WHAT WAY OUT?

Evening Post, Volume XCV, Issue 15, 17 January 1918, Page 6

WHAT WAY OUT?

The Commonwealth political situation, from the--itand-point of its recent history and present state, was.reviewed at some length in yesterday^ issue. What the future developments may be is a much more difficult question. If by its resignation and rehabilitation the Nationalist Government has succeeded, constitutionally if not morally, in discharging its, pledge not to carry on without compulsory powers, the question of reinforcing the Australian divisions at the front still has to be faced. Will the new HughesCook Government—the result of the official death and constitutional re-birth of the old one—attempt in any way to enforce military compulsion? Or will it endeavour to reinforce the fighting divisions by trying to shake up the dry bones of voluntaryism?

Since the Nationalist Party caucus has re-adopted Mr. Hughes and his pledges, the party as a whole'must stand responsible for them. There is a tendency in the caucus to act in-the spirit of the constitutional practice, and therefore to regard the above-mentioned pledge as discharged. In its report of the caucus following the Government's resignation, the Sydney Morning Herald.says:

" Mr. Maxwell (Victoria) used the argument that the obligations placed on the Government by the Bendigo pledge had besn discharge;! by its resignation, and that the Prime Minister and his colleagues were now free men and could do as they pleased. This view found considerable favour."

No one appears to have pressed at this stage , for discharge of the pledge per medium of. a dissolution and an appeal to the country. Having clear evidence of an unexhausted Parliament, the Gover-nor-General was under no constitutional obligation, to enforce a dissolution; but it would have been competent for the caucus to go outside constitutional obligation and to have declared in favour of a dissolution'on moral grounds. Selfish as politicians are, it is not to be assumed that those in the caucus I.were deaf to moral reasoning. .Probably what swayed the more courageous of them against a dissolution was the fear that, under the stress of another election campaign, voluntary recruiting would go from bad to^ worse. The present position is ad; mittedly. far from, good, and yet might be capable of being altered not for the better.

Possibly a political factor like Sir William Irvine, had he been unaffected by the fear just mentioned, could have forced tlio issue and could have precipitated a dissolution. At an earlier meeting of the caucus he expressed himself definitely as inclined to such a remedy.' He urged the caucus'that:

" The proper course was for Mr. Hughes to resign and for Mr. Tudor to be given the opportunity of forming a Ministry. If" Mr../ Tudor could not carry on the King-'s Government, then a general election should be held with thfi present Party pledged to conscription. 1' But, ».o hv n.s the press v«porfc* g«i Sir I WiUism Il'vinn, a,t c»ucu«

meetings, did not follow up his own lead. Indeed, he did much to undermine ,his own advice when he voted for the confirmation of Mr. Hughes's leadership. It is probably fair to deduce that the chief, obstacle to a Tudor Government would be its claim to a dissolution in the event of Parliamentary defeat. Dissolution under the aegis of a defeated Tudor Government would have given the anticompulsiou official Labourites the tactical advantage of going before the electors not as the Opposition but as tlie Government. An old Parliamentary hand like Sir William Irvine would hardly have welcomed this addendum to his proposal. And yet it is an addendum such as Mr. Tudor, in his interview with the Gov-ernor-General, might naturally have stipulated; and such as the Governor; General, having at his disposal an unexhausted Parliament, might properly re- %

If the Nationalist Government holds itself to be absolved by resignation from the. pledge not to carry, on' .without compulsory powers, how does it stand towards the other Hughes pledge—not to introduce compulsion save by process of referendum? So vitally important is this question that we are led to.quote again from the report of the post-resignation caucus referred to above •

"It was held by 1 soino that when the Prime Minister made his policy speech prior to the general election in May, he pledged himself not to introduce conscription without reference to the people. By referring this question to a referendum not once, but twice," he had, it was maintained, fully observed his pledge. It would therefore bo competent for tho Government now, without in any way breaking its promises to. the. people • who returned it to power, to legislate in* the direction of compulsory service. To this it was objected that the pledge was not only for one or two appeals to ths people, but that it absolutely precluded tho Government for ever from-introducing conscription without ■a referendum. The latter view was almost unanimously accepted."

If this statement is correct and authoritative, then'military compulsion in Australia, is for the present dead. The existing Government is estopped by pledge and by two No votes. From these it cannot escape save by dissolution and general election; and that course is avoided on the. ground—good or bad— that it would make confusion worse confounded. The present dilemma has been reached by an impossible blending of the theories-of the- referendum and of responsible government. The combined effect has been to so mix persons and principles that, the result is a deadlock, Solvable only by such heroic measures as a democracy in- tha grip of a- critical war hesitates to adopt.