Evening Post. TUESDAY, APRIL 10, 1917. DEMOCRACY IN FASHION

Evening Post, Volume XCIII, Issue 85, 10 April 1917, Page 6

Evening Post. TUESDAY, APRIL 10, 1917. DEMOCRACY IN FASHION

Now that the Kaiser is publicly assuming the mantle of a Democrat, it is well to .remember that, for many reasons, dempcratisation has become a useful card for the Kaiser to play. In the firat place, the war has made autocracy unpopular—so unpopular that it has fallen even in Russia.. Secondly, democratisation is one of the battle-cries—indeed, the chief one—of the Entente Powers,, whom the Kaiser would like to deprive of a weapon by voluntarily kneeling— or appearing to Kneel—at the altar of Demos: Thirdly, there is a large body of opinion in Germany herself that is democratic In spirit if not in practice, and' which, impressed by the Entente-'s case and er.couraged by the Russian revolution, is even now seeking to break the bonds of militarism and ""to secure effective self-government. Fourthly, this democratic element in Germany, now under' wa/ discipline, will gain greatly in strength as soon as peace is signed, and it is good policy on the Kaiser's part to begin to put himself in,line with it; otherwise his internal difficulties after the war will certainly be of a natureformid • able. All these factors tend to produce a progressive fashion at Potsdam; while they cannot convert the Kaiser into a democrat, they constrain him to present himself as a colourable imitation thereof. But a dissembler is most "dangerous when he appears to yield, and the German democrats and the democratic Entente, will be certainly deceived if they attach overmuch weight to the new Imperial pose. Constitutional concessions made by on autocrat under pressure are chiefly notable for their lack of permanence. That fact is exemplified in the life of the ex-Tsar Nicholas; and Wilhelni is a, more dangerous autocrat than Nicholas ever was, and an incomparably better actor. When, at the outbreak of war, th» ex-Tsar promised autonpmy to the Poles, his action aroused a quite natural suspicion. Why, it was asked, had not Polish autonomy favourably impressed itself on the Imperial mind before the German foe was at the gates? Naturaliy, the Kaiser's conversion- to electoral reform in Prussia, prompts, a similar question. Prussia's franchise grievance is no new matter. The unrepresentative nature of the Prussian Houses constitutes one of the oldest of political issues; and so do the Kaiser's special prerogatives, including his personal authority in the matter of declaring war. If Prussian electoral reform is just to-day, it was just, before the war. To say that it has been justified in recent times by the war-sacrifices of the people- is a thin pretext to excuse the-, time and manner of tho concession, and to cover the real" reasons prompting a Hoheiwolleni surrender. Militarily the Prussian people have always wade sacrifices; they did .so- in 1870, and they have borne the burden of conscription ever since. It is • therefore -obviously disingenuous to say that the Kaiser's belated' invitation to his people to "co-operate in political life" is duo to some military virtue possessed by the Prussian people of to-day over- and above that of its ancestors in the wars of the 'sixties am! 'seventies. Another thing detracting from ihe magnanimity of the-Kaiser's change of .frontis the ..fact

linquishment of those powers of personal autocracy that for many years have caused the rattling of tho German sabre to be the chief disturbing influence to the peace of Europe.. There is in his hew pose enough democracy to 1 delude but not sufficient to heal. It is still a fact that freedom., in • Germany as in Russia, depends not on the good-will of the Kaiser but on the good sword of the Entente.