RIVAL STRATEGIES

Evening Post, Volume XCIV, Issue 59, 7 September 1917, Page 11

RIVAL STRATEGIES

GERMAN AND ALLIED

SYSTEMS

I WATERLOO AS DECISIVE BATTLE | GROUND

Waterloo may witness the decision of the world* greatest conflict as it witnessed the downfall of Napoleon's imperial power one hundred years ago. This is the opinion of an English military expert, Major Stuart-Stephens, who advances it in an article in the latest issue .of The English Review. He also takes up three points about 1 the situation on the Western front in Europe that will strike the average follower of the war's developments as new. These are: —

The necessity that the Allies provide a reserve of 1,000,000 men capable of administering a "knock-out"—for which reserve the English expert looks to America.

The location of the German battle line to which Hindenburg, according to Major Stuart-Stephens, is gradually and methodically retiring. , The radical difference between the Anglo-French and German systems of planning major military operations, which, owing to the progress in aviation, should result, he thinks, in material benefit to the English and French on the Western front. This third point is of special interest to Americans, as it has to do with control of the air, toward which such determined efforts are being made just now in this country. Major Stuart-Stephens met many of the German leaders before the war, and heard from their own. lips their conception of strategy. Especially interesting was his acquaintance with Maeckel, author of a German text-book mi strategy. It is on his knowledge of these men and their caet of mind that .Major StuartStephens bases the conclusions set forth mi his article.

He contends that the war can be setVied only on the battle front in Western and Southern Belgium, and that it can. be settled there only if the Allies are able to increase enormously their numerical superiority. He declares, that such mi increase in numbers is possible, and sets forth the necessity -for it in these words:

A MILLION EESEBVE NEEDED.

"The bedrock, of the overwhelmingly serious problem that presents itself to .us now, now, now, is the setting to work in deadly, bruta-1 earnest for the provision of ■new reserves. In a banking institution we may look upon the actual gold reserve as 'the Eeserve,' and the widespread and ramified resources of the concern in the shape of credit as the bank's 'Reserves.' Now, in the event of a run on the bank, I imagine the reserves are mobilised, and the reserve is produced, ready to throw in to, turn the scale. It seems, to the people looking at it from a business point of view, quite a reasonable conclusion that, if an adequate reserve is not supplied in time to turn the tide of battle, or to meet an unforeseen eventuality, the resources of the bank may not ( save it from disaster. Do the same people see from their business point of view that Field Marshal Sir Douglas "Haig must have at his disposal a reserve of at least a million men before he can accomplish, after many rounds,. a knock-out blow ? I trow not. Because our unmilitary- British public will : not apply to the winning of a struggle for our Empire's existence the principles that are inseparable from ordinary civil life.

"In the ring the boxer's resources are bis skill, ids training, hie fitness—a hundred and one factors which are behind him ; his reserve is that which he keeps up his sleeve, .some knock-out blow into which he has to put every ounce at his disposal, and which he is preparing to put in to settle the combat once for all, either when he sees an opening at a ' predetermined time. And without this million reserve Haig will not be strong enough at a point where he would be looking to the accomplishment of a decision, or where' Hindenburg would propose a decision.

"Now I dare to assert that either of thepe contingencies will not present itself to either opponent for some months to come. Therefore,. there is time even at this eleventh hour to get the 'solar plexus' million. For there cannot be any reasonable probability of a knockout blow in the area in which this summer's operations will be carried on. The 'ring' is not suitable; it doe - not favour a, knock-out. There is no clean area fit for the deployment of armies, one or the other of which would be able to inflict a, decisive blow." , -

"THE COCKPIT OP EUROPE."

■Such an area will not be presented, continues Major Stuart-Stephens, until Hindenburg reaches his formidable new line, in the region of Waterloo, which is thus described: —

"On those rolling plateaus, the ■ immemorial cockpit of .Europe, .within not many miles of God's Acre at Waterloo, where so many of our brave forbears sleep, will" be fought the big battle of the war; on which, if the issue of the result imposes such a course, the enemy will hold us up on their last line, that on which during the last eighteen months has been lavished every atom of Teutonic military engineering ingenuity. "This Torres Vedras of the war, of the nature of which I have heard from neutral sources, extends from the Antwerp entrenched 1 camp to that at Namur. ... One of its most striking features is an extra heavily ballasted railway, capable of bearing the weight of mobile platforms from which 'Fleissige Bertha' (42-mm. howitzers) i can be brought Inifo. action 'with almost as much rapidity,' an informant expressed to me, 'as a horse artillery gun.' Tho whole line is, in fact, stiffened by the presence of a perambulating giant battery which is ready to move up and down between the place of arms op the Scheldt arid that on. the confluence of the Sambre and the Meuse'."

The German system is responsible for the fact that, the 'present British reserves are inadequate for a knock-out blow, says Major StuarfwStephens—the system taught by Maeckel and the rest of his school. The English officer explains, this a 6 follows: —, HINDENBURG'S .SYSTEM OF RETREAT. "How is it that the several 'pushes' of ourselves and our- gallant French Allies have failed to realise the tangible result anticipated? Unhesitatingly I declare that such a lamentable state ,of affaire will continue so long as. Hindenburg's governing tactical principles are apparently ignored and unprepared for. His systerb of fighting detaining actions by enveloping attacks in mass directed -against one of the following army's flanks is no modern development of Teutonic military science. It is the same idea on which Frederick the Great based his offensive-defensive, strokes during a strategic retirement—the manoeuvre to produce his famous 'oblique line'—and this idea should g\iide us during the'preludes of every coming action fought on a .large scale." This German method of retirement,' continues the. Engiigh writer, with its

strong and constant ■counter-attacks to slow up pursuit, will use up any reserves that the English provide under their present system, and the absence of the "solar plexus 1' million will make any settlement impossible short of the Ant-werp-Namur line. ,And this brings him to a most interesting comparison of the Anglo-French and German strategy. The chief difference, he points out, lies in this: With the Hindenburg school it is not the situation accurately known that rules the offensive, but a rapid and overwhelming offensive blow to create a predetermined tactical situation favourable to the Commander . in Chief's strategic plan. Here is hie summary of the two schools: —

THE TWO METHODS.

