OUR WAR POLICY

Evening Post, Volume XCII, Issue 74, 25 September 1916, Page 3

OUR WAR POLICY

HAS IT BEEN SOUND ?

VALUE OF REINFORCEMENTS

VETERAN ARMY THE RESULT.

LESSON OF,THE CIVIL WAR-

(By E.E.M.)

No. 2. In tho opening article in Saturday's issue, discussing the question of New Zealand's war policy, special reference was made to the lessons of the South African War and to the manner in which our t resent Expeditionary Force has been built up. The results achieved during the existing conflict' were shown to be infinitely more satisfactory, not from the point of view of numbers sent, which is not in question, 'but from the purely military standpoint, in the matter of sending definite units organised, trained, officered, and equipped on, the European military standard, and maintaining those units in the field. It is, however, the policy of Reinforcements which many people, notwithstanding two_ years' application of the principle, fail to understand. The reason is that their military knowledge is restricted to what New Zealand did in the South African War, ,and how we did it; they know nothing of the lessons of military history, and still less are they acquainted with the lines laid down prior; to the present war for the enlargement of modern European armies, and maintaining them at strength ir the field.

WHAT THE AMERICANS PROVED,

But this was only what was to be expected, as up to August, 1914, the average man had no occasion to study such matters, and the leading principles governing- the despatch of regular reinforcements have never yet been satisfactorily explained. These principles, perhaps, will be better understood by quoting the lesson of the, American Civil War, which wa3 a protracted trial of strength, extending over four years. • In "Science of War" (quoted in the first article) there is a special chapter entitled "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," In which Colonel Henderson, one of the leading authorities, gives reasons why the Confederates (the South) so often triumphed over the Federals (the North). He attributes the Southern victories in a large measure as being due to the policy of reinforcement-. Referring to the laurels won by the Virginian Army, he says : —

"It was not only the genius of its commanders that won the laurels of the Virginian Army. Many of its victories were achieved by sheer hard fighting, they were the work of the soldiers themselves, and that the Confederates were able to wrest success from opponents of equal vigour was due to their superior organisation, more accurate shooting, and above all to their stronger discipline As to. the first, the Federal Government allowed the pernicious principle of the election of the officers by the rank and file to flourish without restraint; and secondly the strength of the army was kept up not by a constant stream of recruits to the seasoned battalions, but by the formation of new regiments. Thus battalions which had served in more than one campaign, and had gained experience and discipline, ware soon reduced to the* strength of a couple of companies; whilst others lately raised boasted a full complement of rifles, but were without officers, commissioned or non-commis-sioned, capable of instructing or leading their unpractised men.' One State, Wisconsin, created no new regiments, but maintained the strength of those she had originally sent into the field; and so (quoting the memoirs" of General W. T. Sherman) we estimate a Wisconsin regiment equal to an ordinary brigade. I believe that five hundred'new men added to an old and experienced regiment were more valuable than, a thousand men in the form of ,a new regiment, for the former, by association with good experienced captains, lieutenants, and noncommissioned officers, soon became veterans, whereas the latter were generally unavailable for a year. The Southerners, on the other hand, early adopted the conscription; the superior officers were appointed by the Government, and the recruits sent to fill the vacancies in the ranks." REPEATED IN RUSSO-JAPANESE W Allin the matter of reinforcements the same "experience proved true in the Russo-Japanese War. Every European nation learned the lesson; it was adopted by the British military authorities, who laid it down iffsF ield Service Regulations Part 11. that first reinforcements should accompany any expeditionary force to its destination, and should be - followed by regular reinforcements drafts computed on a- definite percentage at monthly intervals. THE OBJECT OF REINFORCEMENTS. Tho object of reinforcements is to maintain the existing Force in the field at full strength, making good casualties and " wastage " from other causes But there are other important advantages to be derived from such a course. They are : (1) The improvement of the morale of the existing troops by the knowledge that on due date their losses will be repaired (nothing is so disheartening to armies in the field as evidence of constantly vanishing strength); (2) the absorption of the recruits among an invariably • much larger proportion of seasoned veterans and placing them ; under experienced officers; (3) preservation of the regimental traditions won during the existing and previous campaigns. Tlie result, in effect, is the creation of a veteran army, as the new-, comers, trained up to..a certain standard before being absorbed among the seasoned troops, soon become veterans ihemselves. That is a military, truth up to the point that the existing Force does not get depleted to the extent that prior to the arrival of the' reinforcement draft it falls below the strength required. In that case the unit has to be withdrawn from the firing line until it is fit to take the field again.

