THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCV, Issue 70, 22 March 1918, Page 6

THE WAR

Very brief messages via New York report the opening of German offensive operations against the British front. One message says that a great bombardment is in progress on most of the front, and another that the Germans are reported to be advancing at several points west of Cambrai.. If the report is accurately iocated, it is in that part of the front immediately north of the region in which the Battle of Cambrai was fought in November and December of last year. The northern flank of'the British advance was practically due west of Cambrai,'and the south crn flank due south of the town.. Without further particulars than are available at the time of writing, it is of no value £o discuss tho attack beyond suggesting that the enemy may be for the time being attempting to push a wedge through the British front so as 10 regain the Flesquieres-Marcoing 'section of the Hindehburg line "on the ridge which was captured by General Byng and was retained as the backbone of the reduced salient to which he retired after the German counter-offensive in December. It is a peculiar circumstance that while correspondents' have recently-remarked that much fine weather has gone by without an attack, tho latest report on the subject is that there has just been. very, wet weather on the British front.

The First . Lord's statement on the .shipping situation conveys a good deal of information, • but the form o;f it shows that the .(xovernment still finds it inadvisable to give a plain unvarnished account of the position. The statistics given do not a/low of a full comparison; and if, as is no doubt.the case, it is intended that the enemy's intelligence, department shall not receive any useful informatipn from them, it is obvious that the British reader is not supposed to be able to arrive at the facts either. The-, .estimate, in these notes _y.e.s-

terday, of about 6,000,000 tons as the gross world loss during 1917, is confirmed by Sir Eric Geddes. But he does not state what the British losses have been in that time. Altogether during the war twenty-,per cent, or one-fifth of tho British pre-war total tonnage has been sunk,- that is somathing over four millions. Yet the net/loss to the end of 1917 is,. according to the Blue Book report, 2,750^000 tons in vessels over 1600 tons alone. It was only during 1917 that the output of new ships from British yards began to be really promising, and had the Admiralty's expectations been realised the output for that year might have reached the same high level as in 1913. Unfortunately they v/ere not realised. Even in the fourth quarter of the year, when the losses had fallen to the lowest and shipbuilding was apparently greatly increased, the British losses totalled "780,000 tons, and the new - construction 420,000 tons. And : in January and February, Sir Eric Geddes admits, the results have been disappointing. .. , - "

The .principal difficulty ''in reducing the rate of ■diminution seems to lie in the shipyards, but. the First Lord believes that the yards, themselves, even the British.yards, are capable of replacing the total loss, of tonnage. Tho supply of material, however, is insufficient, and ;this is itself. accentuated by the shortage of shipping to carry the material; and inadequate, supply of labour is the second great cause of the shipyards' failure to'-keep up a sufficient output. A curious fact is that up till now only .1800 skilled men have been removed from the army to the yards, with another 885 in-process of transfer.^ This ■implies either that there are after all very few skilled shipbuilders in the army, or else that extraordinary difficulty is being experienced in getting them out. . ' .

' The taking over by the Allies of approximately a million tons of Dutch merchant shrpping for use in the service of the Allies "is now practically an accomplished fact. Precedent has been quoted to justify the action of the Entente group,- but if there-were no precedent there would still be more than justification. The position.is that Holland cannot use her own merchantmen, for the simple reason that Germany has seen to it that the seas are not safe for anyone. The safety of the Allies' cause depends in the fullest degree upon the servico of the greatest possible number of ships, and two-thirds of the Dutch marine is practically idle. Since the Dutch are business people, they would in all probability have made over their ships upor practical business terms to the Alliei long ago but for the fear that Germany woul<j[ visit her wrath upon her helpless neighbour. There, would be nothing unneutral in Holland's action if she hired or sold every ship she possesses t° any or all of the Allied nations, or to Germany ; nor does an offer to purchase or hire constitute a breach of a Mligerent't! duties . towards a neutral nation. The taking over, of the Dutch shipping has not had the full,and unqualified consent by Holland which is-a necessary part of a business bargain. The circumstances, however,. are. exceptional, and so far as the rights, and privileges, of the Dutch to refuse 'the Allies' demand have been infringed, .the peremptory action involved is^jiot to' be compared with the set policy of Germany towards neutral nations. A,principle, it may ba contended, has bsei'. departed from; but the stress of the "shipping" problem is, such as fully to justify'that departure if it has actually been made ' .-.'■■•

The Allies are in no way penalising Holland for opposing the bargain. It has been necessary to dictate the conditions under which the. commandeered vessels shall bo used, because to accept other conditions might reduce the value of the whole proceeding to an absurd degree. But Holland is guaranteed against eventual loss of tonnage, obtains payment in kind for the use of the vessels, and otherwise is treated as if the matter had been freely arranged. One asked for by the Dutch Government—that the vessels shall not bo armed—may be granted; but this will probably not reduce in any degree the liability of the vessels to be attacked by German submarines, though it may afford some protection to Dutch interests. For the purpose, of attacking the vessels,, the Germans will certainly regard them r.s being of Allied ownership; but if they were armed and happened to fire upon a U-boat, we may be sure that they would Tor the purposes of that act be Dutch too, and the Dutch people would be quickly reminded of-the fact. As it is, Germany will.probably make things as unpleasant for the Dutch as she. can, even though she is compelled to admit that Holland iias not acted freely. It is already suggested that the incompletely observed "safety" zone for Dutch trade may be abolished.'

A curious^ example of the war story which is invested with an authoritative sound, but which is hardly to be believed, is the, report that German airmen <-£re dropping big rubber halls filled with liquid mustard gas among the American troops. Mustard gas is, as most "people know, a very actual- and painful fact on the front, and a source of severe suffering to the men who axe affected by it. It is freely iised by the enemy iii shel's fired by the artilfery. It can, of course, be dropped by airmen, just aa anything- else* of a portable character can, and placed more or less inaccurately in places that shells cannot reach. But that it should be put into rubber balls ie almost incredible. A metal can would serve just aa well, and Germany has no rubber to spare for such purposes. Moreover, gas, to be used effectively in such a way, must be highly compressed; tho message alleges that it ie "liquid," which means an extraordinarily high pressure. A rubber ball is perhaps the worst sort of container imaginable for such a purpose.