THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCIV, Issue 47, 24 August 1917, Page 6

THE WAR

TFne Italian offensive proceeds roost satisfactorily. The capture of over 16,000 prisoners in three days is a striking sign of the breaking up of the foremost Austrian organisations, as eloquent in its wa.y as !the anemy's admission of "minor defensive retirements." The new reports state that the enemy lias abandoned nearly all his front line between the edge of the Carso plateau and the sea, that is on the four-mile front at the western side of the Hermada hill. Tho fact that the enemy undertook counter-attacks on the Carso plateau, on a front of only five or six miles, with. 120 battalions, or something in the neighbourhood of 80,000 infantry, will give an'indication of the tremendous nature of the struggle on this vital sector. At present; the Italians have reported no appreciable progress since their success on tho Ko-rite-Selo sector, where the struggle has been of the most violent character. The situation here is vital to tho safety of the Hermada stronghold, which may be regarded as almost impregnable so long as its northern flank is not effectively turned. If, however, the Italians could reach, its rear with a large force, its resistance would disappear.

It is worth while to consider at this stage the objects of tllie Italian campaign. From the point of view of Italy's \yar aims, it seeks to regain by conquest the Istrian territory regarded by the nation as truly Italian. That is the desired permanent result as expressed in local achievement, and naturally tho Italians regard possession as nine points of the law and as more nkoly to secure the country to them than leaving the matter for discussion at a peace conference. But Istria is also a region /6T extreme military importance. Not only is Trieste a; great nival base and arsenal, but on the southern end of the peninsula is Pola, wfliich is the chief naval base. An Italian advance of less than ten miles from Trieste would cut the only railway to Pola, and the Aontrian fleet would, within a. very short time, be Crippled for lack of supplies. The value of such a feat as tho stifling of the powerful .Austrian navy, which, though comparatively inactive, is an enormous potential force, is obvious.

Very briefly those are the two immediate objects of the Italian offensive. But quite-outside the Italian theatre is its influence on the war in general. As Mr. Hilaire Belloc wrote during the last effort on this front, in May: —"The success must be judged upon precisely the same linee as every other offensive conducted ag.iinat the common enemy since the tide turned against him. It is to bo measured, not by movements upon the map, but by the moral and material effect of the blow delivered: the expense in men upon either side, the compulsion exercised upon the enemy to counterattack, and to reinforce'hurriedly as best he can; the particular effect of exhaustion upon him and us. This being so, we note in connection with this victory,! that it has been achieved by three elements of superiority, two of which, long present upon the Anglo-French front, are now happily present also upon the Italian; white the third we may congratulate' our Ally upon having produced in an exceptional fashion which has been quite hia own. The first two- are superiority in the air, and superiority in artillery. The third is an element of surprise in a degree ■ greater thari we have b m able to compass elsewhere." It is not necessary to elaborate this argument. It applies with extraordinary force to the present offensive.

An important feature of the Russian situation at the moment is the discussion as to whether the , United States can give more effective assistance to the ,young democracy. J-t is months sines the Americans devised a scheme or schemes for reorganising the feeble railway system of Russia. It needed it badly, from top to bottom,. How much has been done by now is, of course, unknown; but it is obvious that a great deal remains to be done. And it is certainly in the' industrial and economic field' that the genius and energy of America can be best utilised in Russia. The country has men in plenty, though, it is short*of officers. Beyond sending a small contingent to Russia to express in a material way tho nature of the alliance, it would "be unnecessary to consider supplying United States- armies for the East front, even if it could be done; and America has no officers to spare to diminish the Russian lack of officers. As a matter of fact, to maintain a big American army on ths Russian front is geographically almost impossible owing to the extraordinary length and tenuity of the communications through Siberia. The objectionin this respect is exactly similar to the practical objection to putting the Japanese in the Russian theatre, but as a long sea voyage is.added, it is even more prohibitive.