END OF THE GREAT WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCVI, Issue 113, 8 November 1918, Page 9

END OF THE GREAT WAR

AUGUST 1914

NOVEMBER 1918

HISTORY OF THE OPERATIONS

—^^^ (s HE main principle at' Vl^^^^r issue'in the, great war Jf ws* the survival of 'M democracy, which was V J V assailed in the first n place by militarised autocracy, in the second place by terroristic anarchy. Democracy, which permits neither the tyranny of military caste over the people, nor that of class over class, has not yet seen the last of Bolshevism; but its overthrow of autocracy, as represented by Prussian militarisrflj. is to-day . one of the great ; landmarks of history. The purpose of this publication will be sufficiently served if it succeeds in picturing, in v^vid and truthful form, the fateful events of the last fifty months. The central fact of the war is that, for Germany, there was never'any chance of success save by a decisive victory in the West. While the French stood to their guns, maintaining a European bridge-head and battlefield for the oversea Anglo-Saxons, German hegemony of the Continent was impossible; and therefore, for Germany, the overthrow of France was the sine qua non. Almost everything else the Germans succeeded in doing. By attaching Turkey to themselves and Austria-Hungary, 1 they imposed, without sea-power, a partial blockade of Russia. By drawing in Bulgaria, they overthrew , Serbia, and opened the Balkan-Turkish corridor to the East. By political intrigue following on military action, they drove Russia and Rumania temporarily out of the. war; opened, but did not develop, a Russian road to Asia; partially dismembered Russia, enforced their strategy jpon almost the whole Eastern front, and helped Austria-Hungary to inflict a colossal defeat upon Italy, But always, when they turned westward to destroy France, they met with. failure. In 191*, they failed at the Marne; in 1916, at Verdun and the Somme; in 1918, on the whole front. Every Eastern victory, the Germans found, merely committed them to another tilt at the Western wall; and through those successive assault* they bled to death. The war was finally lost when they staked everything on the 1918 campaign to overthrow France before America's arrival By August' it was certam, on the evidence of the American reinforcements, that the interwoven strategy of Ludendorff and Tirpitz had missed its mark; and the German dream of victory- had pasted forever GERMANY'S RACE AGAINST TIME. The meaning of this third major assault upon France—the last and greatest' —was defined by the Evening Post on 3rd August, in an article reviewing the alternate attempts' of Germany to conquer the East and overthrow the West: "Still another year (1917) was spent in <:ompletrng the ruin of Russia, during which the Western initiative in Haig's i hands proved indecisive; and the dawn of the present year (1918) disclosed Germany once more at liberty to concentrate against France, and to concentrate ! in.greater strength than ever before. In this last adventure speed is more than ever essential to the German, not because, as in 1914 at the Marne, he has to forestall Russian intervention, but 'because his task postulates effective arrival before the Americans. What the world is witnessing at this moment is nothing less than the destruction of the postulated condition and the ruin of Germany's hope of victory. Once more, the enemy has lost the race by baches. Notwithstanding the Russian collapse, the release from the Eastern front of a million German soldiers, and the utmost frightfulness of the. submarines, powerful American armies have arrived, not too late, in $ie decisive theatre of Europe. The defensive balance in the West is already restored, and the Allied mass moves irresistibly onward! to the point where it will provide a conquering margin." That anticipation proved well-found-ed, bat its realisation was assisted by a dramatic development not at the time foreseen. Tn the closing days of the month of September, when the tid« of miecesp nad set in strongly in the Allies' favour in the Franco-Belgian and Palest;nn spheres, the long-quiescent Allied ■vmy in Macedonia-Albania (based on -'ilnnikrt. and Valona) suddenly broke th« Bulgarian front, and Bulgaria's *niT«>nder quickly followed. This poli-tico-oiiiitsiry disaster shook th« enemy alliance to its foundations, and mcidfcntally proveH how uncertain are the fort'liins of war. For months, and indeed years, the Allied army in MacerldniaAloMiia had been, by many critics, viewed i'skance. In the intermittent controversy between Westerners and Easterners, the former not infrequently, and not always illogically, held up this prospe> of the Allies' defeat in the West heriiJ.-e of their Eastern diversions. A» a. matte* of fact, the Bulgarian surrender proved the converse, for Germany therebj received a terrible blow in the East because of her Western diversions. A few German divisions might have proppud up Bulgaria for another year; but when Hindenburg and Ludendorff magaetised all available force to France in

