EFFECT UPON INDIA

Evening Post, Volume XCVIII, Issue 18, 22 July 1919, Page 6

EFFECT UPON INDIA

THE OLD FOE OP THE NORTH

WEST.

At any date prior to August, 1914, the prospect of an Afghan war would have sent a thrill of warlike enthusiasm through the length and breadth of the Empire, writes Major Cecil Battine in the London Daily Telegraph. Satiated with excitement, and spent with the tremendous struggle of the last five years, the announcement that the Afghans ate once more Upon the War path has excited less interest than the congestion of London traffic—or. rather, less interest in London, In the teeming bazaars of the Indian Peninsula, probably the tidings have stirred far deeper emotions even than the announcement of the'war with Germany. Nor is the reason' far to seek. Excepting the conquerors from Europe, who came by eea, ali the successful invaders of India in historic times have come through the dark gorges of her north-western frontier. A ruthless: foe, who slays and lays waste, has for. a century and a-half been kept in awe by the renown of British arms.- The Indian native jniist now be asking himself, how comes it that the Afghan heriditary foe has ventured to defy the Sirkar ? Like the current of sedition which caused the Indian Mutiny, the present discontents are the aftermath in India of the European Wan The results are felt in the East after the eruption has subsided in the West.' Unfortunately, the policy of the British Government in India has paved the Way for disloyal tendencies—a state of things which makes any overt defiance of our authority by armed force more serious than it otherwise would be. It will, therefore, be interesting to take count Of the gravity of the Afghan menace, and of ite effect upon .the population of India.

FORMER AFGHAN WARg.

The Anglo-Indian Army has waged two Afghan wars. In 1839 we occupied Cabul,' were expelled; and reocoupied the capital, iii order to place Our nominee on the throne before evacuating the kingdom/ In 1878 and 1881 the same drama was > enacted. In each case our representative in, Cabul was- murdered, and a fresh campaign had to bo undertaken to restore our prestige and nominee. It is easy to blame the unwiadoto of the proceedings, but Afghanistan preseflts a unique problem. The people care :little or nothing for Leagues of Nations, Fourteen Points, or any other modern idealistic theories..- In. fact, they resemble our own ancestors,; who we"i? 6 not ashamed, to .conquer ' where they could,, arid who had little consideration for less warlike neighbours.' The nation ig divided into clans, somewhat resembling the clan system of the Welsh or Scottish Highlands of old, and the modern artny is a far less formidable array than the gathering of the tribes. Prom Jellalabad, on the Afghan side of the great mountain barrier, to Attock, on the Indus, is about 100 miles.. The road follows a dai'k gorge, famous iii the annals of our Army as the Khoord Cabul Pass. The mountainous country north and south of this main road is inhabited by warlike brigands ' akin to the Afghans, and even more formidable as warriors. Their generic name is Pathane, and they al-e reported to be loyal to us up to now. - Perhaps the Afghans can muster 20,000 troops for a raid, into the Indus Valley, a force which would quickly be flung back in fragments by the AngloIndian brigades quartered at Peshawur, Attock, Kolmt, and Rawul Pindi. These garrisons are held by picked troops always, in a state of readiness to march*, and Rawttl Pindi is a vast place of arms liks Aldershot, the base of the Army on the frontier. The Pathan tribes supply some of tho best recruits of Oiiif frontier force, which in no way precludes them from joining in a raid on our territory from time to time, more in a spirit of.sport than of serious enmity. These petty campaigns give our Indian regiments valuable experience, and leave ho rankling hostility. The frontier has a kind of chivalry of its own, in spite of the fierce and even cruel temper' of these mountaineers. It would be a fatal error for the British to destroy this mutual respect.

PPLITICAL ISSUES.

The Afghans, however, somewhat complicate the problem. They are f oared and hated by the inhabitant! of India; {though it is more than probable that they have received encouragement for this desperate venture from Indian traitors. Even a temporary check to our forces Would have a certain Importance, for every bazaar in Inc'ia is sensitive to the news from the North-West. Are the Sahiba still strong enough to protect u« or not? That is the vital question for all the millions of India. Any doubt about the answer would h»ve deplorable results;'.. in other words, .would entail the despatch of large forces to India and heavy expenditure. Probably the raiders will be driven back in rout after a short, sharp struggle, but the principal difficulties are not unlikely to arise after that event.

Assuming that the Afghan Amir continues to be defiant after the repulse of the raid, how is he to be brought to reason? An occupation of Cftbul is no light undertaking, and 20,000 Afghan warriors available for aggression would be trebled in number for the defence of their native fastnesses. Moreover, in defence these veterans are incomparably more dangerous than in attack on regular troops. It may be taken for granted that the Viceroy's Government will exert itself to the utmost to avoid the necessity of invading Afghanistan If, however, We are forced to do it, in spite of ourselves, then the fatal mistakes of the previous Afghan ware should at any cost be avoided. If we Invade Afghanistan at nil we must make Wftr properly. We must, hold the enemy on his Onbul front, and turn his defences from Quetta. • Enough troops must be employed to roll Up and demolish once for all his power for mischief.