Evening Post. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 26, 1918. EUROPEAN MAP-MAKING

Evening Post, Volume XCVI, Issue 153, 26 December 1918, Page 4

Evening Post. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 26, 1918. EUROPEAN MAP-MAKING

The peace terms suggested by the National Committee of United States Patriotic Societies contain a good deal more material than can be dealt with in one or two articles. To;the main issue— liability of the Central Powers to pay the cost of the war—we have already referred. Claufee 9 is interesting because it is the only one in which a self-deter-minative plebiscite is definitely proposed. Under this clause, as we understand it, the people of Schleswig-Holstein and Luxembourg shall vote as to whether they shall be independent or whether they shall join other nationalities—in the case of Schleswig-Holstein, whether sh© Bhall be returned to Denmark; and in the case of Luxembourg, whether she shall join Belgium or France. Before the war, Schleswig-Holstein was part of Germany, having been taken by force from Denmark in 1864. j Luxembourg was nominally independent, but' any neutrality she ever exercised was violated by Germany in August, 1914,. and—it is, alleged—without any very strenuous opposition in Luxembourg Court circles. Germany, therefore, has no right at all to Luxembourg, and no better, right to SchleswigHolstein than to Alsace-Lorraine. And perhaps there would be no seed for a Schleswig-Holstein plebiscite, any more than for an Alsace-Lorraine plebiscite, if the Danes in Denmark and in the raped territory had kept the claims alive, as did the French in Alsace and in France. Why the Danes failed in this respect is obvious at first glance. They had not the strength of France; they had no influential backing; and, placed as they were at Germany's mercy, they simply could not afford the luxury of La Revanche.

In the circumstances, the American Patriotic Societies 6ee fit to prescribe a plebiscite for Schleswig-Holstein and Luxembourg, but not for Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta, which go back to France and Italy respectively. It may, however, be asked ; What is Italia Irredenta? Where are its boundaries? And is Dalmatia rightfully included therein' These questions at once bring into observation the doubtful ground* existing as between Italy and Jugo-Slavia and between Italy a^jd Greece. How will Jugo.-Slavia be created—by agreement between the South Slav (Jugo-Slav) Conncil and Serbia, or by plebiscite of the peoples concerned? If the latter plan is adopted—there is no present evidence of it—then in principle it would be equally just for doubtful fractions to similarly determine their own destiny as between Jugo-Slavia and Italy. Had the American Patriotic Societies sought to elaborate tHeir clause 4 (Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta), they would no doubt have found themselves confronted with the above questions; and that fact in itself indicates how incomplete a, set of "pointe" necessarily muet bo, and how essential it is to ha"vo a Peace Conference to work them out. As it is, thesocieties dismiss a highly complicated matter (clause. 8) with a simple stipulation for "the independence of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and Jugo-Slavia." To provide these geographical expressions with their vital boundaries is in itself a mighty undertaking, and involves, in the case of Czecho-Slovakia, class issues as welJ as racial ones. If Bismarck correctly aaid that the muter of Bohemia Uk its ffljujtecef Europe,, th»a it i»-ef

the highest moment not only to Bay that Czecho-Slovakia shall be independent, but where Czecho-Slovakia shall begin and end. German national interests — presuming that a German Empire survives—are deeply wrapped up with Czecho-Slovakia and Poland. And Poland, in turn, carries on her shoulders the fate of all the new Eussian Borderland States impinging, upon her.

One of the most powerful of these States, Ukrainia, is not directly mentioned in the cabled summary of tie societies' proposals, but is apparently involved in clause 13, providing for the abrogation of the German-made Bucharest and Bre6t-Litovsk treaties. Under the German partition, Ukrainia took Cholm from Poland; while, under the treaty of Bucharest, Eussian Bessarabia —adjoining Ukrainia—went to Rumania. Clause 13 would throw these and other questions open to review. The adjustment of power as among Poles, Ukrainians, and Rumanians is no lese important than as between Czechs and Germans, or as between Jugo-Slavs 'and Italians. To prescribe the limits of these newly-liberated peoples is also to set limits to the power of the Germans and the Magyars; that Ls to say, the problem is both political and ethnographical, and in each division elements of stability must be secured if the new disposition is to survive. Any other course carrie* ■with it, a risk.that the Berlin policy will revive after the war, and that a new plan for the Germanisation of Middle Europe will spring up from the ashe3 of the old. ■ '