THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCI, Issue 92, 18 April 1916, Page 6

THE WAR

Colonel Repington's' detailed statement of the position on the Western front can only be inadequately dealt with in the space and time available, but its importance, in view of the impending FrancoBritish offensive (timed by American papers for May), i 3 obvious. It confirms his previous statement .that the best German, troops—and all the reserves— are massed before the British in the north and before the French at Verdun. In February (and probably for some time before that) the southernmost extoemity of the British line was on the Sommu; but it did not then include all the line between the Somme and Lens. In February the original British position was limited by the Pilken-Boesinghe-road (a little north of Ypres) on the north, and by Lens on the south. Then camo a gap from Lens to just below Arras, held by the French; then the British again took up the line from that point southward to the Somme. But since February the British have relieved the French of the Lens-Arras gap (probably as a result of Germany's offensive at Verdun), and they now hold the whole YpresSommo front., There is an impression that where the British lino' ends north of Ypres, it at once junctions with the Belgians'; and that the Belgians hold all the line from that point northward to the sea.. This is not so. On the British left north of Ypres is a French army, and the Belgians are on the French left. This explains Colonel Repingtons statement that " facing the French and Belgians on our left are a naval corps and two and a-half Landwehr and Ersatz divisions."

Excluding the above-mentioned units, the whole of the German forces (800,000 men, including half a million rifles, with over 3000 guns) are massed before the British;' and they have in reserve eight infantry divisions and one cavalry division, which reserves can be rapidly moved to any point.' That shows what the British Army is confronted with in the way of numbers. As to the quality of the troops opposing us, it is sufficient to say that facing the limited FrancoBelgian front on our left there are two and a-half Landwehr and Ersatz divisions, while before the whole of the British line only one Landwehr division is placed ; "the rest are good active or reserve forces." Confronting the British left (which includes Ypres, where two great battles have already been fought) are German formations "equal" to those at Verdun, and better than any others on the ■ west front or the east front." Also,_ as already intimated, the German line in the west has no reserves except in front of the British and of Verdun. If these facts are true—and in such matters Colonel Repington is one of the foremost experts—they speak volumes.

"This massing of important forces." says Colonel Repington, "is a tribute to the fighting qualities of our men." Especially so as the Germans "hold dominant positions." The. special difficulties, of the position held by the British have been referred to by Mr. E. A. Powell in the following passage: "The question that has been asked me more frequently than any other is why the British, with upwards of a million men in the field"; are holding only fifty, miles of-, battle-front, as compared with seventeen miles held by the Belgians and nearly four hundred by the French. There are several reasons for this. It should bo remembered, in the first place, that the Bvitieh Army is composed of green troops, while the French ranks, thanks to the universal service law, are filled with men all of whom have spent at least three years with the colours. In the second place, the British sector is by far the most difficult portion of the .western battle-front to hold, not only because of the configuration of the country, which offers little natural protection, but because it lies squarely athwart the road to the- Channel portsrand it is to the Channel ports that the Germans are going if men and shells can get them there. The fighting along the British sector is, moreover, of a more desperate- and relentless nature than elsewhere on the Allied line, because the Germans nourish a deeper hatred for the English, than for all their other enemies put together. . It was against the British, remember, that the Germans first used their poison-gas." It was this introduction of poison-gas against unsuspecting troops—its first use, and its only success on a considerable scale—that enabled the Germans to win a considerable area of ground from the Franco-British forces in the Second Battle of Yyres, lasting from 22nd April until 13th May.

