came we could not longer permit our gallant soldiers to bo bombarded with American ammunition and theu wives and children starved by the block ade. Ihe U-boat war was the only meani to oppose.those conditions." SIX QUESTIONS FOR HINDENBURG. The sub-committee's six questions had been submitted to Yon Hindenburg some ciays beforehand, to enable him to studj tnem and prepare his answers. The questions were:— ■'Firs:—Froni what time did the uppei army leadership consider sharpened submarine war unavoidable, and for what reasons?" , "Second-Did the army leadership know of reasons against the submarines and the opening of submarine war froir the declarations of Under-Sei;etaries a State Hiiniel and Albert? Why did th< army. leadership consider those declara tions against submarine war as no longe.sound?'' "Third—Did the army leadership accept, as in the telegram of Yon Hindenburg, 23rd December, 1916, to Chancellor yon Bethmanii, iiio statement that tho Wilson peace was 'called forth by England,' and not agree to the peace proposal made by the imperial leaders?" "Fourth—Was the /army leadership familiar with the various details of President Wilson's abtion, especially on 9th January, 1917, as. tho decision .to begin U-boat wax- was taken? Were tho re ports from Bernstorif during the period, iilst December to 9th January, familiar?" "Fifth—Did the army leadership as sume that England could be compelled to peace at the latest in July, 1917, as contained in the memorandum of th<Admiralty staff?" ."Sixth —General LudendorfE assumes in - his book that on 29th January, in a conversation from headquarters with the Government, delay in the submarine war had not been demanded, while Chancellor yon Bothmanu in his statement before the sub-committee declared that he had made- such a demand. How is this contradiction to bo explained?" WARNINGS FROM AMERICA. Chairman Gothein tried to have Yon Hindenburg; answer the questions separately, but lie declared that he must mix thorn up. Tho questions were read. • The second was by far the most interesting, for it embodied long cable reports of Secretaries 1-la.niel and Albert from America, under date of . 1916, describing as 1 experts what the effect of the submarine war would be.' These reports were unusually clear in their warningl. Haniel's report was read first. In it he said America, despite its business sense and its English and to some extent French ties, was at heart sentimental, and that many Americans with whom he had talked were agreed that if Germany began U-bcat warfare they would go to war, whereas if Germany ceased it they would compel England to remove the blockade. Any relaxation of Germany's promises made in 1916 meant war with. America, in the opinion of all intelligent Germans in America, said the report. National feeling had\grown enormously and America, already on the side of civilisation, feared tho' U-bont. danger less than it wanted to be on the side of the Entente, flerr Haniel was firmly convinced thai war with America wouid result from U-boat warfare: after which America's supplies of money, material, aud food would be enormous. Secretory Albert reported more strongly even in his communication of '6th November, 1916, when the U-boat war had not yet been agreed upon and there had beon^ no question, of recalling tho boats. LUDENDORFF TESTIFIES. In his testimony, General Ludendorff said that tho high command first refrained from beginning tho U-boat campaign because the Chancellor at that time feared an attack by Holland and Denmark, owing to tho pressure of Great Britain, and thero wero then no .troops" to meet 'new enemies. >' The High Command was sceptical regarding President Wilson's peace move, but expressed approval of this and also approved Germany's, peace move, and endeavoured not to thwart political peace steps. He had always regarded Count yon Bernstorff's activities as "unsympathetic." He believed that Yon Bernstorff. had not furnished the Chancellor with correct information. This impression had been strengthened when Yon Bernstorff told the committee that America could only have been held aloof from the war by entrusting President Wilson with the role of intermediary for peace, whereas Ludendorff pointed out this was not mentioned in Yon Bernstorff's reports. The former Chancellor, Yon BethmannHollweg. declared that, with reference to the sixth question, there was no con- , tradiction in his declaration and LHdendorff's book, inasmuch as he, jointly with Hcrr Zimmermann, on receiving Yon Bernstorff's report, asked Admiral yon Holtzendorff (former head of the naval general staff) to defer unrestricted submarine war, but Vdn Holtzendorff had replied that this was impossible. The Chancellor therefore considered tho matter settled.