THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCIII, Issue 85, 10 April 1917, Page 6

THE WAR

"The titanic conflict in the West," according to Mr. Philip Gibb's, "has begun." Ab might have been expected, it has broken ground in an entirely new place, representing a northward extension of the Somme battlefield for a distance of about 16 miles, in which the new fighting front represents about 12 miles. By this northward extension of his activity Sir Douglas Haig has revived the old Anglo-French campaign of September, 1915 (remembered generally by what is called' the Battle of Loos)i. The Somme advance did not extend as far north as Arras, but the new attack takes .in Arras and all the line up to a, point south of Lens. To take in the whole of the Anglo-French battlefield of September, 1915, Sir. Douglas Haig will nave to extend his operations still far-, ther north from Lens to La Bassee, but so far there is ,no intimation that such an extension has been made.

For convenience of nomenclature, it may be well to refer to the Somme battlefield as the Somme-Ancre sector, including Peronne and Bapaume; : north of it comes the Arras-Lens sector; northward again the Lens-La Bassee sector. What has happened is that, having compelled the enemy to retreat in_the SommeAncro territory to his naw line (Cam-brai-St. Quentin, or "Hindenburg's") Sir Douglas Haig has opened fire next door. (Arras-Lens) in an attempt to turn the northern <md of the new line. And we may yet hear that similar turning strategy has caused him to force the •pace on the Lens-La Bassee sector also. Thus,we are coming back to old landmarks.

' In September, 1915, tho attacking armies on Arras-Lens were French; on Lens-La Bassee they were British. The BritisH won .ground in the direction of Loos and Hulluch, ,bnt did not win a, sufficient advantage to enable them to lever the Germans out of 'either Lens or La. Bassee. The French also gained ground, but did not succeed in retaining the Vimy Heights, which dominate tho Douai Plain. Thus immediate objectives were not wholly gained in September, 1915. andi of course the larger aims (such as the occupation of Douai to the east and the outflanking of Lille to the north) were far beyond reach. But in 1917 it is different. Sir Douglas <Haig now has abundant men, guns, and equipment fdr immediate purposes; and as h#> was abl« to batter in the Somme salient, -he has just as good a cliance of (turning the new German line by his twelve-mile attack on the Lens-La Bassee> sector. A penetration here would not only turn the new line. It would drive a wedge between the enemy's Somm« armies and •the stronghold of Lille; it would involy* the fall "of Lens and La Bassee, and it would place Douai and Cambrai in immediate danger.

Territorial considerations are of course only «> part of the objective. Hindenburg was, according to Mr. Gibbs, prepared to sacrifice more territory, and had* planned to retire, but Sir Douglas Haig moved too quickly and engaged him,before his retirement was' 1 properly in train. If the British conwnaifder can fight a holding action, and hold the enemy till the enemy is smashed, something greater than 1 any territorial gain will be achieved. In the Sommc-Ancre retirement, the Germans slipped away without suffering excessive losses. Let us h<*pe that the present action will hold them until they are severely punished, 1 if not completely broken. There is an idea in.Germany that the German grades can retire across France and Belgium by slow stages, in comparative safety, devastating the country, and inflicting great losses on the .pressing them. A heavy defeat wouldi upset that idea, and would induce a much more healthy condition in the German mind.-

Luter messages encourage the view that the first phase of the new operations has been successful, and has filled its programme. Also, the tanks have outtanked themselves, and_ the Somme is outSommed. The Canadians are in it, and no doubt the Anzacs also will be. Meanwhile the Somme-Ancre front continues active; aaid progress has been made by the Ajigjo-French in the direction of Cambrai and St. Quentin, and they have taken a considerable number of prisonera ,

The question forces itself : Has' any political consideration ■'; hastened ■ the British offensive? We know,now that; last year the British Somme offensive was accelerated because of the German pressure on Verdun; to that extent the enemy; forced the British commander's hand. There is a possibility that this year the political conditions in Russia—and the military advantage which Germany is seeking to make out of these conditions—may have stimulated operations in the West. Circumstances of time and season *'do not, however, lend any particular support to that theory. Last year the Germans' began their attack on Verdun in February, and in fact} nearly all their total advance against Verdun was made in that inhospitable month. If the Germans can start' in February, why should not the AngloFrench begin their big scale of operations, in April? The seasonal disadvantages are not insuperable if the munitional advantages are adequate. Possibly before the month is over some big new French offensive will have broken out.

