THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCIV, Issue 67, 17 September 1917, Page 6

THE WAR

Colonel Chumsky, the now well-known Russian military writer, and Mr. F. H. Simonds, the still better known American war critic, both deal to-day with aspects of Germany's prospects in terms of man-power. Colonel Chumsky takes the immediate view as affecting Russia; Mr. Simonds the broader one relating to the whole war. Colonel Chumsky declares that the enemy has not sufficient men to march upon Petrograd in face of the unbeaten and numerous army on the Riga front. Two hundred thousand men are'manifestly' not enough to fight their" way forward and maintain an unbroken line over such a great distance., as separates them from Petrograd. And if' this were not in itself enough, Colonel Chumsky points out that already the weather forbid* rapid movement of a big army, and will soon stop it altogether. A nanjow invasion covering merely the direct road to Petrograd is unthinkable; and the Russian expert on this score mentions the strongholds of Dvinsk, Polotsk, and Vitebsk, which form a chain of defence* on the Dvina' and tend to prevent the enemy passing the river. Incidentally, these fortresses are also' guardians of Moscow. Colonel Chumsky'a remarks are of special value as corroborating the already strong belief in Germany's essential weakness. If Germany had men enough for a great adventura against Petrograd, it is obvious thatiit Avortld have been launched long ago--unlcsc, indeed, the collapse.at Riga came as a surprise to the omniscient soldiers who rule the German Army.

Mr. Simo'nds bases nis comments on recently published statistics (some .of which were reviewed in this''column on Saturday). Mr. Warner Allen assessed the number.of men "shortly to be incorporated ". as 1;300,000; General de Lacroix put. the reserve at 755,000. Mr. Simonds. says the supply of reservesfor the.current year of'war just begun is less than a million, mostly boys. Obviously . there are' different ways of arriving at these, numbers, which fact makes them rather, unsatisfactory. The: exhaustion of a reserve existing at any one-time is riot complete when the enemy has suffered, an equal number of casualties,.because.new recruits come in as they, reach what is for the time being She age for military, service. Variations in the estimates may occur through the author's inclusion or omission of these future' drafts. Another difficulty arises in the consideration of men who reach the theoretical maximum age limit. German soldiers attaining '46 are supposed to be discharged from the fighting army; but in the great majority of cases when, they are fit for,any work at all they go to a less exacting' military duty, so that in the end their nominal relief from service does npt weaken the actual numbers of the fighting army. They take up work which would otherwise be done by other men, who are thus available to go to the front,, The conclusion reached by Mr. Simonds, however, is that in less than a year from now. the German reserves (allowing that the active army re^ mains in its present size) will have disappeared altogether.

Monte San ;-Gabriels appears from various recent reports to have been the scene of some of the most sanguinary fighting in the Italians' recent offensive, which has throughout been characterised by unusual intensity and very heavy losses on' both sides. For many days past there has been little news from the Italian front, and the later stages. of the battle , have been marked by strenuous and, s in some degree, successful efforts by the enemy to win back positions which, had, in the heat of the first prolonged attacks, fallen into the hands of General Cadorna's army. Apart from the Isonzo lines, there have been two or three spasmodic efforts by the Austrians in the Trentmo. TVq of these during recent weeks have been just west of Lake Garda, and can be regarded as unimportant to the general issue and &s purely local affairs. The main struggle is on the Isonzo front. This is the only region where the Italians can see daylight ahead of them; whereas the most promising field for an enemy offensive is from the Trentino, that great strategic wedge which the foresight of Austrian statesmen built by the alignment of the frontier among the forward crests of the Alps.

, It is probably worth while to describe again the broader elements of the Isonzo positions affected by the recent campaign. In a direct line they stretch about 30 miles from the sea northward. At only one place, around and eastward of Gorizia, is the country anything like plain; and here the battle-ground- Is dominated by the heights of the Carso on the south and by the higher irregular peaks and ridges, forming, the rampart of the Ternova plateau, the southern limit of the Julian Alps._ South of the Carso, on a- narrow strip of coastal plain, lies the main road to the Italians' chief objective, Trieste ; 4 and this narrow coastal strip is as it were plugged tight by the missive Hermada Hill, reaching almost across it, and separated from the Carso plateau by the narrow Brestovizza Valleji and from the sea by only a mile of flat. Four miles north of Gor'izia the Cliiapovano Valley offers a precarious route of advance eastward, ,which is much more practicable for military uu as * Una of communication for the enemy., It is flanked on the aorta

by Monte Santo (taken by the Italians) and on the south by Monte San Gabriele, for which the struggle is still in progress. Immediately north and northeast of Monte Santo is the Bainsizza plateau, on which the Italians have established themselves. On these sectors the Italians have advanced, by dint of several successive efforts, to as much as ten miles east of the leonzo River; but further north, for many miles, the river,confined in a deep and steeply-cut gorge, is for practical- purposes the line of th« opposing armies.

The chief point the Italians wish to seize is Trieste, partly because it is the nearest place of great military and political importance to both sides, chiefly because there is no place within reasonable distance of attack the loss of which would have a. more serious effect upon Austria's attitude to the whole war. Trieste is only twelve miles from th« Italians upon the Oarso-Hermada front. A second objective, about three times as. far away in distance and perhaps still furt-Rer off in terms of accessibility, is Laibaeh; bat the value of Laibach to the Italians is not the intrinsic worth of the place itself'; it is the fact" that its capture would mean .a tremendous increase in the ease of capturing Trieste, since Laiback is on one of the two great railways to that port. (It would serve almost as well if the Italians.'reached the railway at any other point, than Laibach.) The problem before the Italians is thus simply to capture Trieste, arid it is necessary to regard all the fighting on the Isonzo front with respect to that object" and no other.

Because of this fact, the Carso plateau and the Hermada sector, though actually on the' seaward flank, are. strategically the centre; and operations on t*he geographical Centre 1 (about and north of G-orizia,, for example at Monte San Gabriele) are strategically flanking in character.. But whether this will remain true depends upon the outcome of the present offensive; upon whether the Italians find the Carso and Hermada defences unconquerable. Such a discovery will compel them,, and may already have compelled them, to shift their main attack northwards to the geographical centre of their present fighting front. But they, will do that only as a means to"" an end, for their chief object will still be to subjugate the Carso defences and reach Trieste. The road to Laibach is simply a roundabout route to Trieste. At present we hear" very little of fighting, but more about the San, Gabriele sector than- any other. The absence of news might have been an indication of the virtual end of the Italian efforts for the present, if it were not for current statements about heavy fighting which has been in progress, but little reported upon, for some time past. The battle is slow in yielding fruits, though General Cadorna was recently reported to have used most hopeful" phrases / about the prospects, and the Italian press was enthusiastic . in its anticipations. Notwithstanding these expressions and hints that the Isonzo might be the chief battleground of the war; notwithstanding even the reported emptying of Trieste of its civil population, it. must be said that there has not been from the first any great Jiope of a rapid victory here, except in the event of a complete breakdown on Austria's, part. By theHime the offensive closes, whether through expenditure of effort or winter's foreclosure of time, Italy will probably b* well content with the undoubtedly heavy tax she has laid, for the benefit* of the Allies as a whole, upon, the manpower and supplies of h*r chief enemy.