THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCIV, Issue 52, 30 August 1917, Page 6

THE WAR

The development of the enemy's attack upon Rumania has been' heavily veiled during almost its whole progress. It is hardly necessary to point out that the brief daily or less frequent bulleitins from either side, claiming trifling successes here or there, or reporting the repulse of attacks, do not in any adequa.te way display the progress or suggest the results of a great battle upon a long front where the fate of a whole nation's army is being decided. A good deal more can be learned from an adequate description of one important stage of the struggle, providing we can rely upon the recorder to select his incidents to represent what he believes is characteristic. Short of an authoritative survey of the whole operation, that is perhaps the best guide; and in the case of the Rumanian conflict up to the present such a report, and the bare communiques, are all there is to go upon. The London Times correspondent's story, published to-day, describing the battle of 19th August, shows that the attempt by the enemy to advance' across Moldavia had utterly failed. A very significant point in the report is that when yon Mackensen delivered his great, a-s; gault upon the Sereth line the Rumanians were taking over the front from the Russians —an event which, was hardly likely if the Russians in v this region were not handicapped by the same disabilities which have now been made painfully apparent on their front further north. . »

The Rumanian defence was gallant m hhe extreme, and the enemy, notwithstanding his superiority in numbers, and probably in guns and ammunition as well, hurled himself desperately upon a line of men he could not break. It was evidently "itouch and go," for the tide was turned at the most perilous moment by the use of the last Runtfinian reserves. The correspondent declares that their violent and well-timed effort drove the enemy back in a rout, and that no renewal of the offensive has since been attempted. For the time b»ing, then, _as far as this report goes, the Rumanian situation was saved. On the face of the account, the Rumanian, army was handled with great skill; for it is the essence of good generalship in defence to have at hand an unused reserve_ which shall intervene at the latest possible moment The ideal, when the question is purely one of defence, is thai itiiat reserve shall not be used until ifche enemy has none left with which he can retort in kind to secure a decision in his favour. That is apparently what the Rumanians succeeded in doing in tftiis case. And fch» conclusion naturally to bo drawn is thatt yon Maokensen had a, superior army and threw all its power away, gaining nothing worth the sacrifice; that many gallant Rumanians paid teheir lives, but the enemy (paid still more .heavily. The line of the Sereth is still unbroken. It is open, of course, to yon Mackensen to renew his efforts if he can; ■and it is .purely a question of the number of men available whether ho can overwhelm the Rumanians, weakened by their past efforts, and make good the ambitious scheme of completing the conquest of fche country. This is where the Italian offensive, as affecting the Austrians, and the British Army's series of efforts in the weslt oa affecting the Germans, play their parts.

It is distressing in the exteeine tor«ad the speech, made by General Korniloff, at the Moscow Conference, upon the state oi the Bussian armies, especially as day by day it becomes more apparent that New Russia is not yet within' calculable distance of finding a unanimous or even a dominant expression of its real feeling about the war. Kerensky, hitherto regarded as the potential saviour of the country, has, if the latest reports are correct, lost some of the glamour which enveloped him as. a most virile and eloquent Socialist leader—a mantle not easily worn by a man canning the burden of the Premiership. It is now alleged that he has resorted, or •been compelled, perhaps, to resort to :the suppressio vead, and that a serious ■difference has arisen between him and >th.c earnest officers at the head of the -army. The reticence of M. Kerensky, and the criticism of him by General .Korniloff, suggest that the issue between •them is committee command in the army, which. M. Kerensky may still believe to have some elements of good. The report of M. Kerensky's speech at the Conference, as cabled here, contained no reference to the reorganisation of the army, yet he spoke of using the most ■ determined efforts to suppress-opposition to the Government's policy.

With the utmost allowance for our present inability to appreciate the new ideals created by the Russian revolution, it is impossible to believe that the ballot-box 1 or tho open vote, the strictly limited skill and intelligence of a largo number of men voting upon a single issue, can bo effective as a- means of controlling- an army and determining its use. The whole ".•pcritaree «rf v-*<u- shows that nothing hvi *ha -tttiMsti possible eonoaitrfttwtt'.oi.

the ultimate command is efficient, however large is the body of opinion informing it; and the same experience shows that that advisory opinion must be the most expert available. In short, war cannot be made by officers who are controlled by the body of soldiers under them, for not 1 per cent, of the soldiers can possibly .understand the problems of warfare. General Korniloft's plea for reorganisation is and must be a plea for the giving yip of fantastic reforms. -

The immediate interest of General Korniliff's speech is its revelation of the bad condition of the army and the disorganisation of the railways and munitions supply upon which it depends. A cToud of reports about the rapid recovery of discipline and the restoration of its fighting strength is suddenly swept away. The speech was delivered in a dramatic setting, in a city full of delegates representing all Russia, • and especially that enormous section of Russians whose'judgment has been unbalanced by the revolution. He made his statement plain and blunt, in the hope no doubt of throwing a cold douche npon enthusiasms too warm upon the one hand, and of stirring up the lethargic to an , imderstanding of their danger. Russia is at present in the grip of a vast hope for the future; KornilofE is one-of the agents trying to make it realise that there is a much more insistent fact at this very moment; that there is a war, and that the German army is a material presence on Russian soil. i