order to match victory before America 1! arrival, they did so at the cost of Bulgaria's' break-down. In other -words, the strengthening of the enemy ting in the West did not prevent its fracture at the point where the almost-forgotten "diversion" army of the Entente began suddenly to operate. SALONIKA STRATEGY. The conclusion therefore forces itself that, even minus Russia, the Entente's envelopment plan yielded brilliant results. Bulgaria's surrender demonstrated that, despite Westerners' criticisms, and notwithstanding the dilatonness that lost Serbia in 1915, the occupation of Salonika was strategically sound, and its evacuation would have been a blunder from the offensive as well as the defensive standpoint. Had there been "no Run- ' sian front, and also no MacedoniaAlbania front, the Central Powers in 1918 could have concentrated Westward with impunity. But the dramatic event } in Bulgaria showed to them their error, and the error was vital. The Toss of Bulgaria removed the connecting-link of j the enemy corridor. It uncovered Turkey and Austria-Hungary;, and, by | accentuating the' despair of the lattei 'country, paved the way for the uncov- ' eking of Germany herself. " Even the j German people began to see that the Western gains were being held by Luden'dorff and Hindenburg at too high a price. For of what profit was it that the High Command should, by heavy reinforcement, postpone decisive defeat in the West—at the cost of leaving open the back-door? Gradually the futility of this furious Western . effort -. was brought home to- Germany, along with the consciousness of impending isolation, encirclement, and overthrow. The real issue between Westerner and Easterner is best glimpsed by quoting from an editorial."of the Evening. Post, written on 17th August, at a time when lhe question was still hot: "Allied policy is, to seize . every chance of exerting direct, pressure in the Eastern theatre, consistent with not t-ompromis-ing the chance to secure the decisive I Western victory. Two things are basic to Allied success. The first is sea? power, which includes the holding of the submarine peril; the second is military victory \n the West. If possibly military supremacy in the East must be added to these twain, but -without compromising them. Not an ounce of strength necessary to the West should be sent East. But neither should the exercise of power in the East be neglected when it is exercisable without prejudice to the basic plan." The principle herein laid down does not seem to be capable of' serious challenge.'' But* the real point of difference between' Westerners and Easterners was not the principle, but the application of it. The real . difference lay in conflicting estimates of I the military force essential in the West; and much of the trouble - was removed when Marshal Foch, with the policy he represented, was elevated into * place of authority. As Generalissimo, Foch was in a position to say what the Wen required, and he speedily showed that lie understood, and possessed, the secret of winning battles against the German in tbe decisive sphere. Thus, at last, West and East were, revealed in a victorious exercise of - glorious co-operation and reciprocity. • VARIOUS BLOCKADEB. Blockade tactics—in which, of course, the Allied naval strangle-hold stood supreme—profoundly influenced the course of the war; and, German submarinism had a revolutionary effect not only on the military side but also, on the political. It must be conceded that the partial, blockade imposed by Germany on European Russia was a strategic success ; probably it weakened a poorly organised State like Russia more quickly than the Central Empires were weakened by the blockade set up against themselves by the sea and land force* of the Allies; but the German conception of a submarine blockade missed its mark disastrously. To its credit may be placed a. terrific mercantile attrition, which diverted an immense amount of Allied labour and material that otherwisn might have been utilised in a more direct offensive. But to its debit are the tremendous facts that it assured the belligerency of America, and it failed to prevent the American troops coming to France The replacement of Russia by America gave Germany the doubtful benefit of being able to initiate in 1918 the concentrated offensive against the sorery-trJed French. Against this, it cut »way from the Allies' cave* the incubus of Tsarism, and U added the democratising influence of the American President and his hundred million Eng-lish-speaking people. An Anglo-Rus-sian Alliance could never have been in the fullest sense popular; it was necessarily official, diplomatic, and—on one side or the other, therefore probably on both—imperialistic and in part annexationiat. From its very nature, an AngloAmerican Alliance could have none of these tendencies; subject as it must be to the popular will on both sides of the Atlantic, it could only bring to the

