ITALY AS AN ENTENTE POWER

Evening Post, Volume XCVI, Issue 113, 8 November 1918, Page 12

ITALY AS AN ENTENTE POWER

BREAKDOWN OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

WARRING AGAINST THE MOUNTAINS

The story of Italy's campaign can be told briefly, because in essence it is remarkably simple, though vivid in events and; dramatic in 'many respects. At the beginning of the trouble, Italy was bound to Austria-Hungary and Germany as the third and least powerful member of the Triple Alliance. But she took her key from the fact that the alliance .was defensive and not offensive, and that, therefore, Italy was under no obligation to participate in the aggressivo action of her partner* in July-August, 1914. Consequently, in the first days of the war Italy declared her neutrality. The promptness and completeness of this avowal is no doubt truTy described as having been of the utmost ralue to France, because it released for the vital business of the Marne the army which must otherwise have remained to guard the Italian frontier, even if Italy had adopted an attitude of neutrality without proclaiming it. Italy then passed through a troubled period, in which she became more and more drawn into the struggle. France had been reassured by the preliminary declaration, and her frontier was clear; but Austria-Hungary had to respond to an evident danger, and through the period of neutrality the Italian border was manned on both sides, to the considerable detriment of t-hs Austrian active armies. In spito of their longstanding alliance, Austria-Hungary and Italy were hereditary enemies, and the treaty which formulated' the Triple Alliance was of no benefit to Italy. One of its most important clauses declared for the stabilisation of the Balkan States; and because Austria-Hungary's aggression at the outset of tho war sought directly to disrupt this stability, Italy found in that clause the justification for refusing to recognise the alliance, and for herself attempting to exact a price for Austria-Hungary's violation of it. She demanded the return to Italian rule of ihe Trontino and Istna, the lands known as Italia Irredenta, or Unredeemed Italy; and 1 the conversion of the Austro-Hungarian naval port Trieste into an independent and free port. But these demands Austria-Hun' gary firmly resisted, one reason heing that the existing frontier was specially designed for its strategic value, and by no .means because of the nationality of the people affected. Italy at last denounced the treaty, on 3rd May, 1915, and on the 23rd declared war on Aus-tria-Hungary. The interim of twenty days was spent in political storm, in the early part of which it was impossible, to tell whether actual war would result or not. But the sinking of the Lusitania, on the 7th, roused the fury of the people to a blaze. For the first time they seized the truth about Germany's atrocious war-methods, previously denied and hidden by German propagandists; and when the opportunity afforded by the swiftly following Cabinet crisis offered itself, the nation stood like one man, and called for war. Nevertheless, Italy remained_ for a long timo technically at peace with Germany, and her policy in that respect, governed by complex causes altogether apart from military conditions, caused distrust in some circles, and _ bewilderment in most. There was no immediate military necessity for a declaration, for the forces of the two nations could not meet until Germany chose; and it was all to Germany's advantage to extend as long as possible tho political farce j of being at peace with an actual enemy. The Salandra Government, however, gradually accumulated sufficient evidence of Germany's actual belligerency to justify the ending of the peculiar position, * and the declaration of war against Germany was made on 27th August, 1916. It was a mere formality, for a state of war had existed foi months in all but name. MAIN FEATURES OF THE WAR. Immediately upon the declaration of war against Austria-Hungary, the Italians, who had already mode large preparations for the warfare which had long- seemed inevitable, sprang to the offensive/ On almost the whole of the mountain frontier they pressed^ the enemy back, from the unnatural line of the political border to a general line of mountain ridges beyond it, and almost everywhere stood on the enemy's soil. This condition prevailed from the St. Elvio pass, at the Swiss frontier, to the far eastern frontier, where the Italians soon reached tho River Isonzo. But the serious invasion of Austrian territory, which was throughout the objective of the Italian command, could not be effected across the Alps, and the greatest part of the efforts at penetration made by Cadorna, the Commander-in-Chief, wore directed east, towards and across the Isonzo. On the other hand, tho AustroHungarians, holding the great wedge of the Trentino, possessed an enormous strategic advantage, which had been the principal object of the frontier as it stood. If they could break the Italian guard on the Trentino front, they had but a little way to go to reach the plains of Vonetia—an accomplishment which would mean the wrecking of Oadorna's eastern positions, however far advanced or strong they might bt>, because the eastern armies relied solely upon coniiminications traversing Venetia. The weakness of the Trentino wedge, from the enemy's point of view, was its poverty of the supply lines, which traversed the Alpine valleys for peat distances, and' could not be easily increased in capacity to meeb military needs. The whole of the military operations thus simplify into two main sectors —Italian offensive movements chiefly directed east across the Isonzo, with counter-actions by thu enemy; and Austro-Hungarian offensive movements, mainly from the Trentino, also with counter-actions. By far the most important campaign was that of the eastern frontier, where the Italians took the offensive at the outset,, and reached at last a eery menacing proximity to Trieste, which was their chief objective, ami the loss of which would ha^e been a very severe blow, both military and moral, to the enemy. It was on this frontier, and at the height of the Italian offensive, that the enemy dealt the mostcrushing single blow the Allies sustained during the war, and threw back the Italians in a. tremendous defeat. '■Italy, fought throughout under sevore handicaps, which might easily 'have proved fatal had her enemies not been very heavily engaged upon other fronts. The .chief of these was her dependence upon imports for the.principal needs of war—ammunition and steel products, and coal. Italy breeds brilliant engineers, but does not provido them with raw materials to work with. Thus it came oboiit that th» Italian army fought in (ervain which ha/1 tiithn.:to Hoarsely known a human fool; built magnificent

