DIPLOMACY IN 1915

Evening Post, Volume XCI, Issue 107, 6 May 1916, Page 14

DIPLOMACY IN 1915

"THE CURSE OP AMATEURISM"

A SUMMING UP. (By Dr. Dillon, in the London Daily Telegraph.) VI. Among the fundamental errors underljrng all our reverses are the amiable weakness of wanting to carry out in wartime a policy consistent only with peace, a pathetic endeavour to cut a respectable figure while fighting for our lives, and ,i pusillanimous awe of hypocritical con- ■ demnation. The Germans, on the contrary, who carried out a military policy ' in peace-time, are having recourse to sheer savagery during the course of hostilities. With them the end hallows the means, and the one thing necessary is success. And in diplomacy, as they understand this elastic term, they can point to a sequence of important victories. The tempting of Turkey, the seducing of Bulgaria, the bullying of Rumania and Greece, the .destruction of Servia, tho grafting of Teutonism on the other neutral States of Europe, are all monuments of their efficiency. They make straight for the goal, heedless of the road, if only it be practicable, whereas we not only limit' our choice of loute, but recoil from obstacles of our own creation. We are bent 'on attaining our end in chivalrous fashion or not at all. It was thus that at the outset we shrank' humanely from bringing Turkey or the Balkan States' into the war, in ' order to set limits to the loss of life and property!' But if Germany intimidates, she also wheedles. And we are unwilling to do either. If she frightened Greece and Rumania with terrifying threats, she also luied them with bribes and promises, as she has lured Turkey and Bulgaria. When Hungary, terrified by the Russians, besought her aid, she sent the requisite men,. officers, and artillery, rescued her ally from danger, and hurled the "steam-roller" back over the Car- ■ pathians. When Bulgaria was ready to , advance Mackensen was despatched to co-operate with her, and inspire her , with confidence. When Turkey's muni- , tions were giving out and her powers of resistance were failing, Germany rigged ' out the Servian expedition, opened up the route between Berlin and Constantinople, and infused a new spirit into her Moslem partner. y _ _ , The behaviour of the British nation , under an ordeal that tested . its moral , fibre is above praise. Its sacrifices are heroic, its achievements almost miraculous. It is none the less probable, however, that an appeal for sacrifices which affect any essential element of the social and political «ystem would fall upon ] deaf ears. Tlie need of permanently subordinating individual liberty to the security and stability of the Empire is not yet grasped by the nation. And yet German militarism, with its diplomatic, industrial, commercial,, and journalistic ramifications, has already touched with withering breath all the politicosocial systems on which tho Allies have , so long lived and prospered People are slow to realise this blighting action at a distance. . But it is none the less real that the cause is far off. Individualism, with its doctrine of laissez faire, and its heaven of ease and comfort, has been exploded by German bombs, and its place will be definitely taken by a system better fitted to organise, ' co-ordi-nate, and utilise all the forces of the Empire for the common weal. This supersession is an indispensable condition of self-defence and permanent security, and will gradually come to be recognised as such. At .the opening of the war I ventured to say that the definite abandonment of voluntary enlistment and of free trade would be among the first effects of the war on our own poli-tico-economic ordering. And already half of the forecast has come true, despite the seemingly inexpugnable strength of a*n institution hallowed to the community by its traditional and easegiving elements. ■ TWO MISTAKES. The two cardinal mistakes of Entente diplomacy during the year 1915 turned upon the Near East, and were caused by a misconception of the respective contributions which each of the Allies was expected to make to the final victory. Russia's triumphant armies were sweeping the enemy before them. Eastern Prussia was invaded, the- Bukovina occupied, Galicia preparing for Russian rule, the Carpathian passes were being captured, and a lively hope was enter- . tained that the Slav "steamroller" would make a smooth road for the Allies through Hungary to Berlin. .That Oris feat;should receive due recognition was natural and reasonable, and the only guerdon which Russia coveted was the city of Constantine and the freedom of the Straits. The question was formally put: Would the Allies allow her claim and henceforth regard the conclusion as foregone 1 One can easily see how potent was the temptation . that confronted the statesmen concerned to show their appreciation of Russia's splendid services, present and to come, by an affirmative answer. But the essence of statesmanship is to yield" not to temptations but to reasons deriving from the interests of the cause they "are championing. . And whatever .one may think of Russia's right to Constantinople, the cause of the Allies was certain to be impaired by disposing of the city at such an early stage of a long and uncertain campaign. It must have occurred to Entente statesmen —for it was self-evident —that to dispose of the Turkish capital just then was to throw away a trump card in our subsequent dealings with the domestic adversaries of the Young Turks. The Turkish Opposition was eager to overturn the Government, establish a new regime, and reverse the Germanophile policy of the Talaat-Enver Cabinet. Whether this projected revolution would have come to anything is dubious,, but once Constantinople was known to have been made over to Russia the stimulus to organise it was gone. For even the Opposition could not hope to find a sufficiently powerful following 'in tlie country which would brook a policy of friendship towards Powers which had deprived it of its capital city. On the Balkan neutrals the effect was still more sinister. Bulgaria was roused to indignation by the tidings. Few people appear to have been cognisant of • the yearning of the Bulgars for 'Constantinople, and fewer still of their steady resolve to bend all their efforts towards winning it. As I was once requested by the Bulgarian Government to sound certain other Cabinets as to their willing- , ness to help or permit Bulgaria eventually to annex tha't city, 1 was aware that the longing was much more than a day-dream. I also knew that during one phase of the Balkan War certain Governments had decided, in ease of Turkey's defeat, to favour Bulgaria's striving to transfer her capital to the shores of the Golden "Horn. King Ferdinand's hope and impatience to use the Byzantine robes he had ordered and to ger. crowned in Aya Sofia were known throughout Europe. And when the news of the decision of the Allies reached Sofia it I strengthened tenfold the links that already bound Bulgaria to the Central ' . Empires.

