ITALIAN OBJECTIVES

Evening Post, Volume XCIII, Issue 84, 9 April 1917, Page 6

ITALIAN OBJECTIVES

' The^recent' ]faistioiGermaii".threa<i -.-on ■] ■'the Italian* frontier serves-to:emphasise the--fact that neither laciallyaior strategically, has Italy :gained her -war; objectives: EaciaHy, the strip of territory ('-that, she has occupied oir the Austrian'side>of'the*lsoiizo is but'a. slight instal- ! ment of the coveted Irredenta, '.which-on-the Adriatic side includes Is- [ tria, Trieste, and the Dalmatian coast. j-Strategically; the-r enemy ,-positionsdn the I;Trentino continue-ftor.menace:-ther-plains |*;of northern Italy 'arid' the communications- -of ihe trans-Isonzo!offensive^- and, "the repulse ofHhe Austrian ad-- ■ vance-jin-this quarter last year, Italy >wiHsen joy -no- strategical/security--as long • nas- Austria remains, the possessor of .the •vantage points-in .'the Trentino and the 'Southern-Tyrol.. Historically, the origin-,-of this unfavourable frontier is to be: .^found>in«the- wars::in '.the middle of'last, Austria -suffered.two successive > 'defeats,-at rtho-hands of' France in 1859?' ..and':at.the.handsof fiPrussiainlß66;and{. .^through, each-^of'-these-wars ih'e--Italians' 'derived-a furtlier>'instalment "of; freedom from4hf>^ defeated Austrian overlord , Yet

with tie genei*osity that the oppressed'; and struggling Italians might have ex-. pected. In 1859 a victorious France— under the third Napoleon as Emperor— added Lombardy to Italy (then represented by Piedmont) .but left Venetia under the Austrian heel; by this act: ISapoleon alienated the Italians from the French, and deepened the breach by claiming as his spoil Savoy and Nice,, which are still regarded by some Italians as part of the Irredenta. Prussians success in 1856 added Venetia to Italy, but the ejected Austria secured all the strategical advantages of the new'frontier. When the Prussian defeat of the French in 1870 overthrew the clericalism of Napoleon 111., the Italian King was able to enter Home and complete his authority over Italian soil, yet the unfavourable northern frontier remained; and after two years of war,witli all the aids of, modem ordnance, the-issue is still undecided.

If Austria --is • thrown- out»of this region, and if the disposal of it is left to the Entente; a new difficulty will arise, for here, as in other parts of Europe, there is some conflict between strategical considerations and the prin-ciple-of nationality. If this principle is read strictly as meaning that" a district whose population is preponder'atingly Italian shall be Italian (or, if Austrian, then Austrian; if Slav, Slavic; and so on.) the frontiers may run on lines strategically unfavourable to one side or the other. For instance, it seems that on racial grounds Italy is entitled to some but not all of the Austrian territory necessary to give her a safe dividing line. According to H. S. Verschoyle, writing :to the .'Spectator: "The complaint of our Italian Allies is not only that 'a ■ large number of Italians are under foreign rule, but that Italy is exposed to continual danger by the configuration of the frontier which was' traced in 1866, and which was such as to leave the heads of all the valleys in the hands of the Austrians. This is what has, in the present war, added so immensely to the difficulties of Italy's task. The important principle of nationality is, we all know, one which will be fully recognised, as far as possible, in the rearrangement which will follow the war. But can it, with due regard to the safety of Italy, be carried out absolutely? Were this done, were all regions in which those of Teutonic race are in the majority to be left under Austria, Italy would be left in the same position of danger in which she has hitherto been, with the heads of the valleys in Austrian hands." Racial and strategical considerations may conflict again on the Adriatic, where the harbourless Italian coast is exposed to naval raids from Austria's harbours and protected, isle-studded littoral. Racially and strategically,-Italy has a good case against Austria; but Servia has some case against either of them. On neither ground could a Serbo-Croat State be excluded from the Adriatic. Again, in the Albanian-Epirus ■ sphere, Italy and Greece clash, and the American papers discuss, an Italian idea of putting the Duke of Aosta, an Italian Prince, on King Constantino's throne. But the day when racial rivalries can be composed by dynastic , machinery has probably j gone; and, whatever the faults of Con-J stantine, it is unlikely that Greece would feel compensated by the advent of a" foreign ruler imposed from without.

notwithstanding her Isonzo gains and her hold on Albania, Italy has "fallen short of her objectives, and, except with regard to Turkey-in-Asia, the same may, be .said of Russia. Militarily, if not geographically, Trieste and Pola are still remote, and so is Constantinople; and neither is likely to be won without a bigger effort than has yet been put forth. While it is true that Italy and Russia are the only Entente (Powers that occupy in Europe an area of enemy ■ soil, by far the greatest menace to the enemy'power, is the Anglo-French pressure in the "V^est, and it .will be decLsive if the Russian and the Italian Annies reinforce it in 1917 with their maximum numbers and energy.

Meanwhile,