THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCIII, Issue 98, 25 April 1917, Page 6

THE WAR

The British offensive has been renewed with vigour upon the northern portion of the moving front, that is, in the region eastward of Arras. The River Scarpe, 3, tributary of the Scheldt, flows eastward through Arras, and divides the attack into two sections. Summarising the reports' so far received regarding this new battle, it appears that the attack prospered to the extent that on fairly long fronts sound progress was made; four villages were captured, and large numbers of prisoners were taken; the offensive was very stubbornly opposed, as the Germans had expected and prepared for it; frequent and violent' counter-attacks, which led to heavy German losses, were a remarkable feature of the battle; and the positions attacked were scattered strongholds and disconnected lengths of trenches rather tban a continuous fortified line. These points make it quite clear that the enemy has been caught unprepared on the Arras sector. The battle of the Somnve last year made it evident that, as the Allied advance developed, it must cause an extensive German retirement. It was, indeed, a simple matter to forecast roughly the extent of that retirement, and that the Germans would try to limit it to that portion of the front between Arras and the Aisne. This they, did.

The renewal of the offensive this year found their preparations far advanced. Their retreat has, 'been executed with, great skill and swccess_, in the sens© that it has avoided any great catastrophe! and has maintained - the front unbroken. The Germans ha-re fallen back upon the ' famous Hindenb/urg positions (which as ■ yet have been only indefinitely located), and as far as territorial defences, are con- ' cerned may be just as soundly placed there as they were upon the original line attacked last July. But it is clear now that they did not expect the British front of attack to be extended northward of Arras; or rathor that theyJioped it would not bo thus extended so ap'u. as was the case. The Arras front was tho pivoi of the retirement, and north of that .pivot the Hindenburg, lines did not extend. The Arras, or Scarpe, attacks have put a fresh complexion on the outlook. At the first blow, the Hindenburg position became outflanked. Tha pivot -which the British chose to swing upon was no longer Arras, but Lens.-; and the Germans are now desperaiely trying to stop this new advance long enough to build up sound defences in continuation of those already existing further south. Unfortunately for them, exactly the same thing may be repeated indefinitely until the whole of the British front has been shifted forward.

The immediate local effect of the Arras advance is that Lens is being forced into a'position of great danger. As the; British force their way eastward immediately south of the town, it becomes tho head of a salient more and more sharply defined. Already the British, having taken Cite St. Pierre on the north-west and Lievin on tho west, are within close range of the town itself, and its defensibility is rapidly being reduced. If Lens; should fall, the next stamgliold to, be affected would be La Bassee, eight miles to the north; and Lens and La Bassee have been specially organised as the outpost defences of Lille. The battle of Arras is thus indirectly an attack on the Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing city-group, the most important single locality, perhaps, in the hands of 1 the invaders. -The original decision of the Germans not to retire from Lens was due to the risk to which Lille would be subjected by such a retirement; and their present desperate resistance is: due to the reversal of their decision and the serious upsetting." of their defensive' scheme. ,

held by the enemy southward of St. Quentin is located in country which is not suitable for rapid movements, for it is heavily wooded and rough. The Reims front and the Champagne lines re-" anain, as they have been from the first, strong against attack; and^it is doubtful whether if they were pierced ahd seriously broken anything- more than local effects would result. No very great modifications of the front would be likely to follow, such as would be caused by a grave threat to Lille. The fact is that the smashing of the German front between St. Quentin and Lille would probably result in a deformation of almost the whole line in Prance; and the expenditure of a given effort there offers more profit than a similar expenditure .on the French sectors. The French armies may therefore be regarded as doing full service by pegging away at the enemy in front of them, keeping him thoroughly occupied and in need of repair. Their. work in that direction is a powerful contribution to the success of the operations in which the British are engaged., „

An unnamed member of Mr. Balfour's party in Washington has broken the seal 1 of secrecy about the anti-submarine tactics by telling the. American people something about the destruction effected among the U-boats. He declares that on the day before the party left England twenty submarines were captured. They were looking for a submarine base which no longer existed,, and as the crews were starving, they gladly surrendered.. Such bases*, he said, were found and destroyed almost as soon as theywere established. The story i$ reaaßSuring enough,. if. we can believe it. . But it is not" to- be assumed that twenty U-boats are caught every day, or anything like that number. That ithe destruction or capture of these raiders goes on regularly we. may rest assured; and the fact that' in. spite of continual .'losses • the , Germans are; able to send out fresh submarines and maintain their steady toll upon shipping is no small tribute io thedaring and selfsacrifice of the men from whom the Üboat crews are supplied. The reffrenee to submarine bases shows .that the enemy must be making considerable use of secret depots, either submerged or concealed in unfrequented ■bays, injorder to .increase the active period of his " fighting " craft. . The natural conclusion is that' the depots are established ancUmaintained by a separate.service, also ot submarines, and that these auxiliary craft are of the, '■' merchantman " Itype .which the Germans so proudly displayed to an admiring -world in the famous- cruises of the Deufcschland to. the United. States. Those voyages proved the. efficiency ofthe new class of submarine, and there is. no reason now to doubt t-nat-tfiespec-' tacular blockade-running "stunt" of the Deutschland was pure bluff. As a'practical blockade-runner/ the Deutschlind was a complete failure, and everyone must have known it 'from' .the first ; and once^he had gMn her demonstration and had been enrolled as a /non-bellig-erent ship, her-trans-Atlantic, voyages ceased. But how many nvfee Deutschlands have been btiilt and used since then? , ■ ■ . ■ / '