THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCIV, Issue 113, 9 November 1917, Page 6

THE WAR

Certain military experts in Switzerland and ItAy are reported to be of opinion that General Cadorna's best strategy now would be to retire to the Adige River, and then to carry ont a vigorous offensive, which might destroy the enemy. But, as the report points ont, the abandonment of Vicenza, Padua, and Venice, which this would necessitate, involving also the abandonment of about 8000 square miles of territory (nearly the- whole of the province of Venetia) carrying a population of, roughly, 3,000,000, or a twelfth of the whole Italian population, would be repugnant to the nation. These experts probably have a shrewd idea as to how the enemy's downfall could thus be brought about; but even if it could, and the fact could be easily realised by the people, tha soldiers would have the utmost difficulty in carrying out their views. It 2S always one of the great difficulties in the conduct of a war that the strategist's ideas of the value of territory are utterly different from those of the politician. The politician's valuation is more m accord with that of the inhabitants, while the military man necessarily treats towns and districts as the squares of a chessboaid. His indifference to the immediate interests of the people affected is more apparent than real, for he endeavours, Eke a statesman, to build for the fefcora, not the present; The fact that he may be-deaßng with an enemy whose policy is complste ruthlessness may alter His valuation in degree, but it cannot change it in kind; and he is always in. this respect apt to be more or less at odds with the political directors of fihe war.

Ti-ms -tins drargenco of conception winch made the problem,of Verdun so difficult for Prance when the enemy's attack began in i 916. Had the soldiers had their way, Verdun, would probably, have been given upj but, for the sake -of public opinion it was had, and foriu3ia±ely all wae welkin the end. The-ex-.Pe^te now state tßat Oadorna desired: in ;l916:to gwe up Vicenza. for two:days because he -eoald then have caught the enemy in a. tcap emerging from the Trentmo'towards fhat city,- hnt the_Gbvernment would not allow it. What might have been a great victory became actually a narrow escape from a serious defeat, in which Russia played a great part. The preaent 'situation is, these experts say, that by abandoning a huge belt of rich territory the campaign may be won; by deciding not to do so it may be lost, and territory overrun by the enemy to the same or ah even greater extent and with at least equally destructive results. So vast is the sacrifice demanded by the strategical theory outlined < in the message that it is almost inconceivable it should be put into practice, in the face of an enemy who systematically destroys everything he cannot take away. It must be expected that every effort will be made to hold at least thePiave River—the last strong barrier "between the Hun and the treasures of Vene-' tia..

Fiesli:eniphagis'is'}ai(fcbyGen. Maurice, the British Director of Military Operations, upon the treachery of intrigued Italian troops as the prime cause of the disaster. Gtdbrna, he declares, knew all about the attack except the extent of the intrigues among his own men. If it were not. for ths enormous h£t&i of iirtillei-y and supplies su&ere&ty the tiaii&iss, we

imght hope that the restoration of the armys moral (probably already largely affected by the shock of what has happened) would enable the enemy to be held easily, for the invasion has been m&do by means of a coop, not by overwhelming forces. But the losKes have occurred, and the issuo is in complete •doubt. The result still waits upon the timely arrival of the Allied troops and tneir guns.

The submarine retnrns published • yesterday are notable- for the fact that the number of vessels sunk is tho lowest on tecord since the new campaign began There were only twelve victims; the previous lowesb was thirteen, and of these eigbt were over 1600 tons—a number which has not previously been "beaten." hver since the great effort in April, the British losses have been on the whole steadily declining, and have been hovering about a low level ever since JulyIhe Italian and PVench losses have been moderate, with few serious jumps, and several blank weeks. A London message to-day points to a very striking decrease in the ravages among Norwegian shipping, which has suffered more severely than any other neutral marine, both relatively and absolutely, under the Üboat scourge. These losses, which had reached 32,000 tons a month in April ■(the period of grcateat submarine activity) have fallen away rapidly since, till, in the beginning of October, they disappeared altogether. The figures given follow, roughly, the same course of decline as the British returns, and perhaps, the June losses, if they were given would show a jflmp comparable with that m the British statements.

The present general decline of losses due to submarine attack must be set down m part to the lees favourable weather,- in part to the better defensive measures adopted. It is possible also that the relief experienced by the Nor"7^? , ls attributable to the activity of British patrols.in the Kattegat, where the submarines are now lees free to moye back and forth between Norwegian waters and the German bases. The winter is rapidly comings on, when submarlmng is a precarious and painful livelihood ; and it is not to be Tightly assumed that next spring will be an easy time f?r shipping. It ia, indeed, probable ttot the enemy is making very special efforts in preparation for the coming season. °