In the great European War the whole of the combatants from the outbreak of hostilities have adhered to the policy of reinforcements. They have also greatly increased'the size of their armies in the field .by the creation ,of new units, but they have reinforced these new units in turn; when they have reached a pertain strength they have ceased raising new units, because they must keep the men they have.left for reinforcements When such nations as Germany and ■ Austria, who are hard up -for men, are still doing this the- deduction is obvious :Ri 'n.forcemonts are worth infinitely more than new units, which, unless 'hey can in turn be reinforced, become rapidly nonexistent, and in proportion suffer in morale, which is one of the most important factors in war. As soon as the supplj of reinforcements fails therelore, the armies become exhausted, and the side which reaches that climax quickest stands to Jose the war. NEW ZEALAND'S VETERAN ARMY. What, then, is New Zealand's record in carrying out this all-important prinVciple? It is that we have observed it j rigidly from the very beginning. As first I reinforcements accompanied the Euro-

pean armies into the field, so the first reinforcements, unbeknown to most New Zealanders, accompanied our Expeditionary Force to Egypt, and we have maintained that Force at full strength ever since by the despatch of regular drafts of reinforcements. As the European combatants have done so we have increased the strength of that Force, and each new unit sent has in turn been maintained at establishment by the despatch of corresponding reinforcements at the same regular intervals. As a case in point, take the Ist and 2nd Battalions and then the 3rd and 4th Battalions of the Rifle Brigade. When they left New Zealand with first reinforcements accompanying them, the 2nd and 3rd reinforcements for each battalion were already in training. The same applied toother new units created. In addition whenever increased psrcentages of reinforcements have been asked for by the Imperial Government they have always been supplied. The outcome of this is that to-day we are maintaining a full division on "the Western front, besides the other forces elsewhere, the whole being reinforced by 2500 men every month to make good losses as they occur. In other words, allowing for estimated wastage in the various fields, 2500 recruits, with from four to five months' training received in New Zealand, are reinforcing some 19,500 seasoned veterans every month : the arrival of the reinforcements has a stimulating effect on the veterans : the veterans have a. steadying effect on the newcomers : tho combined effect is the creation of an army of veterans.

But, is from four to five month..' training in New ZeaJand sufficient for Reinforcenmte? The repfy is that elsewhere they do not receive a-s much; in Great Britain ten weeks' training has been regarded as sufficient for Reinforcements : in Germany, also, drafts have been sent into action with only two months' training. Further, the standard for four months' training in New Zealand has been equivalent to four months' training on the European standard. LAST YEAR'S _.G_TAT_ON. It will be seen from ..hat has been staled that the policy followed in New Zealand from'the commencement of the war has been sound, having been based on strictly European lines. But to appreciate this fully readers require to consider the position we would have been placed in now had the authorities yielded to the agitation of twelve months ago, when they were jr.ged to increase "the strength of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force from 30,000 to 50,000 men." In the first place the strength of our Expeditionary Force then was not 30,000, nor even half that number, "the strength" of the Force being only what wo were then maintaining in the field, which wa6 under 15,000. Over and above that strength other new units were then in training-in New Zealand.: To estab lish and keep up these commitments we had then despatched and had in training ■some 25,000 men. The critics were thus in error in speaking of "the strength" as 30,000 men, but- they nevertheless continued to urge that it be raised from 30,000 to 50,000. Accept-in;?, that 30,000 as the strength for the sal*, of illustration, this meant the raising of an extra 20,000 men in new units, which, supposing they had been formed into a division, would have required reinforcing at whatever rate laid down... The extra number _f men New Zealand would have had to contribute during the second year of war would thus have been fully"50,000 men, plus at least 28,000 more per annum as long as the war lasted. The full significance of what this involved will be realised when it is stated that New Zealand under then commitments was obliged to raise 65,000 men by the end of the second year of war. To have yielded to the demands of the More Men Party, therefore, would have meant thai by August last to fulfil obligations New Zealand must have - raised fully 115,000 men, and for the third year of war would require still another 58,000, making a, grand total for a three years' war of 173,000 men. Yet even then we should not have met the- demand to increase "the strength from 30,000 to 50,000," because our strength in the field is still considerably less than 30,000. To have carried out such a programme as urged last year would simply have meant that New Zealand, would have already approached a state of exhaustion, and that had our Force still remained in the field, it would have been In danger of becoming rapidly extinguished with all the realities that involved. We should have had to break our promise, and would have proved ourselves military incompetents, by having prematurely exhausted our strength, although we were warned by Lord Kitchener at the beginning that, it was a case of a three years' war.

On the other hand, the policy adopted is unquestionably taxing our strength, though, if the occasion arise 3, we may still be able to do something more. It has placed us in the premier position among the Overseas .Dominions in the number of men coutiibuted on a population basis. If the war ' lasts the full three years wo shall have raised close upon 100,000 men, which will be com-., parable to the effort even of Great Britain herself, being equal to 4,500,000 men levied from the British Isles alone for service on European and Asiatic battlefields (not for home defence or garrison duties overseas). It is a- proud record for New Zealand to possess, and is enhanced by the. fact that such contributions a«s we havo made have been of true military value, inasmuch as al_ along they have been based on the European model.