OTHER EFFECTS IN THE BALKANS.

Rumania's resentment was, 11 possible, stronger still. Rumania is a Black Sea Power, dependent on the freedom of its waterways for economic prosperity: 'And the perspective of Russia possessing Constantinople, dominating the Straits, and thus commanding Rumania's principal outlet, went far to extinguish whatever ardour may have subsisted in the breast of Bucharest Ministers for the Allies. This arrangement was one of the chief grievances in Bratiano's indictment against Russia, and one of the mainsprings of his attitude towards the Entente. In vain, explanations of the act and restrictive interpretations of its purport and operation were proffered. "Rumania," he made answer, "has no motive to shed her blood and spend her money in order to help Russia to seize and keep Constantinople. We have long been in subjection to Austria. We ■are capable of fighting to end that, but not of fighting in order to exchange it for servitude under Russia. The least that may be asked for is that the city be internationalised."

Even Greece, whose King was called Constantine as a reminder that the Hellenes once were—and still aim at beinjc —masters of Constantinople, took umbrage at the premature bargain. It was also clear that Italy could not be expected to relish the establishment of Russia on the Golden Horn while a Southern Slav State, Russia's protege, was to have access to the Adriatic.

In short, that unlucky transaction was the fertile source of grievous trouble and disappointment. And it was easy to foresee that it could not be otherwise.

It would be unjust to charge any one country, or even any one party, with this amazing blunder. They are collectively responsible. I have been in close contact with some of the world's leading statesmen at critical moments, when historic treaties were being discussed which were to displace old landmarks and substitute new ones. And one of the maxims followed by the two most eminent and successful Ministers was this: Make no permanent arrangement on the strength of a victory ; defeat, or political conjuncture which is or may be fleeting. And at that stage of the campaign no belligerent was warranted in being treated as the victor.

