THE WAR
Kerensky has left Petrograd, but the presumption is that he has not given, up the struggle. He is now supposed to bs working for the rallying of the stable revolutionary party in- Moscow, where, if he succeeds, the official government of Russia will be re-established. The earliest reports of - the anarchist seizure of Petrograd, having been issued through the extremists' own news channels, must be regarded.as greatly exaggerated, and the report that "a, separate peace-is imminent" means at, present no more than that it is one of the objects of the extremists. A brief statement of their aims is, roughly, that they are bent on reversing everything that exists—so long, presumably, as such, reversal does riot throw them back into the conditions of the late monarchy. If there is a Government at all, they are "agin it." Kerensky's first pro : gramme was almost as extreme, and had tb be modified, for example, in the matter of the death penalty ior desertion and treason, which after beiug abolished was reinstated.. This has been swept away again in the Petrograd scheme. Among other picturesque details "of the scheme is _ the proposed march of political prisoners out of the gaols, and the march in <!f their whilom captors. The new movement is not yet reported >to have reached serious proportions, except in Petrograd, which it cannot be too clearly realised is-not Russia, and in these days cannot speak for Russia. But the wa.ve of disturbance will spread throughout the nation and infest the whole army, with an effect that cannot be foretold except that it will not improve it from the point of view of the prosecution of the war.
People are wondering, of course, what would be the effect upon the European war if Russia, having found a single dominant voice, should cry peace. The real situation now, and for months past, is that Russia is little more than a benevolent neutral, whose frontier the enemy is compelled to "watch" with an army that is large only because of the great extent of line that has to be guarded. If, however, Russia made a separate peace, some of the effects would be : (1) The guarding army; of .some million and a-half men, would be for the enemy to use elsewhere; (2) Russian supplies of foodstuffs and war material would be available to Germany; (3) an enormous number ot Russian prisoners of war, held in : Germany and Austrian-Hungary, would be exchanged for German and; Austrian prisoners of less number held in Russia, which would have the double effect. of reducing the food problem for the Central Powers and of giving them a fresh reservoir of manpower.
There is an interesting development to-day in the news of a French offensive in Southern Alsace, which lias been conspicuously quiet for a very long time. The enemy reports violent bombardment and strong infantry attacks in 'the Sundgan district, south-west of Mul-ha-usen. The details are meagre at pre; sent, and there is no French report at the time of writing, so that the scale of the operation and its object cannot be estimated. If, however, a big offensive can be developed in the Alsatian plains the threat to German occupancy of the province may have an important effect-. , . r
There is no good news yet from Italy, and the retreat continues rapidly. Rome reports that the larger units are retiring safely under cover of valiant rearguards, while Berlin tells a story of a heavy capture in the mountain region north of Udine, where the retreat of a large body was cut off and 17,000 men were captured, with 80 guns. The total captures are now set down without contradiction at the enormous total of 250,000 men and 2300 guns. American advices from Rome tell of the beginning of a decisive battle in the plains, with the Allied reinforcements still massing on the Piave River. Dramatic events are due here before long.
The invasion of Italy by Austro-Ger-man troops may compel the United State? Government to re-examine its attitude to Austria-Hungary. At pre■sent the United States supplies Italy with money to overthrow the AustroHungarians, yet is not at war with Austria-Hungary; and when the AustroHungarians invade Italy and capture material that American credit helped to buy, the relations between Washington and Vienna still remain theoretically peaceful. This position is even more anomalous than was that of Italy during all the long period when she was at war with Austria-Hungary but not with Germany, her enemy's abettor and—to a large extent—his brain and guiding hand. As Italy in time came to a decision concerning Germany, so, it would seem, must the United States deßne its position .to Austria-Hungary. In President Wilson's reply to the Pope there was a sentence in which he said that • punitive damages, the dismemberment
of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues, we deem inexpedients and in the end \vorse than futile." It has lately been apparent that the President lias induced Britain and France to weaken on the economic boycott, but is he so sure of his ground in the matter of the dismemberment of the AustroHungarian Empire? He stands for a free Polish State; why not for a free South Slavic State? In any case, the United States view of Austria-Hungary calls for some explanation and amplification.
Germany, says Herr Erzborger, Leader of the German Centre Party, is already a, democracy. This feverish desire of certain factions in Germany—factions famed more for conservatism than for tolerance —to be considered democratic, dates from the crystallisation of the war-issues into a supreme test between" autocracy arid democracy. President Wilson, when he laid aside equivocation and became a law-giver instead of a mediator, was able to reinforce heavily the cause of freedom by showing that Germany was constitutionally incapable of making any guaranteed agreement. Her autocratic character was so engrafted into her constitution, and her autocracy had proved so uniformly aggressive and faithless, that any settlement with a Kaiser-ridden Germany was pronounced by the President to be out of the question.- "We cannot," he said in effect, "make peace with the Hohenzollerns" ; such a peace would not "make the world safe for democracy." Replying to the Pope, the President stated that it was impossible to' take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. To prove that the "will-and purpose of the German people" is behind the JVaisers Government Herr Erzberger rushes in with his assurance of the democratic character of Germany as a political entity. His statement is, of course, true neither in spirit nor in letter, and will certainly not convince the other peoples of the world." An AJlied victory connotes, ' at the very least the abolition of Hohenzollernism. Anything less than that will reduce the Wilson Notes to .the standard of pious aspirations which the Anglo-Saxon world had not the will to vindicate
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Bibliographic details
Evening Post, Volume XCIV, Issue 114, 10 November 1917, Page 6
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1,182THE WAR Evening Post, Volume XCIV, Issue 114, 10 November 1917, Page 6
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