WILL UNITED STATES BE REPRESENTED?

Evening Post, Volume XCVIII, Issue 115, 12 November 1919, Page 4

WILL UNITED STATES BE REPRESENTED?

A few weeks ago M. Clemenceau was credited with the remark that, even without the United States, " the League of Nations would still be operative." The technical correctness of the remark is doubtless beyond dispute, but nobody' knows better than the statesmen of France what 'a gap the Abstention of tno 1 United States would make in the League, how fundamentally its outlook and operations would be changed, how grievously tho hopes of those who see in an jactive partnership of all the greatest nations, the only alternative to another war even more terrible than the last will be disappointed. So far as the theory of the League of Nations is concerned, tho French have probably been as free as any other nation from Utopian expectations. The national taste for theoretical perfection has in this case been held in check by the concrete reality of a powerful neighbour beyond the Rhine, against whom the mere provisions ■ of' a treaty will supply no more effective protection than they did in 1914. With this terrible menace so close at hand, the French, after the fashion established on the other side of the Channel,; have made x the test question regarding the League of Nations' not "Is it theoretically | sound?" but "Will it work?"j and by " Will it work?" they mean " Will it keep the Germans out of Paris?" ,They were deaf to the call of President Wilson's exalted idealism until they were convinced that it could satisfy this pratical test. It was for this reason that the President's proposals encountered the strongest opposition in quarters where on general grounds he might hava expected sympathy. M. Clemenceau's statement that he was accustomed to remind him. self daily, "Georges Clemenceau, you believe in the League of Nations," indicates how severe was the struggle between faith and scepticism in the mind of .the strong man of France, and the strong man also, by general admission, of the Peace Conference. Nor is it likely that faith would have won the victory without the support of some more solid guarantee than the abstract perfection of the provisions of the Covenant. M. Clemenceau was not prepared to trust to j a theory to keep the Germans out of Paris during the indefinite period that might elapse between the constitution of the League and its endowment with sufficient power to enforce obedience to the provisions of tho Covenant. To bridge this gap France was given what haa been called her re-insurance treaty, under -which Britain and the United States agreed to protect her from aggression. Here, at least, was something tangible, and something to inspire a genuine confidence. The certainty that either of the two great Powers which at the last stood with the French between Germany and Paris would intervene must have stayed Germany's hand in 1914.. The certainty that future aggression on her part would be met in the same way is the best guarantee of the permanence of the present peace that could possibly be devised. While M. Clemenceau has been tilling the French people that the defection of the United States will not destroy the League of Nations, they have received from a section of their own press an assurance upon which they doubtless set a much higher value—viz., that tho reinsurance treaty will stand, -whatever may be tho fate of. tho other. But it is to be feared that these journalists do not speak by the book; for the same lWrow and jealous nationalism which is scared by tho loose bonds of th? Covenant will aurely repudiate etUI more strongly the. definite oMigaluyiA of

the special treaty to which- President Wilson provisionally committed his country at Paris. For the present/however, despite the initial successes of the Presi-. dent's opponents in the Senate, a dogmatic pessimism on either point is premature; and while the bitter struggle proceeds, a message from. Paris suggests that the other Powers may be becoming tired of waiting. "The Supreme Council has," wo are informed, "agreed to summon the League of Nations •without the participation of the United States." How aw we,to interpret this interesting announcement? Does it mean that the Supreme Council regards the success of President Wilson's' policy as beyond ■ Jiope, and is proceeding to make good the statement of M. Clemenceau that the League of Nations can be run without the United States? or is the contrary construction possible—viz., that the Council foresees the emergence of the League of Nations from the heated atmosphere of the Senate in some recognisable and workable form, and at a date that will enable the United States to be represented at the first meeting of the League? It may, of course) be that the Supreme Council knows no more of the ultimate outcome of one. of the most deplorable party fights ever witnessed than we do, and that it is making preparations which can be accommodated to either result. In any case the Council is tc be congratulated on its determination to get the League into working order.