THE WAR
Germany has reopenedl the battle in Flanders, but so far the effort made appears to be 0i1,,a small scale. Its location, however, .is significant. It was suggested iri these notes when, the offensive against the chain of hilb west of Kemmel failed that the enemy's next attempt would probably be made to the north of this important rampart so as to avoid the deadly losses of frontal attack. The conditions tending to prevent such an attack are chiefly those of the weather and the ground. Hereabouts the plain is waterlogged, and large movements are in consequence greatly hindered. Otherwise the enemy would probably have attacked on both sides of the line of hills-from the first. That the attempt is made no\v is a further hint, of the great power of the Allied' defence in the hills; but it is not poof that the ground is yet in anything like practicable condition for a large and prolonged offensive operation. The latest news is that such ground as the Germans took has been wholly recovered, and that a new attack in the~neighbourhood of Kemmel has begun.
If the-Rumanian peace treaty stands in the final settlement, German-Austrian diplomacy may certainly claim a triumph. It has grasped much, and it has also been wise enough to give O something ; wiser still, the something which it has given belonged to somebody else. By gaming Russian Bessarabia, to which they nave racial and historical claims, the Rumanians have greatly enhanced their national resources, and thereby Tiaye re-awakened the jealousy of Bulgaria, probably a reluctant partner to the treaty. But while they have gained in Bessarabia, they have lost territory to both Austria and Hungary, and the territory they have lost is strategically important. Gone are the mountain passes that permitted the Rumanian invasion of Hungarian. Transylvania in 1916 ; instead, Hungary holds the strategic ground in the mountains, and cau dominate militarily tho Rumanian slopes and tho Danube valley. Similar-
ly, Austria Has pushed her frontier into the Moldavian branch of Rumania, ttrns protecting Czernovitz and tho Bukovina, and strengthening the Austrian position on the lower Danube tributaries. Strategically, the Rumanian peace greatly resembles the peace conclnded by AustriaHungary with Italy in 1866. " AustriaHungary then demarcated the mountain passes in her favour, and has been able to threaten the Italian plains ever' since. That was one of the reasons why Italy entered the war. Rumania may well ■study Italy's history in this respect. Evidently Austro-Hungarian diplomats have studied it very well.
Besides the territorial concessions, Rumania has lost all control of the Danube traffic, which is dominated by the Central Powers, who are free to send to and from the\Black Sea not only merchantmen but warships. A GermanAustrian occupying army will see that the Central Empires get the fat of the land, and Rumania will pay for that army's maintenance. Although receiving a notable accession of territory in Bessarabia, Rumania is herself bound hand and foot in a military vassalage, intended to become a political and a permanent one.
The Admiralty's return of. new shipping construction cabled yesterday contains some highly interesting figures. It is shown that British yards in 1917 turned out 1,163,474 gross tons of ships, as compared with a round two minions in 1913, the record year. So far. this year's output, month by month, is: January, 58,568 tons; February, 100,038 tons; March, 161,674 tons; April, 111,533 tons —all presumably "completed and entered for servica" The report makes mention of a large increase in the amount of repair work done in April, and this can bo regarded as compensating for the reduced production of now shipping. For the four months the total of new ships is 431,813 tons, equal to a year's production of 1,295,439. The Admiralty states, however, that the year ended 30th April actually produced 1,279,337 tons, so that though that total is very far ahead of the three-quarters of a million Produced in the previous year, the figures or the past four months show scarcely any improvement upon . the previous eight. But it was about Christmas that Sir Eric Geddes found it expedient to say that the rate of output would soon equal that of 1913. The figures now made public are not particularly sensational as j an indication, of rapid progress.'