Allied aims an influence at once democratising and vitalising. And the evolution of the Allied cause in that direction was one of the greatest facts of 1917-18. Morally, the effect, both on the war and on the world's future, of America's alignment with . Britain, France, and Italy, is incalculable. Militarily, it made the war more thin ever & conflict between Western, sea-power and Continental land-power. . And. incidentally, it. reinsured the tactical defeat of the submarine, that - terrible threat to nations maritime and insular. KULTDR VERSUS CULTURE. The exit of Russia and the "entry of America enabled Dr. Helfferich to observe that the war had resolved itself into a struggle between the political system of Germany and the political system of Britain. The generalisation was not unjust, provided that Dr. Helfferich intended his formula to embrace all thoee moral as well as military: considerations which the rival systems connote. Germany's war against the West amounted to a challenge by. collective disciplined "efficiency" to individual freedom; It was a challenge based on no moral. consideration whatever, but on ability to wield the sword; and it compelled the two great branches of the English-speaking people to resort to military compulsion. Their ability to do this, in the present stage of their civilisation, was as great a. discovery «s that of Columbus, and dazzled everybody, none more than the Germans. Therefore, while forced to admit that democracy is a poor war-ma-chine, 'no democrat should forget that, when forced to fight for its life, democracy, despite its inherent disadvantages, tofk up the sword to the full extent of it* human capacity. The world then saw that what had been done once could be done again; and the "new" British and American' armies in France, with all their machinery imperfections, established an imperishable guarantee of democracy's ability to defend itself against "efficient" autocracy. "If," wrote the Evening Post, "Russia / finds her soul, and China proves 'inconvertible to - militarism, in all probability Wilhelm will prove to be the last of the Napoleons. At the very least, the sacrifice of the Western democracies ha 3 immensely improved the outlook for. a lasting peace in the Old World; and has also pointed the path of duty for nations in the Pacific, wbere-r-as everywhere—autocratic designs will be curbed only by the resolute will of democracy to defend itself'in the most effective manner, and to perpetuate its own existence." • .DEMOCRATIC UNITY AND FOCH. ■The story of democracy's ability to defend itself, and to take up the trapnings of militarism in order to crush the Soul thereof, does not end with the adoption of compulsion. There was another goal to attain—unity of military command on the Western front. Democracy, always fearful of extreme individual power, and jealous of foreign control of a national army, for some time stood" hesitant, and the hesitation was prolonged by military jealousies. Early perceiving the extreme danger of separate commands against the German concentration of 1917-18, Mr. Lloyd George groped out after unity of advice, then after unity of control; was encouraged in Paris, was resisted in London; pleaded, temporised, camouflaged, and exhausted his resources as a "political strategist." At'last the disaster to the British Fifth Army came fo his rescue. His arguments, were reinforced by the German .sword, and the four • Western Allies found themselves compelled to pool their .forces, from the North Sea to the Adriatic, under, the heaven-sent genius of Generalissimo Foch. President Wilson led the way by sinking false national pride, by brigading the American units with French and British divisions, and by putting the full force' of the United States behind the demand for a united control of the' armies and their reserves. Thus the military jealousies were broken down, and it was then found that the peoples, wiser.than their masters, were quite ready for. a radical transformation,such as the situation demanded. Common-sense triumphed over convention, and democracy gave one more proof of its self-sacrificing capacity to adapt itself to supreme necessity. Mr., Lloyd George can claim all credit for having foreseen the need of military union. It is easy to say that his foresight proved greater than his- courage, but critics should always remember the limitations of his political situation. Those same limitations were partly responsible for the fact that the Englishspeaking leadership tended to pass from him to President Wilson. After Russia's decline, such a tendency might naturally result from the westward swing of the Allies' centre of gravity, and from the American Government's freedom from embarrassing diplomatic undertakings belonging to the era of Russian Tsaristic ambition. Moreover, the American President is, constitutionally, mightier than any Prime Minister. Nevertheless, civilisation owes much to Lloyd Georgfc the "political strategist," and to the "tiger" politician;of France, Grand Old Man Clemenceau. OUT OF EVIL COMETH GOOD. In the political history of the war, the United States Presidential election of 1916, the Russian Revolution of 1917, and the ruthless submarining, are conspicuous landmarks. Without knowing what they were doing, Tirpitz, the autocratic terrorist of the sea, and Lenin, the high priest of Bolshevik anarchy, were building for democracy. Similarly, the German peace drives, though' designed to save Prussian militarism, merely -held the stage till its ruin was complete. Until October, last the German Government still strovo to retain Eastern gains at the cost of Western surrenders, when suddenly the Bulgarian secession broke the idea of Mittel-Europa in twain. In a moment the Eastern knot was nut, and the German grip on Russia, without the need of any European intervention by Japan, gave way. The closing stages of the war proved yet again the futility of evil machinations in the face of a Higher Power; and the unalterable truth that out of evil eometh good. An.ottg maiiy builders, few knew the work he was engaged on; yet the labours of all, good or evil, have been turned to the service of humanity. From the foregoing discussion of

