THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCIV, Issue 40, 16 August 1917, Page 6

THE WAR

There is a remarkable absence of war newS" to-day, whether of battle or of' political developments; and the, only outstanding items of tie past twentyfour hours are the announcements of China's declaration of war, of the Pope's renewed proposals of a basis for peace, and the unsatisfactory position regarding the Stockholm Conference. China's influence in the war is likely to be confined in the main to moral and industrial effect, for there is no immediate prospect of her armies being sent to the battlefields, or of her fleet, such as it is, playing any important part in the naval campaign. It is worth noting, however, that China has had for some years a conscription system, nominally designed to provide an army of 36 divisions, totalling 360,000; but during the war (on Ist January, 1916) conscription apparently of a fuller character came into force, and it is likely that China could now raise an armed force of' half a million with no g^eat difficulty. The -ultimate man-power of tlie Empire is of course inexhaustible" for purposes of war if means could be found for tapping it and using it. The trained army is said to be highly efficient and well equipped. The navy is an inconsiderable force. Its largest unit is the unarmoured cruiser Hai Chi, of 4300 tons, with an un-ueual-ly heavy armament for a ship of that size, and a speed of 24 knots. Three smaller, slower, and less heavily-armed cruisers and two comparatively-new training ships are the only other vessels of any size less than twenty years old, except a few gunboats. There has been no attempt to build up a fleet ■with any homogeneity in it. On the_ contrary, the force is a remarkable mixture of types.

, There is little room for doubt that the Stockholm Conference proposals emanated, in some insidious fashion, from Germany, but they have been fostered in most of the belligerent countries by the desire of such parties, whose existence is undeniable, as want to end the war by any means that seem reasonable to them. The extraordinary situation created in England by the connection of Mr. Arthur Henderson, Labour member of the British War Cabinet, with the movement, has naturally seriously disturbed the political atmosphere in the country. It will be a serious matter if it results in affecting the attitude of Labour generally towards the prosecution of the war. The latest news is that if, after hearing the explanations of the Government and of Mr. Henderson, the Labour decision to sendl delegates to Stockholm is upheld, Mr. Lloyd George will ask for a general election. '

A statement-feade by Signor Marconi at a dinner given to the Italian Mission in New York, in regard to the timing of Italy's declaration of neutrality at the beginning of the war, was of much interest for its bearing on the strategy of the Battle of the Marne. As he puts it, France was unofficially informed on 30th July, 1914, that Italy would not side with the Central Powers in a war of aggression. This assurance, however, because unofficial, did not warrant the French High Command in altering the mobilisation plans. But on 2nd August, the day after Germany began the war, Italy de'eided formally to declare its neutrality, and got word to the Frengh Foreign Minister (M. Viviani) in the middle of the night. Signor Marconi continued: " Within half an hour orders had gone forth for the mobilisation in the north of nearly 1,000,000 men which France would have to keep on her southern and eastern frontier to guard against a possible attack from Italy. That million men helped to stem the advancing tide of Germans, to win the Battle of the Marne, and to save France. Had there been the slightest wavering by Italy, France would not have dared to withdraw a single man from the Italian frontier and the history of the world might have been different." Yet the history of the war might have been different in another way if, instead of waiting till 2nd August, Italy had been able, on 30th July to give not merely a hint but such a firm assurance as would have enabled France to mobilise from the beginning on the assumption that it would not have to defend itself against Italy. In speed France at best could not equal Germany, but three days might have just made the difference between holding the invaders in Belgium and having to fall back to the Marne.