TO MEET RUSSIANS

Evening Post, Volume XCI, Issue 150, 26 June 1916, Page 2

TO MEET RUSSIANS

WHERE THE GERMANS ARE

WEAKLY-HELD LIKE.

Now that the best campaigning season in Bussia draws. on apace it is necessary for us to study the strength and distribution of . the Austro-Gsrman armies in this distant theatre (wrote Colonel Repington, the military correspondent on The London Times, last month).

These armies remain practically in the position where they stood about the middle of September last at the close of the great advance. The German armies in the east have their left on the Gulf of Riga and their right on the Pripet. The Austriaiis continue the line to the southward with their left oh the Pripet and the right on the frontier of Rumania. A few troops of each Power stand in the line of the other, but in the northern, or German section, there is now posted only one Austrian army corps, the 12th, while the German contingent with the i Austrian armies is limited 'to a few divi- | sions. Thus, broadly speaking, the Germans hold the 450 miles of front from the Gulf of Riga to the Pripet, and the Austrians are responsible for the rest of •the line." CHANGES IN DISPOSITIONS. j "There have been some changes in the t disposition of the eastern German armies since Stptember last. At that period Mackensen stood on the right about Pinsk, and to his left there were posted in succession the armies of- Prince Leopold of Bavaria, Woyrsch, Gallwitz, Scholtz, Eichom, Below, and Lauenstein. Mackensen has since left for the Balkan theatre, and with him has gone the army of Gallwitz.' Yon Fabeck has relieved Below, and there are other alterations, in detail. Four armies, and two so-called. army detachments, now occupy the front. On the right stands the army detachment under Prince Leopold of Bavaria; consisting of three infantry and two cavalry divisions. This detachment holds the front from the Pripet to Lipsk, a pronounced salient at Pinsk being occupied, by the Guard Cavalry Division. Next on the left comes the 9th Army under Yon Woyrsch, consisting of the 12fch Austrian Army Corps and eight German infantry divisions. This army extends its action up to Deliatitchi. Then comes the 12th Army under Yon Fabeck, eight divisions strong, with one brigade in reserve, holding the front up to and a little north of Smorgon. Here begins the line of Yon Eichhorn's 10th Army, consisting of 11^ infantry and two cavalry divisions besides two others in reserve. From about Vidzy Yon Scholtz's Bth Army . takes up the line and continues it to a point between Friedrichstadt and Jacobstadt. This army has nine infantry and three cavalry divisions. The remainder of the front up the Gulf of Riga is held by the Mitau Army Detachment with about 7-i infantry divisions and one division of cavalry.

GERMAN DISADVANTAGES.

Thus the whole front of rather over 450 miles in length is held by about forty-eight divisions of infantry and ten of cavalry, to which we must allow an aggregate strength of about 1.200,000 men, assuming strengths to be maintained, and a combatant strength in rifles of a little over half this number. Thus, in combatants, tho German armies in Russia have but 1300 men per mile over the. front as a whole, and it is remarkable, that eight of the cavalry divisions are in the trenches, and that, except a couple of cavalry divisions and one infantry brigade, there is no reserve in the hands of cither the army commanders or of Marshal yon Hindenburg, whose control extends over the the whole front. It is a new wall of China, and there is nothing behind it. All the German goods are in the shop window.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that the Germans have no natural line of resistance upon which to base their defence. They failed to win the Dvina lino in the north, and • were forced back behind tho Oginski Canal in the south. They make what use they can of the lakes and marshes, but natural obstacles are on the whole wanting. Nearly all the region where their troops are placed was laid waste by the Russians in their retreat, and offers miserable quarters for troops. The length of the front, and the comparative sparseness of the forces holding it, have naturally led the Germans to concentrate upon important localities best fitted for defence, 'and to hold the intermediate spaces lightly. It is a line of fortified' posts which the Germans hold, and the map must be read in this sense, and must not lead anyone to suppose that the whole force is spun out at the rate of considerably less than a man a yard. On the other hand the lines have the best'of the ground, such as it is. They are covered b ( y seas of barbed wire, and the weakness of the forces is atoned for to some extent by ■ the employment of an immense number of machine-guns, and 'by the' use of all the diabolical inventions of which modern trench warfare has been so prolific. It must further be remarked that the Germans have acquired the best of the Russian railways, and occupy a superior position from the point of view of facility for movement and concentration, an advantage which they have exploited by a great extension of light lines in their rear. It is probably open to yon Hindenburg still to draw a certain number of divisions ont of his line and to use them for soms offensive or defensive purpose, and there is no doubt that in the conquered territory the remaining inhabitants, as well as "prisoners taken from the Russians, have been kept busy in building lines of defence without end. We must certainly give the Germans the credit for having worked with their heads during the long standfast since September last, but all the same it-remains true that the line is a cordon, on the whole weakly held; that it is without reserves; and that, both from the defensive and the offensive point of view, it leaves much to be desired in German eyes. The divisions which formed Hindenburg's reserve have been wasted boforc Verdun, and whether the fault lies with Falkenhayn, j the Crown Prince, or Hacselcr, is no concern of ours. RUSSIA'S TASK. In estimating Russia's task this year j wo must never forget that she has on i her hands further south all that part of the Austrian army which is not engaged j on the Italian front or dispersed in Albania. ft must further be observed that the map shows t!ie winter and early spring dispositions during a period in which Germany was standing ,on tho defensive, and that arrangements made for the defensive do not necessarily hold good when other-plans are in the wind. But Paul can only be paid by robbing Peter, and in face of the fast-growing numbers of- the Russians,' who are vigilant and full of fire, liny important withdrawal of 'German troops from the front line for tho profit of some special offensive may have to be paid for at a high price. The German Chancellor considers the military situation of his conritry to be good. Ho is.easily pleased, for it is far from rosy, since neither in east nor west has Germany tho formations at disposal in reserve capable of conducting a successful offensive of a general character. She may produce these reserves in the shape jot. new foauations from the inItonwjibHt tliera'is no.;ajga of th«sm yet,

and most of Ihb Allied Staffs frankly disbelieve in their appearance. Reserves certainly exist, and' still in largo numbers, but now German formations have not been brilliant in this war, cadres are running short, and it is no profit in the long run to form' new divisions at the expense of maintaining veteran troops. Germany, in effect, has reached, and from military pride has overstepped, the culminating point of victory._ Now it is our turn, but we must not imperil our success by premature attacks before we possess the superiority of numbers and armament necessary Jo'r a crushing victory and for a continuous offensive. Whether 1916, 1917, or 1918 will give us this superiority it is for the Allied Staffs to decide, but history will never forgive us if, out of sheer impatience and war weariness, we hazard a brilliant future and an assured victory by engaging upon a general offensive bc*fore; our hour.