SOBER BY LAW

Evening Post, Volume XCVIII, Issue 144, 16 December 1919, Page 6

SOBER BY LAW

In dealing with the liquor polls, both the poll of last April and the poll of to-morrow, we have carefully separated two elements: (1) the terms of the question and the method of putting it; (2) the answering of the , question. Concerning No. 1, and the legislation to which it gave rise in 1918, we have been careful to state facts that, in our opinion, might otherwise be overlooked. Concerning No. 2, we doubt whether any of the facts have been overlooked', because th.6 merits and demerits of Prohibition have been threshed out in this country for more than a quarter of a century. And that consideration gives rise to another matter equally relevant, which we can best express in the form of the following question: In the operation of the plebiscite or* referendum—that is, where the electors are themselves decreeing a policy by their direct voice, not through elected representatives—what is the legi- ; timate purpose of propaganda? Should the mind of the elector be assisted mainly with facts or mainly with opinions? Our own-view is that the purpose of legitimate propaganda should be to produce, principally if not solely, relevant facts. The essence of the referendum is reliance on the elector to himself decide a direct question which formerly he entrusted to his Parliamentary representatives. If the elector is equal—or hopes to be equal—to that responsibility, then it is on his own responsibility that he should decide. The opinion sought by the referendum is not Parliament's opinion, nor the opinion of the newspapers, nor of the protagonists, nor of the agitators ; it is the opinion of the elector. If the elector borrows his opinion from somewhere else, or if he allows an opinion to be rammed down his throat by someone else, •■ then he is not acting in tho spirit of the referendum. THe referendum is not, like the Parliamentary ballot, an. instrument of delegation ; it is an instrument of decision. And in helping an independent elector to an indepeni dent decision, an ounce of real fact is worth a ton of opinion. Which supplies the reason —and, we think, a sufficient reason—why this .journal has devoted its efforts to information and ana-lysis rather than to personal views.

In order, however, to prove that The Post's support of Continuance is backed up by conviction, we will try to briefly state the case as it appears to us, less in tho spirit of propaganda tha_ of autobiography.- In the first place, we have never met with any convincing evidence that Prohibition prohibits.. If the facts under this head are capable of either a positive or a negative interpretation, they have been so distorted and torn and mangled by dishonest propagandists that ■the result is chaos. Again, as to "" expert " facts: the doctors differ, so do the financiers, and so do oven the ministers of religion. Neither the evidence cited, nor the opinions intermixed with it, are free from the strain of special pleading, and 'we have discovered no constructive basis for abolition of alcohol—that is, for a departure from the known to the uncertain. Under Prohibition—except in medical, religious, and scientific uses — what is good in alcohol —and there is good in alcohol—is a clear loss; and tho elimination of what is bad—such elimination not being certain—is not a clear gain. In the absence of convincing, evidence, we refuse to believe that sobriety can. be grafted on from 'the outside by Act of Parliament. True sobriety, like true socialism, can come about only by an internal individual process; and to suppress alcoholic insobriety by abolishing alcohol is just as logical as to suppress insobriety of utterance by curtailing the rights of free speech—a step sometimes taken in emergencies, but nevertheless always repugnant. It istrue thai, though sobriety comes from within the individual, the environment counts; and, to meet that requirement, this journal has always stood for regulative reform of the liquor traffic, and for a strict enforcement of existing regulations. But it sees little or no evidence that regulative reform would be strengthened by State purchase and control. Moreover, the cost of State purchase, and the loss of revenue on Prohibition, are heavy items. Neither of them would be a decisive factor, if the case for State control, or for Prohibition, was otherwise good. But why accept these losses, for the mere purpose of embarking on propositions upon which even the most favourable verdict must be a verdict of "not proven "?