THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCI, Issue 97, 25 April 1916, Page 6

THE WAR

Dr. A. Shad well, whose recent article in the Edinburgh Review on munitionmaking attracted a good deal of attention, scores an obvious point off the professional optimists. He says that the British worker would be prepared to accept compulsion if he had not been stuffed with optimistic delusions. The politicians, whose business it ( was at an earlier stage to seek to cover up their own defects, have succeeded so well that it is now difficult to convince the mass of the people that compulsion is really required. " The unionists," says Dr. Shadwell, " thinking .that the war is nearly over, regard compulsion as a dodge to smash the unions." They would acquiesce in compulsion if they •were convinced that victory is impossible without it. But, to do that, many publicists would have to unsay what they have said, and might incidentally lose whatever they still possess in the way of a reputation for reliability.

Nevertheless, tha idea that it is best to trust the people is steadily gaining ground. Anything founded on false optimism is fundamentally -unsound, and it is an insult to bho British people to imagine that they cannot look facts in the face. Reverses only stir a manly people to fresh effort. Military secrets that are real secrets must be kept, but the public could, at almost any stage, have been given a. sane idea of the -general position -without infringing military secrecy. The first attempt in this direction by a front rank politician was Mr. Lloyd George's "Preface," in which ha spoke frankly of the Bussian retreat and the munitions crisis. He wrote ■words that xvent home to the popular mind without divulging military secrete. ■But, in general, the tendency has been ■to itdopt the philosophy of Candide, and to wrongly assume that a. false impression of success is better for recruiting ■than a. sane notion of the. real position. Dr. Shadwdl now gives clear evidence in the negative.

Tha eompubioti qiM*.ii<"'o ftHJpn vp fl£aia in connection with Jlr. .Sidney

Low's suggestion that Italy should send half-a-million troops to France. Italy shows no desire to rush in at the invitation, and a correspondent of The Times says that the Italian public is eagerly following the compulsion struggle in Britain. Italy, France, and Russia are all conscription countries ; that is to say, they value their nationality so highly that they insist -that every man must render it some service. They look at the uncompelled man-reserve in Britain, and they take the view that Britain is nol making an equal sacrifice. So when Italians receive a British invitation to send half-a-million men to France, they not unnaturally ask: What about yourself?

Britain's answer is, of course, that she already has sent to France a million men, probably more. Italy's reply is, that, udmitting this, Britain's danger is not nearly so great as Italy's danger, and Britain's uncompelled surplus can be spared from Britain much more than Italy's compelled surplus can be spared from Italy. To support this argument, Italy will compare her own vuhierable fronntier (with its liability to German attack through Switzerland) with Britan's blue-water border and supreme fleet. It is probable that the Italian reasoning is faulty, and that the cause of Italy and tha Entente would be better served if an army of Italians went to France or the Balkans, where the Italian soldier would have elbow room instead of being cramped in mountainous country and confined to a warfare of artillery, mining, and isolated assaults. But the point is that the Italian gaze is fixed on the, British compulsion struggle with wonderment and some suspicion. If Italy was convinced that Britain was putting in every ounce, it would be easier to change her military opinion and to induce her to operate beyond her boundaries. As things are, her attitude may be wrong, but it is understandable, and it hinges largely on a weak joint in Britain's own armour. There can be no complete mutual trust without equality of sacrifice. That principle holds good not only among tha Allies but between Labour and Capital, and between the fit and the unfit. The responsibility of the militarily exempt does not end with hat-waving, yet there are a number of people who appear to think

Herr Maximilian Harden, the destroyer of the Camarilla, and occasionally the candid critic of the German people, warns Berlin against breaking with Washington. Some German newspapers, apparently regarding armies and fleets as the only things that count, consider American intervention to be "of little importance," but Herr Harden holds that American supplies received through Germany's neutral neighbours will be cut off; also, the United States will seize German ships in United States ports. In the ordinary course of the law, ifc would appear that merchant shipping, not condemned as contraband, should be restored to the owners at the end of the war. Therefore, if Germany saved her own ships in her own and oversea ports, and at the same time sank a jjreat part of her enemy's mercantile fleet, she would stand in a good position at the end of the war to capture the shipping trade. But as long as tho British fleet is supreme, that position will never be allowed to develop. For tho gaps illegally created in tho British mercantile fleet, Germany will have to pay in cash or in kind. Failing that, the German flag will not re-appear upon the high seas.

A French General declares that the road to the Rhino is via the Bosphorus, and that the Central Alliance . will be conquered mostly from Asia. He pictures the armies of the Caucasus (Russian), Suez' (British), and Salonika (mixed) functioning in Thrace, and striding into Austria and Germany over the bodies of Turkey and Bulgaria. The difficulties of a Russian advance from; the Caucasus to Constantinople through Asia Minor, and of a British advance through Syria, are disposed of ■with a few strokes of the >pen. .The picture is mainly a fancy one. it is at least as difficult for a Russian army to go from the Caucasus to Constantinople, as for a German army to go from Constantinople to the Caucasus; and the Germans have carefully left that work to the Turks. Nor have the Germans shown up at Suez. Nor are they now likely to.

Britain's Suez (or Egyptian) army will play a big part, but why go through the Sinai and Syria when there are searoutes to more vital points? Having the command of the sea,. the Entente may transport its forces to any point on tht Mediterranean. To this extent it has, as Mr. Belloc has pointed out, the advantage of the inner lines. Land travelling in Turkey's Asiatic empire is slow by comparison. As' to ( whether Germany will be reached via' the Balkans or via. Russia or via France, opinion remains divided. The Nation holds that the Salonika side-door policy is not the key to success. "We were never more certain than we are to-day that that way is not by -the dilntion and dissipation of our force, but by its concentration on the great and vital area of the West, where our main strength, outside our sea-power, is engaged, and where, if Germany falls, she falls everywhere."

The urgency of the military needs on the Tigris is indicated' by the heavy fighting which the relieving army is incurring in its efforts to break through the narrow Turkish fronts. The narrowness is due to the rains and the encroachment of river and swamp waters, and makes the attackers' task exceedingly difficult. The importance of swamp water in campaigning was proved at the Masurian Lakes and among the Pripet marshes, and the defensive value of the Tigris marshes is fully realised by the Turco-German officers." Following the fighting on the southern bank on 17th-18th April, the British attacked on the northern bank on 23rd April, and failed. The next development will be a Turkish communique full of the usual exaggerations.

From tho western front the news is good. Germany has definitely lost Verdun, and .the last attempt sacrificed thousands of men and the last shred of tho Crown Prince's reputation. It.now remains to be seen whether the German operations have modified the plan of the Franco-British offensive.