THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCV, Issue 114, 14 May 1918, Page 6

THE WAR

By common consent of observers at the front, the enemy's preparations, as evidenced by observed movements, coupled with the prolonged lull in severe fighting, presage an enormous offensive when at last the hour does strike. One correspondent whose remarks have been cabled makes special reference to the great activity of the Germans in making and repairing roads, which the Allied gunners and airmen are continually subjecting to fresh damage. This special reference to the repair of devastated coinniunications impliesll that the. field of activity is in the newly-conquered zones, where the enemy has already laid the foundations for a strategic success, provided that he can drive in successive blows in the same way as those which have been expended. On the contrary, tho current writings reflect a strong fesling of confidence among Allied officers. They believe that if the next German attacks fail, the failure will be final. This means that, having gauged as well as they can the quality and quantity of the energy available to the enemy, they believe that another abortive offensive will exhaust the German power of attacking on any scale capable of affecting the issue. In (the argument there is an unknown factor, which will only be revealed by the battle, and that is the extent by which the enemy will fail.

Unless the Allied strategists have decided to adopt new methods of countering the offensive, the Germans will probably gain fresh ground,, As they have the choice of sevoral large sectors upon any one of which they can throw their main weight, and as it is not possible to gauge eiactly, their dispositions of men and material, only a very .ample reserve of Allied troops can ensure that no more ground will be. won by. the Germans.

For the passive strategy of standing on the defensive and "blocking the German bowling" there is only one alternative, and that is the active strategy of the counter-offensive. If General Foch has such an "operation in his mind his preliminary movements have been completely concealed, at all events from people in .this quarter of the globe. Numerous assurances have been given that Foch commands altogether a large reserve' force—an "army of manoeuvre" as it called by the French strategists, who base their whole war plans upon tho. possession of such a force. In it are certainly French with Americans " brigaded " or sandwiched into the divisions; probably British, and possibly Italians. One of the latest reports is that Foch can lay his hands upon two and a-half millions of Italians as reserves—a statement which is plainly inspired by the recent extension of the French Generalissimo's command to the Adriatic, and which really means net more than that he can draw at discretion upon the Italian Army, wliicbN in gross is said to number about two millions and a-half of armed men.'

If all goes well, General EJoch will probably reserve hie use of the counteroffensive till the last possible moment, 60 that so long as the enemy does jiot appear on the verge of winning a great success, we may expect blocking methods to rule. The reasons for this are that the attack is more costly in men than the defence, that l^och's .reserve is not yet decisively large, and that it will go on growing, so long as the_ German attacks continue on standard lines, because of tho heavier German losses and of tho steady increase of the Allied numbers by American reinforcement. Ottawa eupplies to-day a report that the British War Office is said to have sent across the Atlantic. It is to the effect that the German reserves are nearing exhaustion, and that the Allies are so confident of being able to hold their ground that they have decided to limit their use of American troops as recruits to the existing Allied armies (by the process of "brigading"), so that the United States Army can proceed to grow upon normal Ijnes into a separate organisation. This report hae no confirmation in Washington, It is, whether true orv untrue, an example of bad publicity. If it has been misunderstood in Ottawa, tho broadcasting of the error should not have been allowed. If the War Cabinet has in fact made 3uch an announcement it is at variance with the recent vigorous appeals to the United States for the utmost speed in forwarding the men as essential for the prevention of serious results in the present campaign.

The High Military Authority, writing on 3rd May, denied a rumour that yon Mackensen, with 600,000 JWe.n, had arrivod on the West front,' and he referred to him. as the "bogey" who was to deJivet the dflatfi-blow in the campaign.

peared, for Mackensen is now reported to have turned up, and to be in command of the front from Arras to the Somme. There is no.further reference to his 600,000 men. Mackensen is an. imposing "bogey." Of all the German generals he has a record that entitles him to the deepest respect on the part of Allied commaTxlent <wi<J people, »nd if his presence, on the Arras-Amiens front or any other strategically important sector in the West is confirmed, it must be regarded a3 a fact of great significance. Mackensen is a general of tremendous vigour. His strategy is based upon impetuous and rapid blows, launched in great and concentrated force and followed iip_ with the rapidity which is characteristic of cavalry, to which arm Mackensen was bred. It was he who in May, 1913, carried out the, great drive in Galicia, -which began at the Donajec ;\ and laier directed the invasion of Servia; and in conjunction with Falkenhayn conquered Rumania.

The German apologists, who have the duty of comforting the public for the failure to win the war on the St. Quentin front, explain it by the vast inertia of a great army, by the inability then displayed to follow np the first success with sufficient speed. Mackensen is, for the Germans, the embodiment of that swiftness which was then lacking. In being brought to the West front," to which he has been a stranger during the war, he has presumably been put over the heads of veterans of France and Flanders, and there will be "noses out of joint." It is, however, obvious that if the Germans cannot do better than force the Allies a little further back at great cost, and leave them in new positions, the coming offensive cannot win the war. The Allies must be driven bade till they can no longer preserve their cohesion, and if no Western general so far has shown that he can guarantee such a result, it may be Macjsrensen's turn. But tho FrancoBritish front is on neither Russia, Servia, nor Rumania.

If Mackensen is on the West, it is a curious instance/of the irony of circumstances. Hindenburg began the war in the East, and established a reputation which was rapidly undermined when, to preserve his prestige, he was put upon tho unassailable pedestal of the Supreme Command, and propped up by Ludendorff. It was Mackensen who had threatened Hindenburg- with extinction in the East, and who proceeded with the long campaign of invasion to which the Russian military and political collapse was partly, and perhaps very largely, due. Hindenburg, in his capacity of command-er-in-chief, reluctantly left his pet regions of Prussia and came West; and little stands really to his credit there except the great retreat which, at the end of 1917, left Sir Douglas Haig standing ready to strike, but with nothing within reach. Hindenburg, or rather the organisation of brains for which his massive person stands as the figurehead, struck a mighty blow this spring; and! because it fell short of success his old lieutenant and rival is again on the horizon.