DIPLOMACY IN 1915

Evening Post, Volume XCI, Issue 84, 8 April 1916, Page 14

DIPLOMACY IN 1915

"THE CURSE OF AMATEURISM"

GOOD INTENT AND BAD RESULT.

(By Dr Dillon, in the London Daily

Telegraph.)

The political aspect of the problem should have convinced Entente statesmen that strong motives would be needed to draw Ferdinand and his people to their side. But they could not be brought to see the need of any more forcible stimulus than an appeal. to his patriotism and the justice of their cause. Bulgaria would, they urged, receive her due, as would Servia and Greece, whereupon those nations would unite with Rumania and fight for the liberty of the lesser nations against German hegemony. No problem could be simpler, no forecast more certain. What the Allied statesmen left entirely out of sigat was the view of the matter taken by the C'oburger and his Ministers. And the unavowod considerations that weighed heaviest with these could.not bo entertained by the Allied Governments. The aim of Bulgaria's leaders was to revive the empire of bygone days, which had an outlet .on each of the four seas. This can be accomplished only with the assent and active help of one or more of the Great Powers by itlie annexation of foreign territory and the assimilation of nonBulgarian peoples after the manner of Prussia. For there are no unredeemed Bulgars outside Macedonia and a portion of Thrace; the Bulgarian race is not numerous.

Now, one of the fundamental principles for which all Entente Powers profess to be fighting is that of nationality. Consequently they would never brook the seizure of Servian, Greek, or Rumanian territory by the Bulgars, nor the violent Hulgai.'isalion of those populations. That being so, an alliance with that belligerent group would put an extinguisher on the feivent aspirations of the nation and ■its chiefs. Further, Russia could never be got to make over Constantinople to the however sterling their services to the Entente cause might be. Therefore, partnership with this Empire would seal the doom of the projected great Bulgarian Tsardom.

Servia, on ihc contrary, would, if the Allies emerged victorious, become the great Balkan State, whose overlordship would assert itself by sheer ■ weight of numbers, extent of territory, and wealth of economic resources. For Ualmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Croatia are all Servian provinces cat off from the Servian kingdom,-and destined to be cne day amalgamated in one State. This amalgamation would surely be effected once the Central Empires were defeated. Hende it seemed to the interest of Bulgaria that the Central Empires should not be defeated in the present war. Lastly, Ferdinand had not forgotten the solemn threat. uUered by the Russian Emperor against the Slav State which should raise its hand against its own kith and kin on the eve of Bulgaria's treacherous onslaught on the Serbs and the Greeks. That menace was a Damocles sword suspended over Ferdinand's head by a hair which would surely be sundered after the victory of the Allied Powers. It was deemed of supreme moment, therefore, to the Coburger, as well as to his people, that the victory should be with the Allies' enemies. THE BULGAR CHARACTER. The force of these and kindred calculations was self-evident, yet the statesmen whose province it was to draw the practical conclusion from them and to adjust their tactics to that appear to have ignored them wholly, and to have relied mainly, indeed exclusively, on the justice of their sacred cause. "The Bulgarians," wrote a Russian who knew them thirty-two years ago, "the Bulgarians are a cunning, stubborn, patient people, whose one care is to thrust forward their race by any and every mea.ns, and raise it above other nations. It may be taken for granted that the Bulgars will not stand upon ceremony, even with us Russians, once they -j become aware that we do not fall in with all their racial strivings. "Physically, the Bulgar resembles the sturdiest, most plodding, thrifty Teuton. In vain do we seek for some Slav trait in his composition, some creative, some constructive faculty. He lacks idealism , he is coarse, rough, devoid of chivalry, of generosity, of humour. His predominant characteristics are a practical sense, low cunning, great staying powers, extreme caution, and the spirit of a huckster. A Bulgar is always a bargaindriver, even in his friendship, his marriage, and his politics." That estimate was made by Lcontieff in the year 1877, and the writer of these lines came to the same conclusion seven years later, and never saw occasion to modify it during the many visits he paid to the country since then. But latter-day Russians, and in especial the diplomatists, formed a different judgment. They assured me over and over again that while they expected no gratitude from the Bulgar Government for favours bestowed, they were certain that the Bulgarian people would never unsheathe the sword against their liberators. And even that, they added, is a 1 precious asset. Henco Russia delighted in the role of an indulgent mother. This tenderheartedness for her own creature was another of the important factors in the Balkan situation which were generally overlooked. And it was an eminently disturbing factor, for it went a great way towards determining Ferdinand's crooked course, and misleading France and Britain. The Coburger reasoned that no matter what treason Bulgaria might' perpetrate against her benefactress, Russia, would show herself to be a loving'mother, who would always forgive and forget. And he had the highest authority for the assumption. The Bulgarian people are almost mac cessible to sentiment. Thore is no vein of imagination, of poetry, in their composition. Patriotism of a selfless heroic kind is seemingly an inborn quality-, the intensity of which is increased by the amornlity which makes short work of scruples. Characteristic of "the Biilgars is the-following infamous act narrated in the press of all Europe: "Immediately after' the conclusion of the Convention with Turkey the Bulgarian authorities arrested the Hellenic and other Christian deserters from the Turkish army who had taken refuge in Bulgaria, and delivered them nip to the Turks in large numbers. It is added that the lot of those wretched men was terrible; it ■was certainly worse than death by shooting." A DOUBLE GAME. It may 6eem a. heresy thus to affirm that Bulgaria had strong motives for throwing in her lot with the Central Empires, which the Allied statesmen should have divined, but one must confess that, putting oneself in her place, one discerns their cogency once the amoral standpoint is assumed. Divided into P.ussophil and Austrophil parties, Bulgaria felt able to play a double game — the Opposition would sympathise with the Tsardom, while the Radoslavoff Cabinet espoused the cause of the Teutons. And as Ferdinand and his Ministers were, and are. firmly convinced that the Allies have not the remotest chanca of victory, they feel that they have chosen ih« better part..