But apart from the contents of the treaty the question of opportunity ought to have come in for close consideration. And there could be no reasonable doubt that the time had not yet come to deprive ourselves of such a powerful weapon against tho Young Turks as Constantinople, and our wouldbe Allies of such an inducement to intervention as the hope of one day acquiring it. When all the extenuating circumstances have been fully taken into account, the agreement disposing of Constantinople and flinging away our cheering prospects in the Near East will remain the most fateful piece of diplomatic folly perpetrated during the warl And disconcerting as its consequences have already been, we have by no means experienced the last of them. THE DARDANELLES. The other stumble over the Near East was embodied in the Dardanelles Expedition, also conceived and organised for the sake of our Russian ally, to whoso land operations we were then looking for' the definitive decision. The subject has been so often and so fully discussed that little remains to be said that is_ wholly hew. At the time when the scheme was still under consideration it came to the knowledge of the writer of these remarks that the Governments concerned were of opinion that . the objects aimed at were' readily attainable. He entertained not the slightest doubt that a military and a, naval enterprise were . being planned simultaneously. How any less comprehensive scheme could have been subsequently decided upon is a psychological mystery which gives one the measure of the strategic ability of those primarily responsible for the undertaking. Mr. Winston Churchill's expose of the subject is almost as remarkable for its omissions as for its admissions. . At the inception of the scheme, military calculations were unquestionably interwoven with political, and the active support which certain Balkan States might contribute to its success helped to render it acceptable in the eyes of the sceptical. There are grounds for assuming that the insistence of tho executive upon an early, or, say, rather a premature, attack on Gallipoli, against the weight of expert advice to the contrary, prevented- the co-ordina-tion of Anglo-French ■ forces with those contributions from the Balkans which were to have been directed against Constantinople. The calm and deliberate view of a competent technical body is sure of the confidence and support of the Army, provided it enjoys a reasonable degree of independence. It is one- thing to have a General Staff whose function is merely to answer "Yes" to a Ministerial pro posal, and quite another thing to have a'powerful and independent body of experts entrusted with the duty of surveying and examining all the military conditions and environment, and making recommendations for such action as is congruous with the requirements of the situation and the capacity of the mili tary forces set to deal with it. Coordination of plan, therefore, as between Britain and her Allies is a problem that should go before, instead of coming after, the ratification of a. specific plan. That used to be the method before the war, when there was a recognised bureau with the Chief of the General Staff at its head. These plans were drafted and studied in conjunction with France and with Russia. Parenthetically. I may say that the beneficial effect of this system would have been enhanced tenfold if the degree of Britain's liability to be drawn into the war had been less uncertain. But even despite the doubt that hovered over that all-important matter, and the very limited independence accorded to Sir John French, it was a much better system than any that has been in working since the war began.

It was unlucky that tho general belief that the campaign would be short should have seemed to warrant the immediate transfer of the entire General Staff Bureau from Whitehall to Flanders. Nobody appears to have anticipated that Flanders would speedily become one of many zones of operation which, seeing that the: control of them all must be centred in London, would still necessitate the maintenance of a technical bureau in the English capital. The flitting of the General Staff left the military power wholly in the hands of one hard-work-ing and overworked man, and also to an appreciable extent bereft the Admiralty of a corresponding competent buieau for the study of joint enterprises before these were approved by the Cabinet. The War Office wius necessarily filled with understudies, new to tlie work, unacquainted with the machinery of tho place, and uninitiated in the burning question. Abroad and at home it is felt, and has been pointed out, by competent and friendly judges, that in times like these, when the war machinery is bewildeiingly complex, it is unthinkable that any one man, however gifted and experienced, should be responsible for equipping and administering' the troops, and for tho drafting of military plans.

TWO PRACTICAL LESSONS.

It will not be gainsaid that the evi. caused by those defects was consider-

able. A General Staff such as that which existed before August, 1914, but armed with larger gowgre aad receiving

a more ungrudging recognition of its independence in the matter of making original proposals, and led by a man of eminence commending the confidence of the thinking section of the army, would have had a marked influence for good on the conduct of such enterprises as those which had the Dardanelles and Salonika for their objective.

That political enterprise can be as important as military we know to our cost. Tlie myriads of the Empire's noblest sons' who have been needlessly sacrificed in the Near East represent part — only part—of the price we are paying for the deficiencies of statesmanship. And the cause has not yet beeri displaced. To proposals made by friends of mine and myself for a politico-mili-tary clearing house of the Allies, it was objected that foreign policy plays but a very subordinate part in the waging of this war. To that criticism the initiated are sure to demur. An adequate conception of the present struggle must include diplomatic j.nd semi-diplomatic action abroad. Frequently military strategy and. political designs must go hand-in-hand, and require to be care fully co-ordinated in advance.

The practical lessons that flow from the painful experience of the year 1915 might be reduced to two. The first is the necessity of altering our point of view, and in lieu of striving to carry on business and our normal pursuits in spite of the perturbing influence of Avar, it behoves us to wage war first and to Jet everything else come afterwards. In the second place, we need a politicomilitary eleinng house, a permanent board of representatives of the Allied Powers, to study and set forth the various questions, military and diplomatic, before they become urgent, to collect and sift the data, to harmonise the reports of military and diplomatic experts, and to make recommendations, presenting alternative plans of action, pointing out the probable consequences of each and setting forth the fir.al judgment, as well as, the process by which it was reached, in a detailed French and English, report. This report, should be presented to three or, ■ say, four persons, one from each country, who would constitute an international council of plenipotentiaries. The members of this council would be the respective Ministers of i War, Marin 3, and Foreign Affairs, arid the Commanders in-Chief of the four armies. This expedient would not confer upon us the enormous advantages which the Germans enjoy, but it would mark the nearest attainable approach to unity and continuity of direction and coordination of effort, the lack of which is answerable for many of our most fateful reverses.