roads to the fighting front, or where no roads were possible fed its outposts with supplies by "teleferica," or carriers alung on cables spanning the Alpine gulfs; yet, for all its possession of guns of the highest quality, had to supplement its artillery with innumerable "bombards," which wore simply glorified trench mortars. And while Italians carried out the most daring feats at sea (on various occasions they penetrated the enemy's harbours and torpedoed his battleships) and executed splendid aerial feats in- their superlative aeroplanes and airships, the aation itself suffered from lack of coal for the factories in the summer and for the households in the winter, and was continually in straits because the shipping that could be allotted to its eervico from the shrunken resources of the Allies tvas never adequate. But in na» tional spirit and in individual gallantry the Italians never flaltered, and the records of the army in its wonderful battles, and. of the nation in the face of the crushing defeat of 1917, are such .as any nation might well be proud of. Though the Italian operations wore technically of extreme difficulty, and required an infinite amount of ingenuity in direction as well as execution, the sharp-ly-defined strategic factors make the picture as a whole remarkably simple, and. tho major events are few and: striking. These characteristics generally made the whole of the operations move apparently very slowly; and in fact they were slow because everywhere) the soldiers on each side had to overcome not only the resistance of the armies opposed to them, but the enormous natural difficulties of the mountainous regions in which they fought. In addition, there were long periods in which anything more than 4 mere deadlock was made impossible by the snows of winter and, the swollen rivers. THE PRINCIPAL BATTLES. Having, as already described, seized on the whole front positions more advantageous than tho political frontier afforded, Cadoma proceeded to push ahead in the only quarter where any great advance was possible—to the east, across t*ie Isonzo. He attempted also, but not so vigorously, to gain part of the Trentino; his main objective was always in the cast. The first great struggle began on the 2nd July, 1915, with Gorizia. as the prize, but it was at the time unattainable, and the Isonzc- river was firmly held. Further south this barrier was crossed, and the Italians fought their way on to the edge of the plateau of the Carso, from which, it seemed, they might in time react Trieste. In December, 1915, Italy's interests in the Balkans led to tho despatch of an army to ocoupy Valona, which is the southerniwjst port in Albania, and which, because of its strategio outlook on the Straits of Otrahto, has been, called the gate of tho Adriatic. From this base the Italians proceeded to push their way north and inland, but slowly. Valona was a naval objective first, and only secondly did it become a base for the penetration of the Albanian hinterland. In May, 1916, Austria-Hungary made her first great effort against Italy. It was a colossal strategic blunder, for it was directed solely from the Trentino wedge. Though Cadorna was for a time in peril from the menace in his rear, he was not frightened into withdrawing his forces in undue proportion from the Isonzo front. There was, nevertheless, much perturbation in Italy as the enemy drove down from the passes and seized the whole of the Asiago plateau. At the crucial moment the essential weakness of the enemy's attack' was exposed by the sudden attack of Brusiloff oia the Russian front. Instant demand was created for Austro-Hivn-garian reinforcements for the Russian theatre, and the Austro-Hungarians found themselves terribly entangled on the Italian front. In the ensuing confusion, Cadorna's , quickly gathered resctvcs inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, and regained the major part of the lost ground. The offensive and the counter-offensive were over in less than a month. CaHornai replied almost immediately with his Isonzo armies, and on the 9th August, 1916, Groiizia was captured, and the Italians began to advance on tho CarsOi, on the way to Trieste. In that month, too, Italian divisions appeared in the Salonika army, and in November this international force had joined hands with the Italians based on Valona. Cadorna pursued hia main offensive assidtaously, with periodical big drives as his "head of supplies" piled up from timo to time; and there were special offensives in November of 1916 .and May df 1917. In August, 1917, Italy's energy reached its climax^ Suddenly, on the 19th, a vast offensive was launched on the whole of the Isonzo and Carso fronts. « The Bainsizza plateau, east of the middle Isonzo, was in large past conquered; important enemy communications were uncovered as the Italians seized crest after crest, peak after peak. The Carso was the scene of progress; and a vast local battle, reaching the condition of a semisiege, raged round the Hemnada hill, I which lies between the Carso and the coast. Heranada, like a Gibraltar, blocked the coastal road to Trieste, and it was in dire peril. At last it seemed as if Trieste, often in despair before, was lost, and that Italy was on the cerge of a. colossal victory." As the long battle went on the enemy's case seemed to get worse and worse. But on the 24th October the great disaster began. THE GREAT DEFEAT. The Italian front was suddenly pierced by a narrow-fronted attack by speciallychosen German and Austro-Hungarian troops, who ponred through the valley thus entered., and in a few houra wrecked the whole organisation of tlie Italian front. Cadorna had been badly out-geij-eralled. He lmd i'uiled completely to protect the rear against such a mishap, and he had no lateral communications by means of which to repair the omission. The immediate breach which led to tho break-down was attributed to the disaffection ol! certain troops as tho result u[ enemy propaganda; but it is very donbtfnl whether the Italians could. I in tile remaining circumstances, have | withstood the particular form of attack used. The nature of the communications and tho unguarded rear seem beyond doubt to have been the real causes of the disaster. On tho fifth day tho enemy had Udiao. Only superb management saved the Italians i'roiu complete and irrevocable defeat; as it wns, their losses were enormous. On the 31eI October, the Tuglinmenlo River had been reached; but though it was then ht"l!, j)H(l vyljn RKpeii'tfll In Bt""vi> ttis II line of dofance, it betrayed tine fiyipg j