"The German system seeks for success in the envelopment of an enemy whose actual position is often ascertained by a process of reasoning as to the best move open to him. This plan is adopted in order to avoid the loss of time incident on exhaustive aerial" reconnaissance. The chief drawback to this method is tho possibility of the defeat in detail of converging units before they close on their prey." This danger is guarded against in the German system by a high degree of training in initiative 'and cooperation, which leads commanders of units to close with the enemy as rapidly as possible and irrespective of losses, the object being to get at the enemy wherever he is encountered,' in order to deprive him of freedom of movement; in the certainty that their comrades to the right and left are doing the same, and by their vigorous action are relieving hostile pressure.

"One obvious drawback to this form of war is that, should the position of the enemy not conform to the hypothesis of the Commander in Chief, the latter has great difficulty in altering his plan by giving fresh directions to his general officers, for the control of the operations, and once these are launched they are practically in the hands of column commanders. On the other hand, the German system—that evolved by my sometime .Berlin, friend, Colonel Maeckel— is especially adapted to working in the fog of war, and is therefore finding its raison d'etre in the condition' of things that prevail on the whole Western front.

"It demands, first of all, an entirely intelligent knowledge of the art of war on the part of the Commander in Chief, and Hindenburg is efficiently equipped in this respect. And it calls for character and vigour rather- than intelligence in its column leaders. It assumes that, in war, information will not always be forthcoming exactly when it is wanted, or, at any rate, not in time to be acted upon, and that, therefore, it ie necessary to have a hard and simple definite plan of action, laid down beforehand, and a vigorous and irresistible initiative to destroy the independence of the hostile Commander in Chief.

"Now, the German system requires information to confirm the hypothesis as to the whereabouts and constitution of the main body of the hostile army. Our system requires accurate information when the enemy has committed himself and is no longer free to alter his dispositions.

"Secondly, that of Germany requires a standard of ' average efficiency but not genius in the subordinate leaders—not a heaven-born general here and there, but a corps of commanders who can be counted upon to play up to each other. "Thirdly, . the German war method suits ■ the conditions of uncertainty which, airplanes all to the contrary, have, shrouded operations on the , Western front. In this form of war. the German General Staff maintains that a vigorous offensive in. great measure replaces ac-' .curate . information. ■ ,

"Fourthly, the adherents of the German method contend that only the simple succeeds' in war. The German war- doctrine is simplicity pushed to its ultimate. (In favour of the French Staff method, under which I have trained, it may be said that, given sufficient information, the plan acted upon is never an involved one.)

"Fifthly, the German method bridges over the gulf ■ between strategy and tactics, since Prussian enveloping strategy brings about a battle of which 1 envelojiing tactics-are the characteristic feature.

"Sixthly, in the enemy's system the Commander in Chief must, to a great extent, stand or fall by his initial plan of operations. In the Franco Biitish system a Commander in Chief can take advantage of an opportunity if he it able to' recognise it. "Lastly, the German Commander in Chief bases his plans at the onset on reasoning rather than on information. When his mind is made up he risks much to gain time." .

WHERE THE ALLIES GAIN.

This difference in system, according to the English expert, should work for the advantage of the Allies under, present conditions of warfare, because of the extraordinary development of airplane reconnaissance, which enables a commander to use information far more plentiful and accurate than could' be gathered in former wars. Says Major Stuart-Stephens: —

"Let us imagine the two opponents on the Western front of equal efficiency, and, approximately, of equal strength, one fighting according to the ~ Prussian war doctrine and the other according to the Anglo-French system. Now, which ought to derive the greatest advantage from the. new cavalry of the air? , The ■answer is indubitably, 'the side that can make the best .use of. information.'

"Should the airplane reconnaissance prove the German. Commander in Chief's reasoned-out plan to be wrong, the German method of war makes it exceedingly difficult for him to profit by that in-' formation by giving a fresh direction to his operations as a whole. This weak feature of the enemy's battle system may come as a surprise to many of my readers who have been led to believe that a Prussian commanding general embarks upon a massed operation, carrying in his pocket several alternative plans to be resorted to if the tide of battle flows in his' antagonist's favour. . .. .

"The German High Command, laboriously manufactures a plan founded on logically reasoned-out conclusions.'/^ At v/hat is calculated to be the psychological moment it is put into- execution with lightning celerity—time being, with the German system, the essence of success.

"I think -the introduction of the air service factor in this war ought to make for the most favourable influence on our side. To put it in a nutshell, with an equality of aerial cavalry the advantage over the German ought to be indisputable ; for the flying machine assists us in the formation of- a battle plan, whereas it only assists the German' leader in the execution of an alreadyformed plan." "Now the airplane favours our strategic school if the necessary reserves are available to ensure an' irresistible attack," cays Major Stuart-Stephens in conclusion. "For it is man-power, and that factor alone, that will decide in, our. favour the issue of this titanic struggle, and that, no doubt, is why America has come in to ensure tho result."