While it may or may not have been accelerated by Russian political conditions, the British offensive will undoubtedly help Prussia, and the Stokhod reverse indicates that help will be welcome. At the same time, the extent of this reverse may easily be exaggerated.' Strategically the position is that the enemy railway junction at Kovel is covered by two rivers, both tributaries of the -Pripet; their names, taking them in order from east to west, are Styr and Stokhod. On 4th.June, 1916; the enemy held the middle portion of the Styr covering Kovel and the. whole of. .the river Stokhod forming ■ its second line of defence. Twelve days later the Russians, by a sudden offensive, had captured nearly all the enemy section of the Styr and a portion of the Stokhod, and had won a footing on the western side of the Stokhod directly threatening Kovel. Immediate enemy counter-attacks compelled a partial withdrawal of the Russians from the western flank. What happened in the latest battle -is that the Russians were driven from the remainder of the western bank with heavy losses. The nose of the salient created by the Rus-sian-offensive in Juno last year has been flattened, but the nose only; and, so far as present information goes, the Russians still hold the valley of the Styr for about, ■thirty miles north and- south of Lutsk 1 and all the country westward thereof, as, far as the Stokhod. The commanding officers have paid the penalty for the mishap between the Stokhod and Kovel..

Cleaving to<Germany, Austria-Hungary has bioken. with the United! States, who has seized Austrian shipping. So far there is no breach between the Ujiited' , States' and.the- enemy's Balkan partners. It is good 'news to hear that "the United States .Government will work in full harmony with the Entente, on a co-opara-tive and not a competitive bn.si3. An opportunity for co-operation has immediately presented itself. Britain wants wheat; Argentina has wheat; the Ar-gfsntine-whsat, is, - closer. :: to,-BritEtLa Una

the Australian; but Argentina says she needs her wheat, and places an embargo on its export. The plea that Argentina needs all her wheat is not credited; in fact, she is suspected of maintaining^fcowards the Entente the same attitude with regard to grain as Rumania was reported to have adopted in 1915 towards Germany and Austria. When an embargo happens in such circumstances the country that needs the goods naturally applies counter-pressure, in order to Telease them; and in'this case Britain and the United States jointly can exercise great pressure on Argentina through trade channels. • It is therefore reassuring to hear that the United States Government will support Britain's demand for the lifting of the Argentine embargo, and will support it by the practical measure of shutting off from Argentina her American coal supplies. The Hispano-'Ameri-can States, apart from the Argentina and of course Mexico, seem to be unsympathetic to the German cause, and Brazil may lead the way by breaking off relations .with Berlin.

Accepting the statement from Rome as true, that a further German Retreat on the Western front is about to eventuate, critics will not only be keenly speculative on what the future line is to be, but will be equally interested in whether the Germans in retreating will continue to carry out their policy-of laying waste towns and villages and the whole countryside. Both, of course, are matters of conjecture, which the march of events will show. In the second- issue, however, it seems likely that the policy of devastation Will continue. If so, it is instructive to ask what that will demonstrate. It may mean one of two things, if not both. The first is that the German, who all along has preached and practised shameless ruthlessness, intends to pursue his doctrine in the hope that with the threatened destruction of the remaining invaded- portion of France he will so sicken theiFrench nation of the war that it will rather concede favourable peace terms to Germany than continue the combat; the second is military necessity, in that Germany ? desires to hamper the- operations of the Allies over the evacaated territory as much as possible.

Assume either or both surmises to be correct, and then enquire what must be the state of mind of the German High Command in adhering to snch a procedure. Is it reasonable to suppose that it will go on ordering the destruction of occupied France, knowing full well that German guns and bayonete cannot prevent a, decision in the Allies' favour, in which case failure must bring retribution? The assumption is so unlikely that it may be eliminated altogether; the Germans are not quite fools. The position, then, reduces itself to this: That if the Germans continue to spread ruin' as they withdraw, their High Command is either gambling on the final decision, or is still fully convinced that the Germanic Powers can prevent the Allies obtaining the terms they require. If the latter is the case, then it affords a valuable index to estimating the strength of the resistance to which the Allies may still be opposed. Perhaps it is that the German calculations are based on a further gamble—an early success of the submarine campaign.