THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCV, Issue 89, 15 April 1918, Page 6

THE WAR

No great change ia recorded on the Western front in the news received up to the time of writing. The enemy has made some further progress, reaching the railway from Armentieres to Hazebrouck, immediately south of Bailleul, while further west, in the region just north of Merville, he has pressed forward to the Nieppe Wood, about two miles north-west of Merville. The critical situation on this front, and the threat to the communications and stability of Allied armies to the north—that is, those which depend upon Hazebrouck as a base of supply and of distribution of support of all kinds—is somep/hat accentuated. But the line is unbroken; the main lines of communication are still intact ; and the latest comments from London reflect an increased confidence, based upon the evidence of increased strength J in the defence and the beginning of counter-moves that are spoiling the uninterrupted course of his advance. The London Daily News goes so far as to express the opinion that, the Messines ridge positions having been turned or outflanked by the south, the northern armies are already "in the air" ; but this is not necessarily so since their communications, though under an ugly and developing threat, are as yet intact. There is, however, no reasonable means of softening the outlook. Up to the present the enemy persists in his extremely vigorous attacks, and there is no sign of a strong counter-offensive. If he is not checked, the northern armies will be beyond doubt "in the air," and there will be every prospect of a retreat. The prevention of this stage depends upon the fulfilment of Sir Douglas Haig's order ; and for that the nation will rely, implicitly upon the valour of the British troops, which has never for a briefest moment been in doubt. Mr. B. Murdoch, one of the Australian correspondents, says that even if a retirement has to be made from Ypres and Arras, a position can be maintained on_ a line guarding the Channel ports. This is satisfactory as far as it goes, but its accuracy as a forecast cannot be gauged for want of facts which are absolutely unknown at present. One thing is, however, obvious: that in the event of a retreat being- forced upon the Allied armies' by a still deeper German penetration, the continued protection of the Channel ports by an army occupying a narrow strip of country and with the sea behind it will be an undertaking of great hazard and calling for the highest skill and fortitude; and fortitude, above all, on the part of both the fighting forces and of the nations. Such a development would probably defer the heaviest blows of the enemy in the northern theatre, but it would renew the extreme importance of the Amiens sector, which would be in no way affected as the key of the whole of the positions north of it. Router's correspondent lays emphasis upon the confident way the Germans are driving forward 1 their wedge between the La. Bassee Canal and Armentieree, and especially the acuteness of its "nose." Only immense- local superiority of numbers, he says, could render such a situation tactically feasible; and it is of course excessively dangerous if the attacker has reason to expect counteroffensive operations upon his flanks. From his point of view, the worst seems to be that the British on the flanks are hoWing firm, and he is racing 'his advance against the arrival of their reinforcements, in the hope of reaching a vital point (Hazebrouck, to wit) before the da-ngerous_ strengthening arrives. • The general similarity between the Amiens and the Hazebrouck attacks was remarked in these notes on Saturday; and this race between the enemy and the defence is similar to what occurred at Amiens. There, the Germans lost. They were stopped when within long gin-range of the vital point; in this case they are about as near Hazebrouck as they were to Amiens. It will be seen very shortly, no_ doubt, whether the same degree of failure can be imposed upon the northern as upon the southern offensive. The-operations in front of Amiens have been, in contrast to earlier- events, strikingly quiet since the attack opened on the plains to the north. There is a double implication in this fact: that the Allied strength there is too great to be seriously affected in the present condition of the enemy; and that the Germans have diverted practically the whole of their real striking force to Flanders. How they did divert their offensive ie a question of great interest. It is notorious that, with the very rapid: advance of their army from the St. Quentin sector towards Amiens, their heavy equipment was necessarily left far behind, and had no chance of coming up in time to bring about a decision on the Amiens front. The Allied Mne was destined either to break there under the storm of the German infantry, or to hold so long that an entirely new battle must be begun. The second of these courses developed, because the line stood the strain. Since these conditions may have been plain to the enemy from the first, it is possible that he really made no strenuous effort to" rush his big equipment foward' after the advanced army—a work of extreme difficulty and expense of labour—but chose a much -more leisirrely course by taking what additional artillery he needed directly to the Planders_ front, to be followed by his storming divisions. This course-would ena,ble him to make full use of his guns, and to carry on the construction of roads and railways in the conquered space west of St. Quentin unhindered by the simultaneous destructive traffic of vast transport over new and tender ways. It is significant of the decisive weight of the German offensive that no less than 110 divisions of troops have been counted in the battles of the past three weeks. Over a million of infantry alone are represented by this figure, considerably more than half the total number of infantry wearing the Kaiser's uniform. To this number must be added a proportion amounting to perhaps a third of a million more men not in. the infantry battalions—artillery, cavalry, and auxiliary troops. Its is doubtful if the -wholci German Army iv tha west comprises an-

other million men in all services over and above those engaged on the front between the Aisne and the sea; and few, if any, sectors are likely to be manned sufficiently to be dangerous from an offensive point of view while the present battles continue. But this fact does not prevent the enemy from making a show of energy at various points. He is still throwing large forces against the French before Amiens, and bringing about fierce fighting that has gained him nothing on the map. Similarly he makes less important demonstrations at distant parts of the front, as at Verdun, and shells Reims (with serious results from fire). These efforts gain him nothing by outward appearance, and cost him men; but he does gain something if they result in retaining in these regions French units which. General Foch would be very glad to remove to the points of real peril. The Germans are even able to spare a few troops for Turkey . to make General Allenby'6 work a little harder; with the same ultimate object of hindering the High Command in its search for Eeinforcements. The possibility of an offensive against Italy, too, isl a powerful lever in aid of the Germans in the West, for in this sphere the Austrian Army, unable perhaps for political reasons to' fight in France, can still exert a great effort for the Kaiser^s cause against the Allied group in which France and JJritain- are the predominant partners. Even the threat of the offensive in Italy is influential on the West front, for it fastens to the Asiago plateau General Plumer's forces, which, if there were no Austrian menace, would be very welcome in Flanders, Artois, and Santerre.