THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCIII, Issue 28, 1 February 1917, Page 6

THE WAR

The report received yesterday of German concentrations against the eastern frontier of Holland was the first of a sensational group of items which indicate some remarkable developments in Germany's plans. Without the later messages the Dutch story is of doubtful importance; with them it becomes open to an interpretation which is strongly supported. The concentrations are reported as ixr north as the borders of Oberyssel, which is north-west of tho German town of Munster. The location of these troops, of which the equivalent of a full army corps is billeted in two towns, is certainly calculated to cause uneasiness in Holland. Somewhat similar movements recently aroused deep concern in Switzerland, but the conditions are not at all similar. A massing of troops on tlio Swiss border could be explained by a German intention to outflank, by an invasion of neutral territory, the French or the Italian front, just as the Germans outflanked the French by the original nutrch through Belgium. But no invasion of Holland would have «jy outflßuiajia—eflesi;-' -'-usaa -the- "-Allies!-.;

Western front. A march through Holland would only bring the invaders: into Belgium or upon the sea coast. Two ideas therefore suggest themselves; Germany may have in view some scheme for securing the mouths of the Rhine and the Scheldt; or the precaution may be defensive, in. which case it would be aimed only indirectly at Holland, and directly at England. If Germany is raising a scare about a British invasion through -Holland, this is the second effort ,of the kind. On the previous occasion Holland was thrown into a ferment by false announcements which were traced to German agents, and the jscare rapidly calmed down when the stories were proved false. In this instance, the sensation is due not to rumours, but to the actual presence of troops in a novel position ; and there is no reason to suppose that Britain has any scheme for landing in Holland.

It is almost beyond doubt that Germany can only find striking forces for new ventures with difficulty, but hitherto it has not been impossible, and great things can be done when the need is great. Under sufficient inducement of "military necessity," the Kaiser's staff would invade Holland as cheerfully and ruthlessly as it .invaded Belgium. The question is, what military need exists to undertake this big task and shoulder a fresh crime against the law of nations? If such a necessity exists, it is to be discovered in two news items to-day ; first, • the description of the new and extraordinary British minefield; second, the announcement in a Note to America that Germany intends to resume unrestricted warfare at sea. Germany's failnre on land, other things apart, is now certain; but she- has great hopes of dealing Britain a mortal blow by means of her submarines. But with' dramatic suddenness the British Navy has spread out a minefield which bottles up the Heligoland Bight, extending, its screen from the German-Danish to the German-Dutch frontiers. Everyone of Germany's naval bases except Zeebrugge is enclosed behind this screen; and it is only reasonable to conclude that the minefield ha 3 been specially designed to destroy submarines. In fact, it is probably the secret which was imparted to and satisfied the Navy League deputation which a few days ago waited upon Sir E. Carson and Sir-John Jellicoe. It is at this precise moment that Germany, after discharges of journalistic asphyxiating gas, has announced to the United States her intention to resume unrestricted warfare. This announcement is supported by, not a request, but a demand, that Americans shall not be allowed to travel at sea in certain specified zones. The tone of the brief reports received, if they reflect that of the official messages, certainly suggests that Germany means business, and has challenged the United States on. the submarine question.

But if the Kiel Canal, the Elbe, the Weser, and the Ems, and the naval stations that dot these rivers and the neighbouring coast and islands, are effectively blocked by the British minefields, the submarine raiders are check--mated on the first move. Here, then, lies a possible explanation of the "new concentration on the Dutch frontier: Germany may feel compelled to open new ports which, may be used as naval bases, and in every way the best sha could desire are the Dutch estuaries. It must be admitted that the supposition is about as large a^s the data will support, and that the execution of it would open up new possibilities that Germany would find, in, the end, full of evil for herself. But the fact is that effective mining of the German coa-st-line and an effective control also of the Danish passages i«f one full reply to the German submarines, and to ■- the whole German navy, and that is a serious enough matter to induce Germany to take enormous . risks—even the risk that the Dutch river-mouths would be screened with, mines in their turn.

Accompanying the messages already referred to is a report from Berlin that Germany is prepared to make peace with Belgium, if _ she receives an assurance that the Allies will not use Belgian ter ritory as a base.for their future plans. The offer is not likely co- be entertained for a moment. The King of Belgium has, indeed, specifically stated thai Belgium is fighting to .the.finish; and the country is moreover, bound by the Pact of London to abide by the decision of the Entente as to a separate peace. Nor could Belgium alone accept the offer as made, for it is contingent upon an AngloFrench undertaking. The announcement is presumably connected' with the '-ecent peace negotiations, and possibly has for one ■ of its objects a- desire to put the Allies again in the wrong by refusing a magnanimous'offer.'' But magnanimity is not in the German nature; behind every such proposal is military advantage. If Germany were allowed to abandon Belgium under some extraordinary arrangement, which would imply mechanism difficult to conceive, she would be the gainer. Under the proposed, condition, the western front would be reduced to the comparatively short Franco-Ger-man frontier; it would be defended with comparative ease and an enormous number or troops would be released. Germany is no doubt quite aware of the fantastic nature of the. offer; but as she must also be sure it will be'refused, its practicability or otherwise is of A'ttle moment.