Evening Post. WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1917. HINDENBURG'S ADMISSION

Evening Post, Volume XCIII, Issue 45, 21 February 1917, Page 6

Evening Post. WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1917. HINDENBURG'S ADMISSION

"On otir side are right and morality," said the Kaiser in an interview reported a few days ago, "and to help these to triumph must every shining weapon be welcome to ns." In an order to the Navy, which was reported-on the following day, tho War Lord explained that the most potent of the shining weapons upon which he now relies to uphold the righteousness of his country's cause is the submarine. England's "war method of starvation" must be turned against herself and her Allies by the destruction of their sea traffic, and "herein," he added) "the submarine will stand first." The world has ceased to wonder that the Power which gloated over the sinking of the Lnsitania with its hundreds of uoncombatants nearly two years ago should be anxious, for a- further advance of the cause of "right and morality" by an indefinite extension of the policy of murder. German morality sticks at nothing that will pay,, and openly glories in the assassin's knife as- the most shining weapon in her armoury. But if from the moral point of view.we no longer wonder at, -the performance, the tactical aspect of- the extraordinary prominence that is now given to\this particular branch of Germany's criminal activity does provide ground for surprise. There was a strong touch of hysteria in the enthnsiasm with which at the word of command and under the most elaborate stage-management the so-called peace proposals of the German Government were hailed by the whole nation in December. There is again something hysterical in the way in which the nation, disappointed in its hopes of peace, : is seeking its revenge in a policy of unrestricted submarining. And the. new movement is just as obviously stagemanaged as that which it has replaced.

Yon Hindcnburg's statement which is .reported through the Prime Minister of Bavaria to-day is au even more striking proof than tiio Kaiser's' order to the Navy of the concentration of fcho German official mind ujioii the submarine

that the popular mmcl shall be so concentrated. In a' document addressed to the Navy the Kaiser might naturally Jay an undue stress upon the only kind, of offensive weapon, that it is possible for his Navy to employ, but when the Commander-in-Chief of all the forces gives in a statement at large the same decisive,, prominence to the submarine, there is no such obvious reason for disconnfcing what he says. The war, according to Yon Hindenburg, is "theoretically continuable without 'limit of time, because German reinforcements have exceeded the losses, and Germany's frontiers have remained intact." "Theoretically" is a fine saving word. "Theoretically" all sorts of things are true which are practically false. If the German reinforcements have ''really exceeded the losses, "theoretically" the country can carry on the war indefinitely and gain in strength during every year of the process. But practically we know that Germany ■would soon have, to put her greybeards and her children into'the ranks in order to maintain her reinforcements. Practically we also know that the destitution and depression produced by tho Allies' blockade are such that Germany is un- ' likely to be able to keep things going even for another year without some dramatic change for the better which will stimulate the people to further endurance. "Theoretically" they know that they are winning, all the time. Practic--ally they kaow that it is becoming increasingly difficult to get a square meal, and that in this respect the -victories of last year have proved even more barren than, those of the year before. Nor is there, much comfort for the ■■'German people in the reflection that '"■Germany's frontiers have remained inher defensive 1 aims Jiave been completely successful. The defensive aims which Germany had in view when she tore up tha scrap of paiper and crossed tho Belgian frontier were, to seize the ■Rreach capital within three weeks, and 'then (to turn round andj do as much for St. Petersburg, as it then was, before tho winter. Two winters have already passed, and a third is preparing to make way for spring, with both these ! aims unrealised. Not only that, but ■even co consummate, a master of "bluff" as Yon Hindenburg does not venture to suggest' that they ever can be realised. All that he claims is that the German frontiers aro still intact, ihat^ the invincible German armies can continue to mark time in their present positions indefinitely. This is singing email with a vengeance, and it ie also, as we have already shown, singing false. On ih<s other hand, the Held-Marshal's admission, with regard to the staying: powers of the Allies is remarkable. ''The enemy," he said, "could continue indefinitely while able^to draw his strength overseas." Having previously claimed for hi* own people that they are able ■to hold on indefinitely, Yon Hindenburg gives the Allies credit for an equal capacity—under existing conditions. The conclusion he draws is, of coursfty.-th'ail of the Kaiser: "The submarine is the only way to a quick finish." . This admission that the Allies are invincible so long as they retain command of tho sea is a singular admission for the German Commander-in-Chief to make. If his people-were hesitating to approve the pushing of submarine piracy to its furthest limits, the emphasis which he places upon sea> power would be readily intelligible. But why urge th&i so strenuously in the direc-' tion which "they ar© only too eager to take? and why raise still higher the extravagant hopes which the people already entertain-, and which, if disappointed, can only convert their present uneasiness and depression into despair? To stake so much 'upon an issue which at the best is still uncertain seems a kind of gambling that desperate straits ■alone would justify. The inference is tempting that yon Hindenburg' knows that he has that justification. The reception, of the peace manoeuvre at the I «nd of last year in the Patiierland revealed the intensity of the popular eager- ; ness to sea an end to* tho war. That feeling has, of course, now become intenser still, a-ncl Utopian hopes of a decisive success by wholesale submarining may be regarded by the authorities |as an anodyne worth applying".in order to keep the people quiet for a few weeks. The fact that the reaction in the event of failure would involve, an immense aggravation of the present-dis-contents euggests how dangerous their pressure has become and to what sore straits the Government is driven for a. remedy. But, whethex-theso speculations are sound or not, yon. Hindenburg'sv statement is surely one of the most re-, markable that the- war lias produced.