GERMANY AND THE NEW RUSSIA

Evening Post, Volume CXIII, Issue 100, 27 April 1917, Page 6

GERMANY AND THE NEW RUSSIA

The intensity of the internal situation in Britain and in Germany is proved today by the submarine campaign figures,' and by the reports of political agitation and semi-political strikes against the Kaiser's war policy. Without attaching undue importance to political or press agitation in Germany—where official or semi-official manipulation of these matters has reached a fine art —it is possible to see 1 that there is ■ fire behind the smoke, and that the distress of the German people is making itself felt in various ways unpleasant to the war-lords. It may be.that the Kaiser will use the popular manifestations as an excuse for an eventual climb-down; and it may bo that, in his desire to assist the pacifist sections in the Entente countries, he will allow the internal troubles of Germany to be painted in worse colours than are wan-anted; but the fact will still remain that a discontent compelling him to uss such tactics has a very healthy vitality of its own. After, all, the Kaiser paid a genuine tribute to the rising forces of freedom in Russia and in his own country when he dabbled the other day in Prussian i democracy. In thiy case also the unrest may be exaggerated, and the "reforms" makebelieve, but a Hohenzollern would not render even lip-service to liberty if he were not afraid of the' forces—potential, more than present^-that are organising against him. If the Kaiser finally decides that he must really comply with the democratisation movement, and render something to the popular Caesar, the first burnt offering may turn out to bo the Chancellor. To be convincing, the Kaiser's conversion and initiation of a new policy will require a new broom; and such a requirement would necessitate the removal'oranother one of the few prominent figures that have survived the shocks.of war.

, The Russian Republic has now quite replaced the Tsar in the personal affection .of the. Kaiser and his entourage, and tho conflict of opinion between the Minister for Justice (M. Kerensky) and the Minister for Foreign Affairs (M. Miliukoff) is one of the most important phases of the war, since, it represents the clash between Russian expansionists and the new school of anti-annexationists. M. Miliukoff has now yielded some ground on the question ol Constantinople, and has spoken of neutralisation, but Kaa so guarded his concession that its significance is doubtful. For tho Austrian Slavs he demands "complete independence," and probably no one outside the enemy countries will contest the principle.; but how it is to be. attained is another question. Geographically, militarily, and ethnographically, it devolves on Russia, the head of the Slav nations, to carry the war of liberty Into Austria-Hungary and Rumania; but the Russians arc very pre-occupied with their own new-found liberties, and it is still to be proved whether these will combine- sufficiently with military discipline to permit the reconquest of Galicia, the forcing of the Carpathians, and the regaining of the Danube. In. demanding "complete independence" for the Austrian Slavs, M. Miliukoff evidently places himsolf outside any autonomous compromise such as Mi". H. W. Massingham, editor of tho proscribed Nation, has suggested. Alarmed, at the project that Austro-Hungarian pacifists would be handicapped by the Entente peace terms being interpreted as meaning Slavic freedom and consequent dismemberment of the Dual Monarchy, Mr. Massingham lately wrote:—"Our Allied note must have generally aimed at establishment of autonomous rather than independent governments, for this is the' solution of Irish difficulties which Liberalism would apply, and we could not demand more of Austria than we' yield ourselves." Evidently tho Massingham interpretation is not that of Miliukoff, and the difference is one that vitally affects the question of Austria-Hungary's secession from the Central Alliance.