SEVENTEEN INCH GUNS

Evening Post, Volume XCI, Issue 97, 25 April 1916, Page 3

SEVENTEEN INCH GUNS

HAVE THE GERMANS ANY?

NOBODY KNOWS BUT THE GERMANS.

Sir,—ls there a 17in German gun? There is a 16in gun, turned out by Krupp's in 1913-14, of which the following are the particulars: — Weight of shell, 920 kilogrammes. Initial velocity, 850 metres per second Range (at 15deg. angle), 21,850 metres. Armour-piercing capacity, 20 inches of Krupp's steel. Rate of fire, two shots per minute. Inasmuch as the Germans had this gun in the autumn of 1913 or spring of 1914, is it not against all probability that they should have troubled to lay down plant for another gun only lin heavier in calibre? My information is derived from yon Lobel's Military Year Book (January, 1914), page 271. The book—which was thus published, before the war—includes : — (a) Full description of Skoda 12in mortar. (b) Experiments with 42cm mortar in 1911 and 42cm howitzer in 1.913. (c) Notes on the unpreparedness of Antwerp. (d) Articles on siege and trench warfare, by yon Beseler, exactly forecasting the tactics employed by him both at Antwerp and Novo-Georgievsk. Faithfully yours, MILES. The above letter, written to the Editor of the London Daily Telegraph, was replied to in the same journal by its naval correspondent, Mr. Archibald Hard. Ho says:—No one in this country, either at the Admiralty or elsewhere, can positively affirm that Germany has or has not made a 17in gun and mounted it in one or more bhips. Mr. Balfour admitted as much in 1909 when we were at paace. He then said: "I do not believe it is in the power of the Admiralty, or of any organisation, however well constituted, to know with certainty and security what is going on in Germany." War is rather like the game of chess. Neither player knows what is passing in the mind of the other. He is aware that no one move is independent; all the moves are related to one another. Ha may be in a good position at one time, and yet be out-manoeuvred. That is so in war. For that reason the British Admiralty must be continually considering, not what it is probable the Germans may do, but what it is possible they may do, and taking measures accordingly. Is it possible for them to make a 17in gun? The First Lord of the Admiralty lias admitted that it is. But when we proceed a step farther and enquire whether it is probable that they have made this departure difficulties at once arise. WAR AND SECRECY. We are at war, and war closes all the normal channels of information. The Germans, as their success in accelerating ships, in concealing from the Allies the progress they had made in accumulating big army guns and machine-guns, and in storing war material of all kinds has shown, are ad:pt3 in secret preparation. Before the war they deceived the military attaches of the world, who were actually resident in Berlin and frequently visited the great military centres ; no one of them suspected the extensive schemes which were being carried out. If, on the- naval side, the Germans had achieved a similar triumph—well, the Daily Telegraph would probably not be appearing this morning, and other events of even greater consequence would have occurred. The enemy'"\'vas foiled. When hostilities began wo had more ships, better equipped ships, at least in some respects, and particularly in the matter of guns, and they wero better manned and moro quickly mobilised. In this silent contest we won. The " real thing" is now in progress, and we must bo on our guard leat the enemy spring a surprise upon us. We may be sure thst in the past eighteen months the Germans have not been idle. The conditions on land made it desirable for the Germans that they should achieve a sudden and dramatic victory, because they were ready and their opponents were not. Tho conditions at sea made it desirable for the Germans that the war should be j a long one, because they were unready, and their opponents were ready, or at least the supreme fleet' was ready. Tho Germans possess great resources, as we realised at the time of the naval crisis of 1909. How they have utilised them in the past eighteen months we cannot know. They may have made 17in puns; they may have further developed the submarine, and information points in that direction; or they may have hit upon some other idea in the hope of , defeating us. They are masters in deception, and they are masters-also in adapting the triumphs of physical science to thoir own ends. THE ADVANTAGE OF THE 17-IN. GUN. Yesterday's correspondent remarked that " Inasmuch as the Germans had this gun (a Krupp 16-in. gun) in the autumn of 1913 or spring of 1914. is it not against all probability that they should have troubled to lay down plant for another gun only 1-in. heavier in calibre?" It is not against probability. An increase of 1-in. in calibre is a matter of considerable importance. „ In the history of naval ordnance every development has been by lin. or l->in., and there is no question of laying down fresh plant. The point may be illustrated from Krupp's list. The 14-in. gun fires a shell of 13661b, while the 15-in..gun has a projectile nearly 3001b heavier, besides possessing a higher \*;locity. During the period of peace we out-manoeuvred the Germans by inches in gun calibre. When they were satisfied with the 9.4-in. gun we' had a 12-in. weapon; when they advanced to the Uin. we first made a better 12in. and then a 13.5 in. At length the Germans adopted a 12-in. gun, but already we had a 13.5 in. and a 14in., and by the time the Germans determined on a 15----in. gun we had under construction ten vessels with 15in. batteries. The advantage of the heavier gun is that it possesses greater velocity and a heavier shell, and thus strikes a more shattering blow. It also has a. flatter trajectory, and it is easier to hit a target. Whether it actually carries farther or not—and it does carry farther —is not a matter of great importance, since no action, owing to atmospheric conditions, can be fought at a greater range than that of the 13.5-in. gun. The point is that whereas the 12-in. gun gets home with a shell weighing 8501b, the 15-in. gun has a shell more than twice as heavy, and the advantage of a 17-in. gun would be that the shell would weigh nearly 30001b—about a ton and ahalf. Think what a blow that would give < AMERICA'S POINT OF VIEW. It is forgotten that we once had guns of 16-25-inch. These weapons were carried in the Benbow, Sans Pareil, and Victoria. They were built on the hoop principle, tho hoops being put on in layers. When we adopted the wirewound system, which is in use to-day, we returned to tho 12-inch gun because that weapon of the new pattern was actually more powerful, all things coa-

sidered, than the old 16.25-inch gun. But since we adopted the 12-inch gun, ordnance manufacture has made great progress. Before the war opened the Americans had made and tested with good results a 16-inch gun, but they have never mounted it in a ship. Why? The gun was heavier, and used a shell I of greater weight; therefore, it would have been necessary, if the 14-inch gun had been superseded by the 16-inch gun, either to reduce the number of guns carried or to increase the displacement of ,the ship; only eight of the bigger guns could be carried instead of the twelve 14-inch weapons. The Americans determined that, for the time being at least, they would be satisfied with a j larger number of smaller guns rather j than a smaller number of larger guns. That is the American viewpoint at ! present. They may change their opinion to-morrow, and, for all we know, the j Germans, impressed by the battle off the j Falkland Islands, and the actions in the North Sea, may have decided, since a ; change from their 12-inch armament was j necessary, to jump at once to the 17-inch gun. The nation must rely on a strong and capable Board of Admiralty exhibiting insight, courage, and determination in building new ships to reinforce the Grand Fleet. Certain it is that we I cannot rest on our oars, but must utilise to the utmost the immense resources of tliis country from week to week and i month to month to reassure our position i at sea. | Whatever may happen on land, the nation must have the assurance that i nothing humanly possible is being omitted to make our sea command assured. Only sailors can give that assurance— sailors who understand what war means and who realise by their Knowledge of things as they are and as they may be what possibilities the future holds in store.