The total of Allied and neutral shipbuilding during 1917 was about one and a-half timesthe British output, and the first three months of this year showed an upward tehdency, to be attributed, no doubt, to the energy of the United States. But so far the American programme has scarcely made itself felt in actual products. That is natural; because a certain period necessarily must pass before a country in which phe industry was trifling could spring into pre-eminence. As with the army, so with ships. Preparation on a vast scale for producing a huge output has led to exaggeratsd ideas of the immediate prospects. Not until the ,whole great machine is working can the output reach the promised magnitude. So far the United States has not built a great number of ships; but the yards have begun already to break records in the way of speedy construction.
The new •" prohibited area " reported by the Admiralty on 2nd May as having been created in the North Sea as an additional preventive against German submarine operations was very inadequately described by the cable message sent to New Zealand. It is, however, exactly described in Australian files now to hand. As there are no doubt many people who would like to plot it on their maps, the details are given below. The prohibited area is enclosed by a line joining the following points : First: latitude 59deg 12imin north, longitude 4deg 49min east- Second : latitude 59deg 29min south, longitude 3deg lOmin east. Third : latitude 58deg 2&nin north, longitude Odeg 50min west. Fourth : latitude 59deg 20min north, longitude Odeg 50min west. Fifth : latitude 6Odeg 20min north, longitude 3deg lOmin east. Sixth : latitude 60deg north, longitude 4deg 56min east. Thence along the western limits of Norwegian territorial waters to the first-mentioned position.
The area thus -' defined is' of curious shape. Its northern, edge commences a few miles south-east of Bergen, runs ion sixty miles west-north-west, and then turns west-south-west in the direction of the southern extremity of the Orkney Islands, for 180 railes. The western boundary runs due south for sixty miles (fifty-five sea miles) and is due'south of the Shetland Island's, and about 75 miles east of the Orkneys. Tho southern edge is almost exactly parallel with the northern ; and has a similar elbow about sixty miles from the . Norwegian coast. Finally it meets, the territorial boundary 'three miles off the coast) about twenty' | miles north of the Bukke Fiord, which is north of Stavanger; and the eastern limit of the area is fixed by the threemile strip of Norwegian waters. The total area thus enclosed is in the neighbourhood of twelve thousand square miles—an enormous area if it is regarded as a minefield. Of course the actual nature_ of the defences which are in the area is not disclosed. The feature that will probably interest most people is the location of the closed zone. Not only is there a large gap between it- and the Scottish coast, but it is: a very long way—four hundred miles or so—from the submarine bases. It lies, moreover, in the deeper portion of the North Sea, Most of the southern part of the sea is not more than 300 feet deep. The whole of the prohibited zone, however, lies in water from 300 to 600 foefc o* more deep, and the eastern "leg," the sixty-mile section next the I. Norwegian coast, is from 600 to 1200 feet in depth.
Obviously no attempt is made directly by this prohibited area, whether it is a vast minefield >or not, to close in the positive sense the German U-boat ports. Actually it makes a. sort of tactit admission that the thing cannot be done, and turns the greater part of the North Sea into a sort of "No Man's Land" between, the entanglements of the German mines in the south and those of "the British, in the north. Within that area the submarine has no doubt a certain amount of freedom to move—subject to attention by British attackers; but the Straits of Dover are closod tight, and the wide northern gate has been restricted to a three-mile neutral channel in the east and a seventy-mil© highly hostile one in the west. A highly important point about the location of the closed area is that it is in every part nearer to the British coast fhan to the German, so that the warships operating in conjunction with it have the advantage in steaming time over enemy vessels disposed to interfere. But the principal reason why it was located so far north is no doubt that here the gap to be_ closed is narrowest. It is across this gap that many naval critics havo urged that a great net-barrier should long ago have been placed. TMs proposal, however admirable it might have seemed on paper, is one that seems to be too big to be practicable. At all events the presumption is that mines are the mainstay of the present barricade.
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Bibliographic details
Evening Post, Volume XCV, Issue 111, 10 May 1918, Page 6
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1,541THE WAR Evening Post, Volume XCV, Issue 111, 10 May 1918, Page 6
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