Evening Post. FRIDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1918. CAN EUROPE QUARANTINE BOLSHEVISM?

Evening Post, Volume XCVI, Issue 154, 27 December 1918, Page 6

Evening Post. FRIDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1918. CAN EUROPE QUARANTINE BOLSHEVISM?

< Concerning Russia the usual multiplier ity of counsel* prevails;'and: the usual conflict of opinion. The America!). Charles Crane declares that armed intervention by the AEies would have small chance of success; while the Russian Professor Miliukoff affirms that intervention is imperative, and should have occurred before. On top of these expressions comes that of the American journalist Carl Ackerman, who says that " Russia's civil war is not a fight for freedom, but a contest for power between anarchy and military autocracy, as represented by" Kolchak and Deniken. The action of Semenoff complicates the situation." So-intense is the-general complication that the A|lied Governments, according to Paris, are " disinclined to despatch a large expedition to Russia, because the Russians are unable to form a starble Government with which to cooperate. .' . . President Wilson, while in London, will discuss- the situation thoroughly with British statesmen." To this j discussion President Wilson will bring a trans-Atlantip mind/ unbiased with Europ"ean traditional entanglements, and above suspicion of harbouring any selfish intention towards Russia. It is therefore reasonable to conclude thai the American President will be adverse to further armed intervention in Russia, if there is any chance that the present controlling forces in Russia will harden into a Government of justice and stability. But as all the evidence is to the contrary— as, according to Miliukoff, Russia is threatened with " the most appalling catastrophe in history " —what will the President decide, or what will, America do?

If Russia was Cuba, America would, according to precedent !J -'intervene. But as Russia, even shorn Russia, is a Colossus; incapable o£ being propped up without some assistance from its own feet, neither Cuba nor the Philippine Group affords any parallel. The problem is really in two parts: How to defend from Bolshevism (a) Russia and (b) the civilised world outside. The second part of the contract does not necessarily demand military action within the present area of Bolshevik infection. In order to defend the outside world from Bolshevism, the first necessity is to rebuild the beaten enemy countries, and the Russian Borderland States between the Baltic and Black Seas, on sound democratic lines, so that their freedom and sanity shall be a buffer ,to resist the westward march of the Russian fever. This rebuilding is necessary and it is also quite possible of attainment; and if the Peace Conference is truly successful, it will create a barrier of liberty behind which Leninism will burn itself out. But armed intervention in Russia, on the only scale o : which it could possibly be successful, is ,-i. much more formidable proposition. In jf'&land, in Ukrainia, in Germany, in Hungary, and in Austria jthere is still something to build upon; but in enormous, heterogeneous Russia,- according to ;the Paris advice quoted above, there is so far no sign of those elements of internal stability without which external aid can accomplish no permanent improvement. That is the feature that will, we think, cause the 'Allied and Associated Governments most trouble. Unless the official knowledge of internal Russia is much more reassuring than the unofficial reports, the responsible statesmen will be confronted with a question of tho ps&teife ■dUflfsully. It all depends on the eitesUfti maul

and material factors—factors seldom reveaied to the public—whether Allied armed intervention in Russia will cure the class-war or increase it; whether armed intervention will redeem the repu.diated Russian loans, or whether it will merely be throwing good money after bad. Strategically, Russia can be militarily mastered, but at a price. It- is for the Allied and Associated Governments to determine whether the'end justifies the means.