THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCIV, Issue 49, 27 August 1917, Page 6

THE WAR

* Our tanks were not much gooi. I am afraid they hardly* justify their cost." . This is an extract, of unusual interest,. from a letter from BrigadierGeneral G. N. Johnston, which Sir. James Allen read in the House of Be-" presentativea on Friday. It musi have come as a great surprise to people who take current reports wholly for granted; for the "tanks" have been almost as thoroughly advertised and boomed in English writings as the U-boats have in German. General Johnston has stated openly what must have been suspected in some, form or other by -very many people from the first as to the ultimate usefulness of the tanks, except in special circumstances. That they are valuable and powerful fighting machines on occasion their feats have shown. The fact that after they had been tested the British multiplied their " landships " and the French adopted a machine (for which they generously adopted the English nickname) of similar effect, but considerably different form, shows that the Allied command expected much good use to be made of them. A good'example of the successful work of the tanks 00-. ourred the other day on the Ypres front, when a, number of them went out to subjugate some enemy machine-gun posts and, according to the reports, completely paved the way for the infantry. This sort of thing has no doubt been done many times, by both British and French machines. But it is very easy to exaggerate the powers of a specialised fighting machine. There is one close resemblance between the submarine and the tank. Both have to be very careful of the nature of their adversaries. The submarine, however, has the great advantage that it can hide from excessive danger; the tank, if it runs into trouble, has to put up with the risk.

The tank, as is now well known, is a ponderous, though not very large machine, armed with machine-guns or with cannon •o£ small calibre and medium power for. their size, and carrying a crew merely sufficient to run the powerful driving motors and work the guns. On account of the great risks, and arduous work 1 of this service the men receive special rates of pay_. They are protected by armouring which extends over the whole machine; but the thickness and therefore the protectiveness of the armour is limited by the weight allowable, and the practical result is that only mis- \ eiles of low power, such as bullets, shell fragments, and bombs are certain to be stopped. It may be that a small shrapnel shell might not smash its way through, but a tank suffering direct hits from shells of medium weight, or high explosives of any kind, or attack by any heavy detonating charge, would have 6mall chance of surviving. This is so obvious that it needs no elaboration; and it may be added that a hit which would not penetrate tins armour might disable a machine in an awkward position by wrecking the belts of "feet" on which it travels and which go, as the now familiar photographs show, under and over its whole length on each side.

The weakness of the tank obviously limits its reasonably safe use to operations in which it is not likely to come under.accurate firs from cannon. It cannot, for instance, go within plain view of gun-crews at any range at which accurate shooting is possible; but, providing the enemy's .gun-positions are known, it may be used with impunity within the limits set by the accurate range of the guns. Unfortunately, it is within the power of an enenry to adopt special tactics against tanks, in face of which great risks are inevitable, and the machines may be robbed of most of their power. Carefully handled trenchmortars, for instance, might he relied upon to cripple them. A machine-gun stronghold might he defended, by a series of small high-explosive minos close enough together to be sure of 'being run over and fired either by the pressure of the tank or electrically by observation. A field gun, even a worn ouit one, lefifc in a forward .position and ostentatiously "abandoned" or else carefully concealed, could be used at an appropriate moment. And there are plenty of other ways which could be suggested without giving Gennan a-gents any ideas the war-lords have not discovered for themselves. It is quite certain that the enemy is freely using special tactics against tanks. He .probably has had special guns Built to use against them. Two recent German communiques (one of them published today) have made special reference fto the destruction of tanks; to-day's, report claims that twenty-one were smashed, presumably in a <fay. If (this report is not exaggerated, it is significant of an unusual development of defence, or else of an. unusually bold use of tanks; and we may suppose, too, that prominence is given to the matter on account of the recent British report of the tanks' exploit .before Ypres.

With the utmost rapidity the Italian offensive has developed, into one of the greatest battles of the war, and apparently one of the most sanguinary. It is stated to-day that something like 100,000 Austrians have been put out of action during the few days the battle has lasted. A few miles north of Gorizia ,the Italians have captured the summit ot Monte Santo. The victory at this point is more than the mere achievement of' crushing a mountain stronghold. Monte Santo stands just north of the outlet of the Chiapovano Valley, which traverses the Trnovaner forest from the northeast,, and is a very important avenue of communication between the rear and the Austrian front north of Gorizia. Already the Italians have attacked troops moving along the road in" the valley, by means of their aerial squadrons. ' With the commanding height of Monte Santo at their disposal their guns will be able to add to the ban-ago in the valley; and it seems probable that another valuable road from the »§«th«ew(*'Bft» ftlsei h» eaflkded from the mountain. The latest .development

i j on this sector. is an Italian advance to- , wards the Bainisizza plateau, which is the portion of the Tmpvaner plateau north of the Chiapovano valley. On the Carso, ■ the battle, which is being fought with the I , greatest vigour on both sides, shows no i . new appreciable movement, and progress in the presence of an enemy who is un- [ crushed though he may be inferior is cer- ! taili to be slow. The fortress of Mount • Hermada, between the plateau and the , coast, continues to hold out, although the 1 Italian and British guns have, it is said, ' j isolated the garrison from further sup--1 | plies. Even without being surrounded ! I by troops the hill is in something ap- ! proaching a state, of siege. > Further good news comes from the Verdun front, where the famous Hill 304 ! has fallen with extraordinary speed into : the hands of the French. The ease and ' rapidity of this victory and other circum- , t stances noticed in ftie battle have sug- [ i gested to correspondents that thctGerman ' i force on this front is inadequate for its ■ j defence. In four blows, each brief and ; ' sudden and clean, the French have won t i back almost the whole of the ground { and practically every position, of im- : i portance wrested from them by the sav- ' rage offensive which the Germans carried i| on for five months last year. The [ Crown Prince of Germany is no longer there to see his painful work undone; but the last v attack, was watched by a worthier spectator, the American General Penning.