THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCVI, Issue 10, 11 July 1918, Page 6

THE WAR

In the course of a brief cable message received yesterday afternoon, Mr. George Perris remarks upon the approximate equality of the fighting forces in the West to-day, and says: "Surprise is now Ludendorff's only hope. German espionage has been, extended upon daring and scientific lines, and is compelling the Allies gradually to improve their information services. . . ." It was a commonplace observation earlier in the war, when aerial observation had been well developed, and the "eyes of, the army" were no longer so restricted in movement as in the days when reconnaissance was chiefly undertaken by cavalry, that secrecy and surprise had become practically impossible. Many of the great offensive operations were prepared for 'and carried out with little assistance irom real surprise, though as early as Verdun the Germans showed that extremely important preparations could be concealed. An article by one of the many writers "mobilised" by the War Office contains some interesting observations on the paradoxical developments_ that have occurred in the use of surprises.

"While everything superficially," the writer says, "has combined to eliminate the chances of surprise, the theory of modern war _ almost monopolises itself with its N attainment. Just when everyone began saying that the element of surprise was obsolete, everyone began scheming to secure it. This element has been almost re-created, on account of the vast supplies available to the armies. In 1915 there was no ammunition to spare for a bombardment of disguise. Nowadays there is such a mass of material scattered behind the lines that the relatively small increase concentrated in assault areas has a chance of escaping notice." Means of communication have so vastly increased that a rapid surprise concentration has become moro feasible. In the old days every spare gun and bomb was massed in the assault area, so that it was plainly marked out as the future scene of great things.

The _ same writer also refers to the ingenuity practised nowadays in "strategical camouflage," by, among other means, the use of extensive bombardments behind which there is no intention to attack; the manipulation of troop and supply trains, and the more subtle manipulation of publicity, including even the publication of what seem like indiscretions, in the shape of extracts from eokliers' letters, all designed to create false impressions in the mind of the enemy. This is in addition to the "tactical" or local, 'camouflage used everywhere in the war zone for the concealment of material by the various forms of disguise with which the public is now fairly familiar. Of course, this leads inevitably to the counfer-operation of espionage, whether by agencies in the enemy country, or by means of military raids to capture prisoners and documents (both of which are capable of bearing false witness), or by the higher development of aerial observation. In the end, the intelligence department becomes loaded with an enormous mass of information, from whicn it has to winnow out such grains of useful truth ,-is may be discoverable. As the writer already quoted remarks, "the opportunities for a General to be wrong have increased in the same, ratio with his chances of being right. If a General knows nothing, lie cannot bo deceived, cannot be susceptible to his opponents' suggestions. If he has received a wrong impression he is doubly in peril. It is a moot point whether a vast mass of conflicting and uncertain evidence does not cloud rather than clear his judgment. An impressive intelligence summary docs not necessarily imply knowledge."' Advocates of what is called the "ton Jt>r ton" »©Ufiv liavs reseived much lc*a__

publicity lately than they did in the early stages of the German war against merchant shipping. This policy demands that on the conclusion of the war the Allies shall secure from fiormany by confiscation as much tonnage as that nation has destroyed during the war. It is indifferent, apparently, whether the replacement is to cover vessels destroyed legally as well as those sunk in outrage of the laws of war; but tho difference is after all only small. The House of Commons has just been informed by Mr. Sonar Law that the subject cannot be ■usefully discussed at this stage of the war. Tlie Allied' Governments, ever sinco the policy was first proposed, and' in spite of very vigorous pressure from many quarters, have studiously refrained from expressing any definite opinion on the matter, and there are no doubt ample reasons, some of which have to °-° Wlf tt neutral interests, to justify this official reticence. At the beginning of the U-boat campaign it seemed as if a threat of compulsory replacement might have caused Germany to revise her policy of destruction. But it is clear now that it probably would have had little if any effect; nor would it have much now. The unrestricted submarine campaign was adopted, and is being pursued :n order to win the war; and if it does win the war, there is nothing (from the German point of viow) to be said against it. Germany still believes at least that a£ Will not' bo s° clefeated that the A'lhes can make ant' enforce any demand they like; and the idea of paying for something like five hundred millions sterling worth of ships, either in cash, or in credit, or in kind 1, is probably not vet seriously on the mind of the German public, And, after all, it is a bagatelle. It is about the cost of three months of war; and it has been worth while, from the enemy's viewpoint. The direct replacement of the sunken tonnage by existent Gertna-n shipping is in the present state of the German marine an impossibility.' In round figures, the enemy has; sunk a grand total of about 14.000,000 tons of snipping—of. all nationalities, more than half of it British. Including even small vessels, Germany cannot claim the ownership of 5,000,000 tons; and even if her Allies' merchant marines are added, the total is less than six a-nd a-quarter millions.

A brief message published' a few days ago reported that Mr. Baker, the American Secretary for War, had announced that 276,382 men were carried across the Atlantic in June, making a total of over a million. Australian papers received by mail contain the full text of the President's letter in which this announcement was published, and it is reproduced in this issue. The tabulation of the monthly drafts of American soldiers which is n. feature of the message is eloquent of the rapid and almost regular increase in the rate of despatch of troops, and is a 'remarkable commentary upon the complete failure of the submarines to-inter-fere with the great transport undertaking of the United State 3. Up to that date the total loss of American soldiers at sea was only 291. .