army, fell at the enemy arrived, and allowed him to pass almost dryshod. The retreat was continued on the sth November, and in a few days the Italians stood on the line of the Piave, having chosen that river because.it covered Venice, though it had marked disadvantages as a defensive line in case of further great peril, as the enemy saw. He proceeded to try to wreck the position by a drive down from the Alpine front,, where the Italian* had necessarily retired till they stood but a little way from the fringe of the mountains. In the meantime the clear peril of Italy had been instantly responded to by her Allies. British and French armies were despatched in all haste, and quickly took up sections of the front in the mountain/3, where they fought long and stubbornly till at length the enemy's offensive wore itself out. At the iam« time the Italians at the mouth of the Piave wore for weeks busy in holding back the enemy's efforts to pierce the swamps and lagoons and get within range of Venice. The Italian disaster had a highly important political result. About the time when the Piave became the line of defence, the Allied Premiers hastily met at the little village of Rapallo, and there established an inter-Allied political council, with a permanent military advisory committee. This was the origin of the Versailles- Council (of which General Cadorna became for a timo a member, having been replaced by General Diaz), and ultimately bore fruit in the longdelayed, though always needed, unified Allied command. It was the Italian | disaster that created the Versailles Council; and it remained for the Germans' great Western offensive five months later to put a single leader in command of the Allied forces. Something like stability; then, waa reached in November and December of 1917, and it remained to be seen whether Italy, partially crippled by her losses, but still with great human resources, or Austria-Hungary, working at the end of attenuated and long communications, would be ready to strike first. A SWIFT RECOVERY. On the 15tk June, 1918, the enemy commenced an offensive on the whole front from Asiago Plateau to the sea, an attack which, if Italy had not wonderfully recovered, would probably havo been fatal. But the nation as a whole had been not shattered, but revivified by the disaster of October. A counter-offensive was launched; the enemy was held in the mountains; and by the 23rd not only had the enemy forces that had crossed the Piave been driven back, they had been utterly and ignominiously defeated. This defeat had a singularly deep effect in the enemy countries. Little of moment occurred after that till the anniver- | sary of the October disaster, which the Italians and their Allies celebrated by taking the offensive again on the whole Piave front. The sudden onset of bad weather imposed only a temporary check, and the Piave was soon ci'pgml on the whole front. Immediately it was evident that the enemy was destined to bo beaten. He fell back rapidly, and enonuous numbers of prisoners were taken. Austria-Hungary was already on the vergo of collapse as the result of her long military efforts, but still move of the revolutionary reorganisation of the system of government. The end of October found the Allies sweeping victoriously forward, and proposals for surrender in process of consideration.