PRUSSIA'S VAST SCHEME BROKEN

principles, we pass to. a review of the war in greater detail, with, as far as possible, a chronological survey of the event* of the five fateful years, 1914-18. 1914—THE "SHORT CUT" THAT MISSED. When the real history of the war comes to be written, it will probably have to be admitted that Germany very i nearly won, >n the first round, by her rapid knock-out blow at France, which failed, only because of an exceptional combination of adverse circumstances. Given its best luck, the German march through Belgium should have over. | whelmed France in two* months; at the least, it should have secured for Germany'the Channel ports down to tho mouth of th« Somme; but it did neither. France was saved, in the first place, by French courage and skill, culminating in the Battle of the Marne; aided by the British alliance and its moral and material expression, the British Regular Army. But the saving of France was very substantially contributed to by Belgium, and by ' the unexpectedly rapid mobilisation of Tsaristic Russia, , who early, in 1914 had won and lost tremendous battles against the Germans and the Austro-Huntrarians.' Russian victories and defeats helped the victors of the Marne to save Paris, and aided the victors of the First Yores in the high strategic accomplishment, of protecting the Channel ports. Blood shed liberally. by Russia, as well as by France and Britain, forced the Germans to be content with settling down in the West to a rigid Franco-Belgian trench-line. They retaliated with a land blockade of Russia, to encompass which they forced Turkey into the war in November, and at the same time accepted, having little choice, the naval blockade imposed by Britain. That was how things stood at the close of 1914. I

