THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCIII, Issue 45, 21 February 1917, Page 6

THE WAR

A.'-generalised forecast of the-report of the Dardanelles Commission is published, but it is not official; and, ev©n if it was, to attempt to dot the " i's " and to cross the "t's" would at this stage be unwarranted. The Daily Express has furnished a skeleton which readers will complete according to their own preconceived notion as to who was right and who was wrong. The best course, however, is to wait for the report' itself. For the late Lord Cromer, Chairman of the Commission, cut off while the great war is still in the balance, it is already a posthumous document; and it is. a matter for. conjecture how much the melancholy revelations of the Dardanelles may have been to blame, for hastening the end of one who shared with the late Lord Kitchener the honour of being the greatest British Orientalist of the day. Lord Cromer, at any rate, goes to his grave full of years and honours; but there are. "severe critical observations" in the report concerning some other, dead leader. One other question arises : Is it wise to publish a confession and exposition of British blunders before the war is over ? Chloroformists will say "No," and the the people" school will say "Yea." Chloroformists will connect the Dar-danelles-Gallipoli charges. with the Australian "No" vote; arid tHe other school will say that the Briton hates lies and half-truths and that ho fights best when he knows that his back is to the wall. One side cries "cover up," and the other demands exposure. And a wise policy lies somewhere between the* two extremes. '

A. Homo message says that torpedosinkings in tho Mediterranean were never fewer than since Ist February; and the. Budapest correspondent of the Morning Post tftatea that efforts to

Austria-Hungary and the United States continue. Probably some mutual relation of cause and effect exists between these two facts. The most important enemy sea-frontage on the Mediterranean and its branches is'that held by Aus-tria-Hungary on the Adriatic coast; and the reported reluctance of the new Emperor of Austria-Hungary to engage in ruthless submarining, and hie desire not to break with Washington, would be consistent with the lull in the enemy's submarine campaign so far as the Mediterranean is concerned. While the German heart is absorbed in the „ superfrightfulness in British waters, tile Aus-tro-Hungarian heart is distinctly not in the business; but. Washington policyshow's its customary weakness dn not insisting either that Austria-Hungary should withdraw her endorsement of Germany's policy, or that Count Tarnowski should follow on the heels of Count. Bernstorff. Instead of that, another yes-no situation is in danger of diplomatically, developing between Washington and Vienna, instead of between Washington and Berlin. But, after all, Berlin is merely round the corner.

■ Swiss-information was quoted m a message yesterday as the authority for a report that 115 German and 13 Austrian submarines had been lost up till 15th February. Probably the total, ' which must be taken to include all losses during the war, will seem disappointingly small; but it is also probably incorrect. The Swiss calculation is far more likely to have been based on German information than on data from the Entente side; if not, it is of small value, for the Entente is making no revelations. If German reports have been used, they can be only such as have been made available in some form to the public; for the German Government also has motives for secrecy. Actually it is reasonable to, take the Swiss.figures as a minimum, and to say that the enemy's losses of underwater vessels number at least 128. Early in 1916, American correspondents were shown an official chart which showed that between 18th February (the date of the opening of the Tirpitz " blockade ") and the beginning of- November, 1915, fifty-eight submarines had been accounted for, and the destruction of twenty more was considered " most probable." That report was issued with the permission (though not with the confirmation) of the Press Bureau, and deserves some credence. At least sixty vessels were thus accounted for in a little over eight months; and since then over fifteen months have elapsed.' Even if the Germans showed increased skill in avoiding destruction, or the anti-submarine.tactics became (as has been alleged) temporarily. less effective, it is hard to believe that in two full years the additional losses have not doubled those of the first eight months. The total of losses is probably very much larger tEan the Swiss figure. But ev«n a correct statement of the number of submarines destroyed would actually be of comparatively little value. What would afford a satisfactory viewpoint would be a statement giving also the number still in existence and the rates at which the destruction is going on and.at which new boats are being produced. On these points complete secrecy is maintained.

> Norway has been induced by the pressure of circumstances to mate an arrangement with Britain to secure a supply of coal, of which Scandinavia is extremely short. .The condition on which British coal will be available for the Norwegian fires is that the export of pyrites—probably the copper ore—to Germany, shall stop. " Thus far,' the hardship inflicted upon Norway,by the blockado has worked to the disadvantage of the enemy; but the effect may nob after all be of great importance owning to Norway's long-established leaning towards the Entente. It is likely, moreover, to concentrate a little more of the submarines' attention upon shipping to and from Norwegian ports. This shipping, especially that under the Norwegian flag, has suffered severely during many months, because Norway alone of the neutrals dared to put active opposition in the way of the submarine operations, as they affected her territorial waters. But Germany, in spite of the comparative hostility of Norway, has been unable to avoid trading with her for copper. , ,

A map of the Tigris Valley in the neighbourhood of Kut-el-Amara appears in this issue of The Post, to illustrate the interesting report of the latest operations in that region. The heavy black lines in the Eastern part of the map, said the black and dotted lines about Kut-el-Amara itself,' may be disregarded; they relate to the siege of Kut last year. It will be remembered that several recent reports have described, successful operations to the south and west of the town of Kut, in which General Townshend stood, and succumbed to, the famous Turkish siege. The big Es Sinn position six.miles east of Kut, whfch was the final barrier that stopped the too slender relief force sent to help Townshend,,, fell fairly easily when the British campaign was resumed; and the main body of the attackers has since developed an at-; tack upon the river west of that position, -without any serious interference with the Turks on the north side of the river. They are now as far west as the Shumran bend,.five miles west of Kut, and one of the latest events was the capture of two thousand Turks who had been completely penned up in the Dahra bend, between the . Shumran and the town,.

It is not clear in -which, direction the British operations were chiefly developed, but ('probably a co-operative effort was made by forces coming- from the east and from the south (based on Nasirieh, on the Euphrates), along the Shatt-el-Hai. In this neighbourhood, then, the British a,re in contact with 1 the river for several miles west of Kut, and so far as the enemy depends upon river -transport his communications are already hampered. To-day's news, while it refers'to further progress a* the Sbvumran bend, relates principally to the eastern portion of ifche field. The Turks have never, since the siege of Kut, been dis : lodged from, the northern portion of the Sanna-i-yat lines, which extend across the river between . the big Suwaioha marsh on the north, and a smaller swampy area on the south. A frontal attack may have been thought unnecessary if the western operations against the river could be depended upon to cripple the Sanna-i-yat forces. Now, however, an attempt has been, made to carry these lines; but the Teports show tha/t it has for itie present failed. Two stretches of the front line of trenches north of the river were oocupied on Saturday afternoon, but in one case a Turkish counter-atkick recovered t-lfe lost ground, forcing ifehe British right flank back to where it began; and the left, afte^ holding' on all the afternoon, retired in the evening. It remains to be seen whether the attacks have been made necessary by inability Ito out the Turks' communications. "Perhaps the British have found that the river route has been paralleled on the north bank by a road-line, •which is neither within gun range nor. easily accessible from the British standpoint west of Kut.