THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume CXIII, Issue 88, 13 April 1917, Page 6

THE WAR

In Wednesday's issue, and again in yesterday's, was discussed the vital qu«3tdon whether the United States is to enter folly into the Entente .partnership; and, if so, -whether- the advent of American notions of settlement—plus a military weakening in the New Russia-, and. an abatement of her expansionist designs—will modify the Entente peace •terms. Yesterday we dealt especially with the difference between the mod«avates and the extremists in Russia with regard to Constantinople and a reversion to the status quo. To-day the cabled news adds considerably to the consideration of the American side of the question. It is indicated that the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Balfonr, will visit Washington, and it is suggested that one of the subjects of discussion will be the entry of the "United States into an agreement not to make a separate peace. Such an agreement already binds the other. Great Powers warringl against the Central Alliance. It is known as the Pact of London. The signatories of the Pact of London have not only agreed not to mako a separate-peace, but have also proclaimed to tho world most of the leading principles of the peace they require. Therefore two very important questions- arise: (1) Will the United States adhere to the Pact of London on the basis of peace terms proclaimed by the Entente Powers? (2) If not, will the Entente Powers modify those terms in ,ordei< to secure the adherence pf the

United ; States to the Pact of London? The answer will depend 1 very largely on Petrograd and on Washington.

| It needs no special discernment—no i Lloyd George speech and no Balfour misi sion to Washington—to see the immehsei importance of what is taking pla-cs in the two capitals. Just as Washington Tias; got rid of its old doubts, Petrograd has assumed new ones; and in each case they are democratically sincere but militarily! bad. Consequently, as a military factor, Washington increases and Petrograd diminishes. Coming as-it does in the third year of the struggle, this event , shows how profonndly politics can affect I war, and how dependent, at all times | the general is upon the diplomat. Prior to 1917, the Entente was a European and Asiatic alliance, but for about two the Asiatic had been a sleeping partner. From the standpoint of active warfare, it was a European alliance between the Western democracies of the Continent and the Eastern autocracy. In the West, London and Paris closely co-operated; a less close co-operation [ existed between them and Rome. In the East, the arbiter was Petrograd, supported, however, by Western money and munitions; Tokio held a position semi-detached. Probably the centre of I gravity was somewhere between SetroI grad and the Western capitals, and its | instability, in the midway position between democracy and autocracy, partly accounted for the military inefficiency of the Entente as compared- with the. unified enemy. ■ But with the advent of the United States—-if that country is coming into foil partnership — the centre of gravity will be drawn more definitely Westward and more into the homogeneous democratic group of Western Europe arid America. The Grand Alliance will become a World Alliance — that is, if the United States can drop the forms of Monroeism and find with the Entente diplomacy a-common ground. ; The see-saw, formerly pivoted nowhere in particular, will then be pivoted on j London, with Washington balancing the Western end. The main cohesive force will be the mutual'attraction of London and of Washington; and again of Paris and Petrograd, all united in a, common aim. ■ . .

Here, however, it is worth while to dig up the Entente peace terms, and consider how their strong Slavic complexion will appeal to trans-Atlantic taste. These terms were published by the Entente Powers on i2th January in reply to a peace Note from President Wilson. The Entente Powers say therein that their aims can only be -set forth in detail, "with all the compensations and equitable indemnities for harm suffered," when the negotiations are in progress, but "the civilised world knows that they imply, necessarily and first of all, the restoration of Belgium, Servia, .and Montenegro, with the compensations due to them; the evacuation of the 1 invaded territories in TVance, in Russia, in Rumania, with just reparation; the- reorganisation of Europe, guaranteed by a stable regime and based at once on respect for nationalities and on-the right to full security and liberty of economic development possessed by all peoples, small and great, and at the same time upon territorial conventions and international settlements; such as to- guarantee land and sea frontiers against unjustified^ attack; the restitution of provinces formerly torn from the Aljies by force or against the wish of the inhabitants ; the liberation of the Italians, as also of the Slavs, Rumaries, and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination; the setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; and the turning out,of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to Western civilisation." ■

It has'already been indicated that the Polish intentions of the ox-Tsar, cited in the Entente, peace terms,: hardly square with the Polish expressions of President Wilson. As to American criticism of a Russian Constantinople (as compared with an internationalised Constantinople) there is already abundant evidence of a fierce internal contention in* Petrograd itself. But over and above the question what moral view the United-States may take of certain elements in the Entente peace terms, is the military question whether the New Russia can enforce her claims even where those claims ar« just and democratic, as in the matter of the liberation of the Austrian Slavs. It will be noted that Mr. Lloyd George very diplomatically hails, in the spirit of democracy, both America's advent and the Russian revolution; but he significantly adds that "if the Russians realise, as apparently they are doing, that national discipline is compatible with and essential to national freedom., they will become a free people."" In other words, discipline is' essential to military success, and military success, is essential to defence of the ..new Russian freedom; and military success is doubly essential if the Turkish flag is to be replaced in Constantinoplerby the Russian. Can the war wait to help Russia into Constantinople if Russia is too politically sick to militarily help herself? In this question the voice- of uncommitted America must count, assuming a full American partnership. In Petrograd the Kerensky section would avoid. the issne by dropping Constantinople; the Miliukpff section considers Constantinople vital, and prescribes the national self-discipline that Mr. Eloyd George • says is essential. Meanwhile Britain and France do their best to give the Russian Provisional Government breathing-time, by bitting hard in the West., . ■

What the American war resolution and the Russian revolution mean is strikingly shown by the sentence in which the British Prime- Minister rejoices at America's advent "because it finally stamps the war as a struggle of human liberty against military autocracy, and because it would have been a tragedy if America had not sat at the peacexconierence." Herein is a very definite invitation to the trans-Atlantic democracy to enter whole-heartedly into the European settlement; and at a later stage Mr. Lloyd George paints the outlook in terms of permanent peace more optimistic, than anything yet pronounced by a British Prime . Minister. At the same time the report of enemy peace feelers directed at Washington is renewed. There, is, indeed, evidence that these feelers have been active for a .month, past, and it will presently be found that the enemy terms have climbed down very substantially. The question is whether they have climbed down enough. Despite the breach with America, Rome reports that Austria is consistently pressing for peace. But the greatest of all the factors for peace is still in process of manufacture ; on the Western 1 front. It is the growing success of the Anglo-French armies.

In one portion of his speech Mr. Lloyd George-connected America's advent with a Rhine boundary for Germany—a very significant allusion to the French revanche. Equally interesting is his affirmation that it is in the Anglo-Ameri-can interest to defeat the German underwater campaign, which seeks to place a barrier between Britain and the Americas, and thus aims lit negating the principle that "the sea unites, it doesnot divide."