BRITISH NAVY'S CONTROL

Evening Post, Volume XCIV, Issue 67, 17 September 1917, Page 10

BRITISH NAVY'S CONTROL

ADMIRAL JELLICOE ON THE SITUATION

GERMAN DESTROYERS' RAIDS

HOW THEY ARE MADE POSSIBLE.

"The British Navy's control of the nervo system of maritime communications of the world at this juncture is moro complete than the control exercised by the array of the Central Powers on land," said Admiral Sir John R. Jellicoe, First Sea Lord, and Chief of the Naval Staff, in an interview with the American Associated Press last month, in which he discussed the submarine menace and the naval situation at the end of the third year of the war. "That," he said, "suggests perhaps a train of thought which American students of the war might pursue with interest and advantage to the Allied cause. But I am content at'this moment merely to emphasise the supreme importance of' the work which the Grand Fleet is doing under the command of Sir David Beatty. •

"You ask me how it is that German destroyers are able to carry • out raids from time to time. Such missions are entrusted to the swiftest vessels under the German ensign and they are carried out with every advantage on the side of the Germans. The North Sea is a very 'tiig area of water. It is'more than twice as, large as the whole United KingdomEngland, Scotland, Wales arid Ireland— which is traversed by nearly 24,000 miles of railway lilies. . "The German desti-oyers wait for dark and then daeh off from one of the bases situated within an hour or two of steaming of the British coast. They have *c choice of an objective against a coast line of great length. There is hardly a point but is undefended, advantage having been taken of the immunity from bombardment which international law was believed before the war to confer!

ADVANTAGES WITH THE ENEMY.

"Now,' mark these points: The. enemy has the choice of nights when the weather and visibility are most suitable for its purpose.; He puts to sea clear of his mine-field. He can steam in a northerly, westerly, or southern direction. Aircraft are used for reconnaissance so as to gain, information of the movement of the British patrol forces.. The Germans have the further advantage of being able to fire at every craft which comes within sight the monient it is sighted. "What is the position of the British patrol,, whose vigilance has been subjected to three years of unceasing, strain? Officers have many duties to carry out quite apart from punishing these 'tip and run' raids. They never know, when the enemy ships will break out or where they will speed at their highest speed, and" in the darkness they have to discriminate between friend and neutral on the one hand and foe on the other hand before they fire!' . x . ."Despite the advantages which the Germans enjoy, no raid has resulted in the slightest military gain to Germany cr loss to Great Britain. Such a policy cannot be pushed successfully unless the enemy is. prepared to support his. de- ■ stroyors with stronger forces—in other words, ri»k some portion of his high seas fleet—arid thus' the menace of our Grand Fleet operates. ' ■- ■ "We: deplore the loss of life among non-combatants, but, after all, we are engaged in a war whereon .the freedom of the world depends, and we cannot de^ fleet our.strategy from its.main purpose. That is what'the Germans hope to effect and they have failed. At the same time perhaps. I may add that since the exp]oitvof thgjSwift, andlßroke the enemy Has attempted ho'^'i'aid 'on theißritishcoast. ' '..-■,

THE GERMAN BASES,

.'• "This leads me to say a few words as to the destroyer and submarine bases.on the Belgian coast which are' in the occupation of the Germans. One is Ostend; the other is Zeebrugge. The Germans have applied to this length of eand. fringed coast the same principle of intensive ■ fortification adopted higher on the' North Sea and the 'Island ,of Heligoland. The coastline is studded with heavy guns, which in themselves constitute ' infinitesimal targete at a range of more than, twenty-thousand yards on which any bombardment could be carried out.

"Moreover, the enemy has not been slow to make ■ fullest use of aircraft and smoke screens by way of .protection. Ostend offers the best target, but it can only bo attacked at rare intervals when a favourable combination of wind, weather, and sea conditions" can be attained. Zeebrugge, in the real sense of the word, is not a naval base, but merely an exit from the inland port -of Bruges, with which it is connected by a wide, deepwater canal. There is little to hit at Zeebrugge. Still I hope that the problem which the Belgian coast presents is not unsolvable." : THE GENERAL: SITUATION. Turning to the general naval situation at the end of the third year of the great war. Admiral Jellicoe said: \ "The fourth year of the naval war opens this week, and only those who are, familiar with German naval literature— which preached the doctrine of the offensive—can appreciate the significance of naval events during the past three years. The German High Seas Fleet was not' created that it might ■remain inactive month after month. It is a great war engine. No greater mistake can be made than to underestimate its strength. It is far stronger, for instance, than the British Fleet was ten years ago, and in years before, the opening.of the war it' was submitted to a'very thorough intensive system of training. "The British Grand Fleet has offered it a challenge to action which has not been accepted, for, on the occasion of the Battle of Jutland, the Germans had no thought of a fight to a finish. For the whole year now the High Sens Fleet has ventured only beyond its protected minefields on one occasion—2lst August last year, and then it speedily sought shelter once more .

"Owing, to the attention which the novel and barbarojs submarino warfare has attracted there is perhaps a tendency to.forget that continued success of our Grand Fleet in the main German force on which the success or failure of the Allied cause is mainly dependent. Very little can be said as long as the war lasts of the wort'of the Grand. Fleet, bnt it is the foundation whereon all the-efforts of the Allies rest.

"What has it ..done? For a period of three years it has robbed the Germans of all advantages which they expected to reap from the possession of a strong battle fleet. That force was to have sallied forth from time to time. The Germans calculated that they would strike at their selected moment, when their fleet would be at a maximum strength, and that they would cat^h our Grand Fleet at a moment wh'en, owing to the absence of ships undergoing, refits and repairs, the odds were little, if anything, against them. They have not been permitted to carry out that scheme, but we have always to be--,on our guard. "Wo cannot permit them, for instance, to emulate the example of Villeneuve when he eluded Nelson off Toulon and cruised to the "West Indies and then got hack to port again, having suffered little injury as the .result of (Holder's action. No, we must not contemplate such i

break-out on the part of the Germans, particularly now that the American people are_ in the war and require peace and security in order to mobilise their enormous fighting power. • "The carrying out of that purpose imposes a heavy responsibility on the Giand Fleet. The Grand Fleet consists noi only of battleships and battle cruisers] but includes .also light cruisers 'and, destroyers. If these destroyers were not working with ithe Grand Fleet they would be available for combating the. submarine menace. It is sometimes l suggested that for -this and other reasons we ought to adopt a more offensive .policy against 'the German High SeasFleet. We 1 are face to face with the old problem—how to force a fleet which hides in a harbour ito come out and fight. It ia a very old problem. Our forefathers were familiar with it. For twenty-one years it' confronted them at -the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of. the nineteenth centuries.

"A superior fleet can force an enemy fleet into port, but if it is to be compelled to come out against its will; history suggests I(hat compulsion must be. applied by the army acting against itsbase or bases. I need not say any more on that issue, except to suggest that naval power and military power are complementary one to.the other. The navy alone cannot win a war, as history has always shown, arid the army alone cannot triumph, as . the . Germans havelearned." ■ ■•. , . . ', i ■