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THE WAR

The importance of the submai'ine war on shipping has been clearly focnssed by the remarkable speech -of Mr. Lloyd George.; and the nation is now unequivocally faced with facts that can only be overcome, by a civilian effort as selfsacrificing as that made by the men at the front. .During the earlier stages of the war, Britain was engrossed with the enormous task of preparing a superlative army upon the Continental scale, out of ■* population which had in pr.st years never dreamed of any such necessity. This task has now been accomplished practically in full, as five millions of armed men, supported by a vast supply of munitions, testify. But the moment when this vast "force is beginning to move in preparation for its destined use, the nation is faced with an imminent crisis, which ennnot be avoided, and can only be palliated. Its cause is in part the German submarine campaign; and the failure of the British, and, indeed, of much of the world's, last harvest has aided the enemy. It is often stated, and it is true, that the. insufficiency of shipping to serve the Allies as they desire I to be served is not due to the submarines. The few millions of tons which they have sunk have been in a considerable measure replaced, and ths nel loss, compared with what remains afloat,; is trifling. The crisis is due to the fact that the direct military and naval needs of the Allies have been so great and so urgent that only a very limited amount of shipping is available for general purposes; and that limited amount has been, and is being, .reduced very seriously indeed by the German sea operations. In every belligerent nation there has been an enormous reduction in productive power through the diversion of producers to military duties; and a corresponding need' for help from overseas. And as Britain, being the • banker nation, has had to supply her Allies with funds, so as the shipping magnate of the, world she has had to lend tonnage. And Britain, of all the Entente Powers, is most:sensitive to the result. . Mr. Lloyd George now pictures a remarkable paradox: a nation depleted of men, with millions of workers engaged in the vast new industries of war, short of outside supplies and extraordinarily short of home food products, lacking labour, is to arise and pro3uce more home supplies than ever before. As he points out, a civilian effort corresponding to that of the Army will mean success.

Paramount, however, in Mr. Lloyd George's proposals is the drastic economy scheme by means of which shipping space is to be saved. A great array of items have been gazetted as no longer to be imported at all, or at least to be greatly reduced in quantity. In certain categories the restrictions are positive and the saving of tonnage can be arrived at in figures; in some others, for instance the vast timber and ore-carrying business, the possible saving is indefinite because it is governed by the quite unknown factor of the rearrangement of labour within Britain. But an estimate of the restricted imports gazetted gives, according to a London report, a total Ct five,, million tons tt year, equivalent to the service of a hundred and twenty-five steamers each of 5000 tons—nearly the size of the Aparima—each making eight voyages a year. This figure is of gratifying magnitude, for it represents a very big set-back —over 600,000 tons—to the submarine campaign. The number of 5000-ton ships represented by the saving is practically equal to half the total tonnage of the famous HamburgAmerika line of the enemy, the largest individual shipowning concern in the world. ..■"-■ ' -^

But the mere saving of even a million and a-quarter tons of shipping by direct economy is but a small part of the vast scheme described by the Premier. The amount of extra foodstuffs which can be handled by this amount of shipping will not solve the food problem ; for Britain consumes, roughly, seven million tons of cereals alone in a year. The Premier proposes to ■ attack on a large scale the problem of building more shipping. This has already been partially dealt with under the scheme of Sir Joseph Maclay, particularly by the introduction of standardised design. But the new proposal goes even deeper, by inaugurating a general system of piece-work. AVhere payment by results has been introduced, he stated, the output has increased by from 20 to 40 per cent. The usual comparative failure of payment by results is that when it shows.the workmen amassing what appear to be unexampled wages, the piece-rate is pulled down; and the system defeats itself by compelling workmen to toil far harder than they did before in return for very little more wages; and they, for that reason, prefer to be paid for their time. But this'nigger is already driven out of the woodpile by the Government's plans, which propose a guarantee to prevent the ' employers from diverting- to their own pockets any of the extra pay earned as the result of faster work by their men. If by~"such means as this the British shipyards can bring their output of merchant tonnage up to the prewar level—of nearly two million tons a. year, in spite of the extra work necessitated by the naval and militai-y services, a big advance will be made upon the present situation. Obviously this revolution in the shipbuilding trade, and the essential increase in the home production of foodstuffs and timber, and iron ore, depend upon the patriotic action of both employers and employees; and the Prime Minister's appeal is so framed that it is irresistible.

Meantime! a careful -watch has to be kept upon the submarine campaign, which continues to wear down the slender margin of shipping towards that limit where it may be necessary to reduce the services at the disposal of the fighting forces. The week-end news tells of the sinking of five British vessels, totalling 13,000 iim. In addition, there has been a very serious attack on Dutch' shipping, in the neighbourhood of Falmouth. Seven vessels, bound for Holland, left Falmouth (where presumably they had made a complsory call for examination) on Thursday; and a few miles out they were all attacked, and three were sunk, the rest remaining afloat. This singularly "ruthless", operation must be regarded as an important indication of Germany's intentions at sea. Not only were the vessels fully illuminated to show their nationality, but Germany had official knowledge of the date of their departure, and of the nature of their trade. An understanding had been reached by which Holland hi\d been promised a certain measure of safety, although Germany could not guarantee absolute safety. Such a promise was perhaps as good as the Dutch could expect having regard to the fact that Germany's .new tactics were likely to be fraught' with "accidental" happenings. But these steamers were attacked in such a way, that their nationality was known ; they were not torpedoed "on a flying siflht through a periscope. Naturally Holland lias displayed great indignation, and Germany, with remarkable speed, has come - forward with some amazing explanations.

It is alleged, for instance, thai, the Dutch vessels knew, in effect, not that they would be favoured in their passage, but thdt. th*y must tn.ka ths jama e&uicg as other vewwla of wea-pics »t<

tack; and that'they were the victims of " a combination of mischance and circumstances over which Germany had no, control;", Actually Holland is in the: same-general position as other neutrals, having been warned off the " barred: zone"; but there appears to have been; a special promise none the less, and the German explanation is simply a. gratuitous insult. It is so gross that >.t: compels tht belief that a special trap* was laid for the Dutch ships, because the . Germans' had foreknowledge, through the Dutch Legation, of the sailing date. It is scarcely to be expected that Holland can do any more than protest; Germany is playing a fairly safe game. The incident derives tts chief importance from being a clear indication of the moral as well as physical frightfulness behind the submarines. From a nation devoted to warfare with new weapons, subject, as one of its own states-: men has said, to no existing law, a,' nation using its weapons for the purposes of insult .as well as injury, concessions are not to be expected.

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https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/EP19170226.2.47

Bibliographic details

Evening Post, Volume XCIII, Issue 49, 26 February 1917, Page 6

Word Count
1,401

THE WAR Evening Post, Volume XCIII, Issue 49, 26 February 1917, Page 6

THE WAR Evening Post, Volume XCIII, Issue 49, 26 February 1917, Page 6

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