For they will thrive marvellously if Germany wins, becoming the Prussians of the Balkans. Within fifty years from to-day they would then play the same, part in the Peninsula that Prussia plays in Germany

But even if the Teutons are worsted, Bulgaria, will not be ruined on that account She has still many resources -in reserve. She can invoke the principle of nationality so solemnly laid down by the. Allies She can appeal to the d«clarations of Sir Edward Grey, M. Sazonoff, and others, which recognise Bulgaria's just claims. Her Parliamentary Opposition, which is now quiescent, and her clergy, which is wisely silent, can send a. delegation to the Slav brethren in Petrogi'ad, 6etting forth that Bulgaria was misled by a foreign interloper, who had never given up his Austrian nationality. The}' will remind M. Sazbnoff of the memorable words he uttered some ■ months ago : " Mother Russia will never disown the Bulgarian nation, whom she brought into the world with such pangs of travail; never, no matter how heinous the transgressions of this' erring child i may be." This is a free absolution and i a plenary indulgence all in one, and Fer- I dinand of Coburg would have been a. nincompoop if he had failed to avail himself of it. So long as to Germany's , doctrine of frightfulness Russia opposes : that of loving kindness, Bulgaria.^ behaviour towards each will continue to be what it now is. M. Sazonoff himself proclaimed this doctrine of plenary indulgence, and the press of Moscow and Petrograd ratified , it. It was political" wisdom, therefore, ! for Ferdinand to join' the Central Empires, because, if they should win, and he was convinced they would, their victory would be followed by the creation of a Greater Bulgaria, and if they lost Russia would receive back to her arms the erring daughter and pamper her as before. Consequently, solidarity with Austria and Germany would confer all the chances on Bulgaria and relieve her of all the risks. Co-partnership with the Entente Powers would, in the circumstances, have the opposite result. At be6t it would lead to the consolidation of a little Bulgaria wedged in between a great Rumania and a greater Servian kingdom, with no hope of further expansion, no hegemony, no future; and, at worst, it would involve the frightfulness of war as Germans understand it, and the ruin of the Bulgar State. Surely it stands to reason that none of our academical appeals to Ferdinand's Bulgarian patriotism and the sacred cause of liberty could have any hold on minds thus constituted and thus riveted on the alternatives outlined above. It was clear that Bulgaria was certain to throw in her lot with the Teutonic Empires unless, by playing deftly on the vanity of the peacock and the fear of the hare, the Allies should succeed in stringing up the King above the level of these hopes and fears and making him to take a broader look upon the situation. But our delicate moral sense forbade us to adopt the only means that could dislodge Ferdinand from his standpoint between the hare and the peacock and set him down in a circle concentric with our own. We merely continued to harp on the principl3 of nationality and the sacredness of liberty. FERDINAND AND THE ALLIES. But the trustees of the Allies had no serious misgivings. , They saw no reason why the Austro-German Prince should feel powerfully drawn towards the Teiitons, or why, if he were, his Bulgarian subjects should follow him as ' unconsciously as the Hamelin rats followed the mysterious piper. Their semi-con-scious vision of him was that of a man of relative honour, a monarch who loves his adopted country sufficiently to be willing to make a heavy sacrifice for the nation. He and his Ministers could, therefore, be trusted. The- few dissenting students of politics who knew him and his subjects well, and who limned a very different sketch of both, were' labelled pessimists,' ruled out of court, and silenced pere nptorily. When the writer of these remarks came forward and said/ "To my knowledge, Fei'dinand has already made over his support to Austria-Hungary and her ally; I have convincing evidence of this; his sole concern at present, therefore, is to beguile our statesmen and gain time for his Teuton friends," the answer was, "We have no need of information on this matter; our mental pcrtralit of Ferdinand and the Bulgars is fixed, and we aro not. prepared to alter it. Incidentally we may add that, even if you were i-ight ;n asserting that his hands are tied, you seem to forget that he is clever and unscrupulous enough to let us untie them, if that were to Bulgaria's interest, and that he has a formidable body of Russophile public sentiment to reckon with." What our diplomatists apparently lost sight of was the danger ; s well as the inconsequence of building upon the assurances of a man whom they themselves branded as occasionally unscrupulous. Ntfither did they realise the full extent to which Ferdinand was master of Bulgaria, nor how little he recked whether public sentiment favoured this belligerent group or that, well knowing that the German press machinery would speedily correct any national leanings likely to prejudice the success of his designs. • But what is calculated to astonish one even more than these fateful oversights is that, while relying upon interest to move the King to. treat his covenant with Austria and Germany as a mere scrap of paper, they took no efficacious steps to make it his interest to add this treason to the many that already stained his inglorious career. And yet this was the very essence of successful action, for neither he nor his subjects could afford to espouse the losing side, whatever their natural sentiments might be. To Ferdinand it would mean abdication; to his dynasty it would spell banishment; and on the Bulgarian nation it would bring down the doom of Belgium. Yet the utmost that, in these circumstances, was offered to Bulgaria by way of inducement to join, us was the revision of the Treaty of Bucharest, and to Ferdinand a vague hope that Russia's generosity and forgiving spirit might perhaps include himself and his offences in the coming amnesty. Of course, the motive deriving from this perspective- was absurdly insufficient. But although we had in our power to offer him a much more attractive ■ bait, we unwisely flung it away. CONSTANTINOPLE. There was one other hope which he might have been allowed to cherish without binding the Allies' hands or detracting from their assets; he and his Bulgars might have been permitted to yearn, for and strive after the possession of Constantinople, as they had been doing in secret for years. And to them the attraction of that magnetic goal was almost irresistible. This aspiration would not have tied our hands. It would not have prejudiced the final decision which circumstances might press upon the' Allies at the close of the war. And on Bulgaria and her ruling it would have had a magical effect Constantinople was the open sesame to Bulgaria's affection. No statesman should have thrown away such a trump card at a momentous crisis like that through which we were then passing. With the lure of Constantine's city, the help of an efficient news-distributing organisation, and the disposal of a secret service fund to operate with, Bulgaria's support was well within the Allies' reach. But we shrank from evarythiag