garia's enemy, Serbia; they knew of the treachery to Serbia of the Greek King, and they recojnised tho disservice to Serbia of the Entente's dilatory Balkan policy. Bulgaria therefore joined the Central Powers in October, 1915, about a couple of months before Britain and Franco began to withdraw from- Gallipoli. Thus Bulgaria completed' for the enemy the Eastern "corridor," and sealed the fate of Serbia, who had twice thrown out the Austro-Hungarians, but was overwhelmed by the new combination in October-November. Anticipating their failure in Gallipoli, and feeling that they should at least hold Greecs, the Allies had secured ;i new Balkan foothold at Salonika, "too late" to save Serbia. The melancholy record of 1915 embraced the trench-war iti France, including the Second Ypres, the Russian disaster ; the Gallipoli and Salonika, failures; indecisive Austen-Italian- fighting; a generally passive defence in Egypt; in Mesopotamia a reckless offensive (Towns'hend's) doomed to disaster. Final disappearance of the German flag from the oceans was the bright spot, tinged with forecasts of the submarine phase. Save in East Africa, all German colonial resistance was extinguished. im—VERDUN, THE U-lOATB, JUTLAND, RUMANIA. In 1916 Russia's reverses—though relieved towards the close of the year by a successful reaction against Austria-Hun-gary—permitted the Germans to once more attempt a great offensive against France, where the Verdun operation was begun as early as 20th February Verdun was a German defeat ranking morally with the Marne, for it proved that the long-suffering and "Boloised" French could not bo terrorised out of the war. | But the new British army's offensives ia this year were disappointing in result, and the submarine smkinga began to give the war at sea an unfavourable turn for sea-carriage and for British insular power. In May of 1916 Germany was even emboldened to bid for seasupremacy ; the result was the indecisive Battle of Jutland, 31st Jtl»y, which did not alter the pre-existing naval situation. / By April Russia had captured Erzeroum and Trebizond, and had occupied most of Turkish Armenia; but this achievement was offset by Townshend's surrender. Egypt's defence began to be offensive in May, 1916, giving the "Westerners", new ground for criticism of "<iide-shows" and diversions. Salonika was stagnant, the occupation being at that time presented in a political rather than a military light. It played no active part in the tragedy of Rumania, who was probably betrayed by the Stunner Government of Russia. The showiness of the Rumanian ■. victory enabled the German sword to pick up much, of the prestige it had dropped earlier in the year at Verdun. Cut the great event of 1916 was political : President Wilson was^ 4 re-elected, and ruthless submarining (initiated Ist February) began to draw the United States into the war.

warfare in subordinate theatres had at last some ammunition with which to return the fire of the "Westerners." But the point of view of the "Westerners" was quite understandable, considering the temporary unreadiness of America to fill the gap left by Russia, and to pour troops m well as munitions into the West. ISIB — GERMAN EFFORT TO FORESTALL THE AMERICANS. The race with the Americans for Paris was the keynote of German policy in 1918. Germany abstained from giving any substantial aid to the hard-pressed Turk or to Bulgaria; she did not try to push tho Salonika force into the sea; she did not realise all tho military advantages she. might have realised in Russia and Finland. Instead of doing these things, she. aimed to destroy the Allies' Western armies before America's arrival. Henco Germany's offensive (in five phases) in France and Austna-Run- [ garys one-phase offensive in Italy. Aus-tria-Hungary's defeat, and the . Allies' successful reaction in the fifth phase of the German operations in France (a reaction admittedly due to the acceleration of American reirtforcements) once more swung the odds against the Central Powers. Indeed, Germany's second misfortune on the Marne was probably the turning-point of the war. It was followed, of course, by * series of defeats inflicted in Foch'e best style. Having regained the initiative, the Generalissimo made a masterly use thereof. And he won his Western victories without robbing the Eastern armies. In fact, during 1918 the Allies detached troops to help Japan to aid the Czecho-Slovaks against Bolshevik-German forces between ! the Pacific Coast and . Lake Baikel; and they opened up new fronts in North Russia and on either side of the Caspian Sea. Moreover, the British forces in Palestine won one of the most classic and complete battles-of-all-arms that history records, destroyed three Turkish armies, and conquered Syria. The crowning-point of Eastern politico-mili-tary success came in October, when d'Esperey's Allied arm ; based on Salonjka, broke the Bulgarian front and divided the Bulgarian forces, whose right wing was placed at the mercy of the the Serbs and French. Before . this sudden and astonishing, victory was driven home in a military way, Bulgaria surrendered to the Allies, thus breaking the enemy "corridor," uncovering Turkey and Anstria-Hungary, and setting those States an example which they were not very slow : to follow. By that remarkable development the Salonika strategy was at last vindicated, and the German ' Westerners fell into their own trap. The failure of their policy of Western concentration was threefold: (1) they failed to preserve their Western front; (2) failed to crush Foch before the American arrival; and (3) even failed to hold the Western position which they had inherited from 1917. After losing to Foch thousands of guns, hundreds of thousands of prisoners, and millions of. casualties, Germany was unofficially reported to have signed a surrender armistice on Thursday, the 7th I November.