Mr. Powell's remarks about the configuration of the country bear direcSly on the military dispositions revealed by Colonel Repington. Most of the greenness of the new British troops has now, after another half-year in the trenches, worn off, but the natural disadvantages of their position remain; though mitigated, no doubt, by artillery improvement. Only by a superiority in men and gnns—and, of course, the men and guns must be welded into a really efficient machine—can the natural ■ disadvantages pf the position be overcome to a degree permitting! a successful offensive. Colonel Repington states that "the superiority in men and guns necessary to assail modern trenches is now fairly well known." His subsequent remarks show that he doubts whether the British Army has that superiority; or, at any rate, he doubts whether that superiority could be sustained during a prolonged offensive. "We have," he says, "still not all the troops in France that there should be. ... Our output of guns and munitions is still below that of France and Germany." Recent estimates have placed the British troops in France at over a million, and the cablegrams have been full of out muni-tion-making and of our approaching independence of America. Yet Colonel Repington is not convinced.

After a knock at Lord Kitchener ("our strategy may have improved since the' General Staff regained its functions in October"), The Times critic goes on to refer to the manhood reserve of ths United Kingdom, in its relation to muni-tion-making. The problem of the British Government is different from what it has been hitherto. Last, year the task of training and equipping entire" armies of new units was in hand. This colossal constructive work has been accomplished, and what is how required is to train men to go out as drafts ami fill gaps in existing units. When the big spring fighting- starts, the need for drafts will be urgent. Colonol Repington complains that Britain has not yet sent Fiance as many new divisions as she should send ; and the possible explanation of this is that some doubt exists as to the power to maintain the reinforcement drafts, in the face of the intense wastage that is expected.

If it w«te merely a quafction of maintuning ths Army, th» pepuUtkm «»in»

would speedily answer all questions; but there is also the vital necessity of maintaining munition-making, ship-building (rendered very urgent by the submarine campaign), and the industrial business life of a country which is. lending its allies not only men and material but also money. So the statesman who sets himself the task of disposing of the British reserve man-power (and womanpower) to the- best advantage has a delicate problem. It is necessary, says Colonel Bepington, to keep two millions on munition-making, of whom one million will be males. "Wo 'will attack when we are strong enough," and our strength is as much a matter of the factory as of the field. In other words, Britain must keep her Army within such limits that she can reinforce it without prejudice to her necessary factory work. But no human material should be allowed to go to waste, and that is why compulsion may become essential.

In placing over three-quarters of a million men m front of the British, Germany's intention is either to break through or to resist the predicted British attempt to brc*k through,- or to attack the western part of Holland and thus secure the mouth of the Scheldt. For eighteen months Germany has held the great shipping and mercantile centre, Antwerp, on the Scheldt. But both sides of that river below Antwerp are owned by Holland, and Holland claims the right to close the mouth of the Scheldt. The legality of Holland's claim is arguable, but Britain did not challenge it when Antwerp was in danger. By claiming right of passage on the Scheldt and sending a fleet and trans, ports up the river, Britain might have saved Antwerp, but she preferred to respect Dutch claims. Tt follows that Holland is bound to equally prevent the Germans' sending .warcraft down the river, and for this" purpose it was reported that the Scheldt had been mined. Whether Holland has prevented the ingress and egress of German submarines is another question. In any case, Germany, would free herself of all Dutch shackles on the river-way if she seized the lower Scheldt, and Antwerp would then become in the fullest sense a pistol pointed at England. This is not the most likely explanation of the German concentration in Belgium and North France; yet it may well cause the Dutch Government some careful thought.

The Greek Government, it is cabled, has decider? not to oppose the transport of Servian troops over the Patras-Athens railway, but to formally protest. Germans will now be making comparisons between Greece and Belgium. Germany asked Belgium for right-of-pas-sage, was refused, and gained it by violence. But Belgium had not ' compromised her neutrality, and the German attempt to prove that she had is quite a failure. Greece, on the other hand, has compromised her neutrality by harbouring submarines, and in other ways. (Vide statement of the British Minister at Athens.) When the time comes the Entente Governments will no doubt be able to show evidence that will be convincing. In the meanwhile, however, there will, be many unconvinced Swedes. There are in Sweden men who can see no harm done in Belgium, but every harm. done in Greece. " The Entente policy," declared a, Swede recently, "is calculated to make Denmark a- Greece and Sweden a Bulgaria."