that smacked of bribery and corruption ; I we took pride in being able to dispense with an organisation for "manufacturing" or swaying public opinion, and to put our trust in the justice of our cause. These tactics clinched the Bulgarian problem. Ferdinand thereupon made up his miild, and set himself to devise means by which he could keep our diplomatists occupied while Germany was pushing forward and making ready. It is no exaggeration to affirm that if the German Foreign . Office had had the ordering in their own interests of the policy which the statesmen of the Entente were to pursue in their direct dealings with Bulgaria and their collateral arrangements with Russia, they would have devised the methods actually employed. Long- hesitation followed by undue haste in coming to a decision about matters imperfectly understood accounts very amply for mistakes like that just described. RUMANIA'S POSITION. Into another of the same nature the Allies would appear to have fallen about ! the same time in connection with ] Rumania. Conversations were being I carried on in October, 1914, between M. Bratiano, the Premier, and M. Poklewskyliozel, the Russian Minister in Bucharest. j Their upshot is said to have been a general agreement by which Rumania, in exchange tor her neutrality, shall be entitled to annex all territories of the Hapsburg Monarchy, provided that she takes possession of them before the close of the present war. The strict de- ; finition of these territories was not de- ! bated until 26th April, 1915, and it was continued with breaks until last autumn. At one time a sharp divergence of views made itself felt between the Governments of Rumania and Russia as to whether the condition affixed to the right was neutrality or intervention, M. Bratiano maintaining that it was the former, while M. Sazonoff claimed that it was the latter. But the pith of the matter lies in this, that the Allies have already disposed in advance of territory belonging to Hungary and to Austria, and have .allotted it •to Rumania. Consequently they have' disposed themselves of one of the most powerful inducements they could have offered to the Hapsburg. Monarchy to conclude a separate peace. And in spite of this they naively expect it to lay down arms and turn traitor to its ally, and enable Franco, Britain, and Russia to defeat the Germans decisively, and. then .to break up the monarchy' that helped, them to victory. What we say to the Hungarians is: Withdraw from the war. We shall then win more easily and rapidly, and we will guarantee your integrity by way of recompense. " What can you mean by guaranteeing my integrity," one can imagine Hungary objecting, " when you have already mnde over four millions of subjects and the flourishing provinces of Transylvania and the Bukovina to Rumania?" /That sequence' of mistakes was fraught with graver and further-reaching consequences than any committed by the Allies since the beginning of the war. And its operation is still unchecked. It entailed the desolation of Servia, the tremendous loss of life at the Dardan-. elles, the expedition to Egypt, and thejoint occupation of Salonika. And there may be other painful developments to follow which are "still in the seed-plot of the future. High praise is due to the intentions of Entente diplomacy, which were truly admirable. They did their best according to their lights during the | campaign as they had done their best before it was undertaken. That that "best was disastrous was' not the result of a lack of good-will. What they were deficient in. was insight and foresight. Their habit is not to study the mental and psychical caste,of the peoples with whom they have to deal, but to watch and react upon the shifts of circumstance. Amateurism is the curse,of the British nation. Their vision of the political situation in the Balkans "was roseate and blurred, and their moral maxims were better fitted for use in the Society of Friends than in intercourse with a hard-headed people whose morality', begins where self-interest ends.