Persistence in the blockade of Russia was ultimately one of the essential elements which forced the Russians out of the war, and which thus placed France (in 1918) in a position of freat temper- j ary peril. But, masterly as this. department of German strategy proved later on to be, nothing could compensate for.the great initial miscalculation —the wrecking of the plan to overthrow France with on<> swift blow. 191S-GERMANY LOOKS EAST. Defeat in the West meant much more than failure to destroy France and the French Army. It meant also failure to prevent France from becoming the battleground of new British armies, and pos. sibly in the future of new American armies. The surprise blow of 1914 having mis-carried, it became at once the business of German strategists to prevent, by land and by sea, Anglo-American reinforcement of France. Owing to the eclipse and blockade of the German High Sea Fleet, no preventive means pre Rented itself at sea until the later development of the submarine; and the possibilities of a further big offensive against France by land were discounted by the pressure of Russia. Consequently, the year 1915 found -the Germans' with their eyes mainly turned eastward ; a lap south-eastward, where the Franco. British Gallipoli army was striving to pierce European Turkey and raise the partial blockade of Russia. A series of Austro-Gennan defeats inflicted by the Russians earlier in the year terminated at the Dunajec, where, in April-May, Germany turned tho tables, and Russia lost Poland ami Western Galicia. Fortunately, Russia's disaster did not prevent Italy entering th 3 war on 23rd May, 1915, though the eclat raised by that event was diluted by Russia's continued misfortune and by the Allies' poor progress on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Worse still, these unfavourable elements were being observed and appraised by Bulgaria. The Bulgarians saw that, excellent as tile Gallipoli strategy was, the forces employed would fail to' penetrate Turkey and lihsrate Russia; they saw that thow forces were wrongly placed to help Bui-

1817-EXIT RUSSIA, ENTER AMERICA. In 1917 submarine sinkings reached their monthly summit in April, but Germany paid for them an altogether disproportionate price, since the United States declared war on 6th April, 1917. The other great event was the Russian revolution, at first Liberal, then LiberalSocialist, then Bolshevik, ■ and leading rapidly to Russia's military collapse. The replacement of. the Slav by the i American, the Tsar by the President, revolutionised the whole political and military meaning of the war, which became more than ever a fight between Western sea-power and Continental landpower. On the Allies' side democratic ideals finally replaced secret treaties and political bargains. Sir Douglas Haig's numerical advantage in the West produced no big military results—despite costly offensives— and seems to have been cancelled or reduced ue the Russian collapse released German troops. It was now evident that the Allies could not be sure of a military decision without the aid of great American armies. While Haig gained little or nothing except attritive effect on the best personnel of the German army, Italy suffered a colossal defeat. Thus the enemy closed 1917 with a brilliant victory over the Italians in somewhat the same way as he saved his prestige in 1916 at the expense of the Rumanians. Russia and Romania and Serbia (except the remnant of Serbia's army) having practically dropped out, no Allied offensive in the Balkans was. reasonably I possible without Greek sympathy ' and aid. Venizelos had been busily paving the way for a Greco-Entente co-opera-tion, and a step forward was taken by means of Constantino's abdication in June. The Entente armies in MacedoniaAlbania bided their time Palestine and Mesopotamia became, once again,' theatres of British offensive operations, carried on despite the failing grip of Russia in Armenia and Persia. The fall of Bagdad (10th Match) and Jerusalem (10th December) was of great importance religiously, politically < md militarily. Ihni the advocates ol