THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCIV, Issue 135, 5 December 1917, Page 6

THE WAR

( The story of Cambrai is not yet all told. The British advance a fortnight ago covered as much ground in a forward direction as was^to be regarded as safe for one stage, because the new front line had at its conclusion gone about as far as it could without losing the cover of the British heavy batteries; and it must therefore wait for these to be 1: "ought forward. Meantime, even without any remarkable counter-concentration by the enemy, a salient of jihe dimensions created by the Cambrai. victory was scarcely large enough to be the scene of a series of forward movements, and the logical next offensive in this region, if it came, would be intended to' widen the salient on one side, or both. But the enemy has cried check. It seems likely that ne concluded that the British offensive, which opened against a weak German line, was conducted with a force 6f n6 vast strength ; proportioned, that is to say, to the resistance it (had to meet. Moreover, he may have concluded. that the method of using tanks instead of a great bombardment was evidence that the British had also economised in guns. This is indeed likely, because of the great mass of heavy artillery in Flanders, and of the sudden and urtforeseen call for guns to-be sent to the Italian front.

'Coupled with these probabilities are certain, plain facts: (1) Cambrai is a point, as we have already explained, of high strategic value to the enemy. Not only is it a very important advanced base, but there is no place behind it capable of being saddled with its functions. (2) The enemy has received and is still receiving increased strength on the west front, owing to .the collapse of Russia. The degree of this increase it is impossible to guess. Somo people obviously exaggerate it; others assume'that it' is trifling. But it exists, and as it is practically certain 'to foe much greater as time goes on, the Germans may feel perfectly safe in anticipating the arrival of reserves as yet unreleased by drawing upon those already held under the rule that an active army is not safe -without inactive reserves. The effect of this increase in reserves can be judged by the -widely-accepted theory that to Germany, treating war as an exact science, the .possession of superfluous reserves means not so much the power as the duty to use them -up in an offensive "This duty is the more imperative because the Central Fcwers ar*e above allthe belligerents eager to end "the war at the earliest possible date. (3)xßy losing important positions; and involving a Breach in the Hindenberg line, and by Sustaining- a serious defeat through the ignoble channel of oompleto surprise, Germany has suffered a nasty moral shock. T6 recover from* this alone is ■worth no small expenditure of effort. (4) Germany is well aware that at this inoinerit Britain and France have had to transfer a large reserve foroe to help in the defenco of Italy.

The conditions sat out are' favourable to a-German offensive on a scale much larger than a mere counter-blow intended to restore the lost position. They are- not by any means what Germany would like them to be; but they are as good as she can expect. .They follow, from-the great results of her campaign of diplomacy, bribery,, and corruption, which has at a niihimum e&pense in the military sense put out of action an enemy with a population of over, one hundred millions. But across the Atlantic, separated in space only by an ocean inadequately patrolled by submarines and in time by a matter of months, is anl other new enemy with almost as big a population, incomparably more vigorous, more intelligent, wore morally warlike, more self-supporting and self-supplying. Germany may suppose that, with great determination and greater luck, she can win a valuable victory now; but when those American divisions roll across the Atlantic it will be too late. The offen-sive-defensive, which is the only true soldier's defence, is the German ideal; and it is to be seen jn a highly-developed form in the Battle of Gambrai, opened as a coup by the British -arid converted into a gtsat test by the Germans. We have perhaps witnessed only its initial stages. After its first extraordinarily successful phase it has takpn on the, characteristics of a vast and costly battle, about which much remains yet to be told; Already, perhaps, it ; has had an important effect on future events. -

A New York message has. conveyed the news that the British and French forces in Italy have now taken over the vulnerable points on the entire line of the Piave River, ".which the enemy will find is now an impassable barrier." This ■is good news,''and it is remarkable that the. work of bringing these large forces and their equipment through the narrow ways between France and Italy and getting them into position has been done in five weeks from the time whtfn Italy's peril became evident. It would be a. mistake to attach much importance to the phrasing of an isolated message such as the one under review; but it seems likely that it has been appropriately worded. The probability is strong that, at least for a considerable time to comej the Allied effort will be to maintain an impassable barrier, rather than ito take the offensive and'turn the invaders out. No great military harm would result from maintaining the present front; to ptish it back might make intolerable demands upon the Western armies.

Ih the Russian theatrei ot* of the principal events during the p«ct few

days is the despatch of a party of Lenin's representatrves to negotiate at the German head(sartere for ah armistice, which l^emM appears to hope will affect not only -the Wern but. all the fronts. There seems to be about as much sound basis for this hope-as lKtre ; 3 j udgment h ; selection of emissaries. Two colonels have g one f ?rWaM & ]ook ofter f^h . military p .o ln ts; but the diplomacy of Sfrt,^ Wrt " t J tusted-- 'Witt Utopian taith in the coneideration the enemy will show them, to W peasants, a soldier a sailor, and a workman. These words of course are to be read a little widely • Wfi'S 6?: 11 representatives of the bodies kT thm\ and the men a™ possithWUiw P€°ple enough- But how they will fare at a council table against JJerman diplomatists trained in thefinest . 5^»ol- o* rchacaajety ■ and international double-dealing history his known is i question that seems to have only one answer. Ifc xs perhaps a «uspiciori that they may be out-manoeuvred that has led their chiefs to announce that the world is to be the grand ; arbiter of the negotiations. It is proposed that the whole discussion is to b« reported throughout the world by wireless; but to suppose that the peoples will thus be aide to control the affair, even that the intricaciesv of such s discussion can be reported for full understanding, is another grotesque idea. „

General Van ' Deventer has reported that the whole-of German East Africa, is now clear of the enemy; the sole' remaining German force has escaped across the border into Portuguese territory, where steps are being taken to deal with it. It is, of course, possible that this last remnant may ..still give some trouble, but " finis" has been set upon the tragic story of Germany's overseas empire. Not a, shred of it now remains to her; and the history of its conquest will emphasise the fact that the removal of the Kaiser's flag has been in a very large measure due to the work of Britain's colonial troops.