THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCV, Issue 51, 28 February 1918, Page 6

THE WAR

"The brutal question," says one of | Kerenslcy's ex-Ministers, "is whether Gei'many shall organise Russia against the Allies/ or the Allies organise Russia against Germany." The idea of organising the Russians to resist certainly seems to be closer to the nractical than the companion idea of railing Japanese troops across Asia. But tho two proposals are not mutually antagonistic. They oould be applied on parallel lines, with the certainty, however, that the greatest present need is promptitude, a quality that could hardly be expected from a Japanese expedition confronted with transport difficulties of a nature stupendous. If anything anti-German is to happen in Russia., it should happen quickly, and that" means that it should come from the Russian people. Foreign organisation might help, and might be indispensable, but the Russians are themselves the best architects of their own salvation. And, to clear the way, the sooner that "Red Petrograd" goes down, the better. The Russian causeway from Berlin to Asia is the subject of comment elsewhere. _ It may be added that the' Turks may aid materially in promoting -the scheme, for the termination of the Russian armistice has enabled them to advance in Armenia. Trebizond, it is reported, has'already fallen to them. If the Russian administration in the Caucasus and in trans-Caucasia is at all similar in quality to that of "Red Petrograd," the Turks have a quite,fair chance of not merely regaining Erzeroum and the Turkish ground conquered a couple of years rgo oy Tsaristic Russia, but also of pushing over the frontier into the Caucasus and occupying the main lines of communication | between Russia and Central Asia. Thus it may happen that the Central Alliance is able to seize the causeway, at two - strategically vital spots, at the same time and with small losses. The Turkish advance in Trebizond, and the British forward movement in the Tigro-Euphrates valley, may or may not be related. If a strong Caucasian Administration were upholding the Russian cause in Armenia and in Persia, in loyal alliance with the Anglo-Indian army at Bagdad, ihe British commander might well lunge at the fqe, if only in the interests of his ally. But the quality of the Russian Caucasian Administration, and its ■ resistance power, are unknown. Int-r-relation o£ the Armenian, Tigro-Euphrates, .md Palestine fronts has long been obvious. Since the Russian Revolution, the two British expeditions have received little or no assistance from Armenia, but their activities have been mutually helpful. Mr. F. H. Slmonds emphasisss the design of General Allenby '"to draw away from the Turkish army now preparing for a thrust at Bagdad certain divisions and squadrons for the defence of the Holy Laud and Syria. Under the command of Falkenhayn a Turkish army has been preparing for months to retake Bagdad. A threat to Syria and an immediate menaue to the Mecca railroad might conceivably lead the Turks to insist upon detaching troops from tho Bagdad army for use against Allenby in defending their threatened dominions." It is interesting to hear again, from so authoritative a ( source, of Falkenhayn'6 Turkish army. As far ac the cablegrams- are concerned, this army might be dead. But for that matter, the same remark might be made concerning the Allied army at Salonika. The Bagdad and the Palestine armies occasionally make history rapidly. Salonika has been Ic6t in the fog of war for years, and Falkenhayn is almost as much in danger of dropping from public notice. Has he been waiting for the forward movement in Armenia? Is, hie real objective Erzeroum? .The frankness of .Mr. Barnes has revealed a serious fact. Seriouß as it is, the balance of good is on the side of revealing rather than of concealing it, and the nation is indebted to Mr. Barnes for beting told candidly that the shipbuilding programme both in Britainand in the United States is behind time. A little lees efficiency in the Anglo-American workshops, and a little more efficiency (or luck) in the German U-boat fleet, might together profoundly affect the history of the world. Mr. Barnes's appeal for further effort will need to be heard on both sides of the Atlantic if the submarine peril is to be firmly held. Nothing is more dangerous than to assume that that menace is dealt with. Such an assumption was perhaps the worst of the many sins of the Asquithian Ministers. That the German will to succeed in the undersea ' remains undiminished is proved by the inventiveness displayed in the cruiser-submarine. The Allies probably need not fear the'invention so fnuch as the spirit that is behind it. In enlarging the submarine, the Germans' have probably reaped disadvantages as well as advantages; if they have increased their hitting power and 6urface epeed they have also increased the target they offer a.nd tho duration of its exposure before submerging. By changing their coin from one pocket to another they probably have not augmented | their capital. But the restless determination to go one better than the enemy is a spirit that seldom goee entirely unrewarded. The story of the German raider Wolf eeems to be very much the story of her predecessors, except that the duration and range of the raid were very great. From Europe almost to the Antipodes the Wolf cruised with commerce-destroy-ing guns, throwing off at least one satellite, in the shape of a captured I ship jitt-ed with apparatus for mine-lay-ing. No one can withhold from the German captain and crew their due in praise, but it is surprising" that there have not been more sea-wolves, and etill higher losses. The world 'is etill not small enough to exclude the practicability, in the vast expanse of ocean, of piratical hide-and-seek. Over one-fifth of the Commonwealth returned soldiers saw no service because of their failure to reach the English medical standard. The economic loss must he immense, and the fact is one more demonstration of the unsuitability of the voluntary system to prolonged modern warfare. Shortage of recruite induces the sending of men who have no; chance of pacsing an examiner unaffected toy Australian conditions and mindfulsolely of military efficiency. It is an expensive system of optimism -and makebelieve. General Foch suggests an enemy offensive in Macedonia, "working towards Italy." The General does not exclude the "idea, of the mueh-talfcsd-of Western offensive, but is clearly of opinion that the enemy -will not devote to it, his whole and sole effort. Reasons for his not placing all his eggs in one basket may be rgadily found, Tho principal reason is.

that a Western failure would ha a blow to prestige, but that blow would fall less lightly if the onemy could pqint ttf an Italian, or a Macedonian) or a Mesopotamian success. The best opinion is that the enemy is not strong enough to victoriously engage in a maximum offensive in the principal theatre, and the last end of a gambler's throw might be-worse than the first. •