THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume CXI, Issue 18, 22 January 1916, Page 6

THE WAR

Rumania, which has not figured recently in the war news, is brought suddenly into prominence to-day by an interview with an unnamed Minister, who announced that the Government ■ has come to a, decision. It is that Rumania (both Government and people) has decided not to fight at all, or to fight for the Allies.. This statement does not, after all, go very far, because it has not been feared, generally speaking, that Rumania would side with the Germanic combination. The .singularity of the message is that, inasmuch as it purports to declare the Government's policy, it should come from an anonymous Minister first. A few months ago, perhaps, when readers were a little more unsophisticated than they are now, the interview might have made a serious impression. But recent samples, such as the stories about the surrender of Montenegro, give cause for hesitation/ and something more official is needed on this matter of the Rumanian Government's decision.

The prospect that the British. Navy will be used in the most vigorous way possible short of actual fleet battle—in a full blockade of Germany—is one of the leading features of the present outlook. It has brought from the United States a very significant testimonial. The Navy. Department of the United State* has assured the Secretary of State (Mr. Lansing) that England Has sufficient ships to enforce an a-ctual blockade effectively without difficulty. This is a point on, which Mr. Lansing might have received a British assurance, but he could hardly have accepted it as he is almost bound to accept that of his own Navy Department. An important step has thus been made towards fruition of the blockade agitation. A blockade, to be lawful and to demand the respect of neutrals, must be effective; and its effectiveness must be either recognised by the neutrals or demonstrated by the blockading Power. If the greatest of the neutrals goes so far as to recognise that its' effectiveness is beyond doubt, even before it is put into operation, many difficulties disappear. The United States has chafed considerably under the present method used by Britain of controlling the seas for her war purposes; and it is likely that she will find fewer objections to an actual blockade, which operation has figured prominently in her own J naval history.

I . i _——_ "My idea about a. navy," M. Bloch once said, "is that unless you have a supreme navy, it is not worth while having one at all." This generalisation was not intended by its author, to be as sweeping as it appears to be. He meant that it is not worth - while to have an offensive navy, unless a supreme one. He did not mean to abolish coast protection or such a fleet as coastal defence may require. His remark is recalled by the etory of the "sorties" of the German fleet, which also reminds us that the German Navy cost about 300 millions. Yet its battle squadrons have never voluntarily risked an engagement. Their controllers planned to send them forth on an offensive mission at a time when the German under-water flotilla phould have worn away the British fleet's margin, of superiority; but—the submarines having quite failed in their attrition campaign, so far as warships are concerned—-the foundation conditions of an offensive use of the German 'battle fleet were never realised. At the outset of the war it lacked the superiority which M. Bloch deemed essential to an offensive fleet; and, as under-water warfare has failed to give it that superiority, it is now on the defensive, waiting for something to turn up. As long as it is undestroyed, it continues to be a potential offensive force, which extraneous circumstances (a series of British naval accidents, or a new grouping of the Powers) might turn into an actual striking unit. In the meanwhile; viewed purely as a defending organisation, the German battle fleet is not worth the 300 millions. Defence could have been made effective without all those battleships. -

The above remarks, of course, are a-pplied to the position existing between Germany and Britain. As between Germany and Russia, within the confines of the Baltic the German fleet possesses superiority, and a superiority that counts. Just' as no German ship can keep the outer^ seas, so no Russian can keep the inner sea; excepting, in - each case, . submarines. The phrase "keep the sea" excludes occasional raids. It is known that German

and Russian squadrons the Baltic. Russian raids in the Baltic have been much more effective, and less interfered with, than German raids in the North Sea; but in neither case can>it be.said that such raiding is a, proof of command of the sea.. The Russians inflicted heavy loss on the Germans, but did not seek a decisive battle with the main German fleet. The Germans' performance was much poorer; on the only occasion on which their battle-cruiser squadron was sighted by ours they ran their best, lost the Blucher, and suffered serious damage to two capital ships. Now it is cabled that "the German battleship fleet left its anchorage in Kiel Harbour and made three sorties in December. It made no effort to find the British fleet, bnt coasted by the mouth of the Elbe and within the Bight of Heligoland, keeping within the mine-protected waters all the. time." This is a very paltry performance; comparatively, the Russians have done much better. If the submarine arm is excluded, all that the Germans can show for the 300 millions is naval superiority in the Baltic, and the preservation of a fleet. which may at some future time, with adventitious aid, become a weapon to strike with.

In an appreciation—or depreciation— of the German battle fleet, one is loth to include the failure in the Gulf of Riga. It was in the nature of -a diggingout operation, and if the German fleet has failed to dig out the Russians, it is also a fact that the British fleet has not attempted to dig out the Germans. In his robust period the former First Lord of the Admiralty—now a prominent officer in the army!—did talk about digging out the enemy's navy, but the experts evidently deemed tiie undertaking too risky; and their opinion derives some support from the way. the German fleet burned its fingers in the Gulf of Riga; also from the fact that, even in the pre-eubmarine days in the Dardanelles, three Anglo-French battleships were sunk in one day by floating mines. As a weapon for attacking the Russian sHips: in their lair, or for landing German troops on parts of the Russian coast-line, the German fleet has accomplished nothing. : To the German army is due the fact that the Russian flag has been lowered in the Courland ports of Libau and Windau; and the ambitious attempt to secure command of the Gnlf of Riga and to land troops there not only failed but resulted in considerable German losses. No more need be said about it, seeing that it is a class of risk which our own Admiralty has not yet seen its way to undertake. To sum up—the German submarines have failed to reduce the British margin of naval superiority. After, some initial successes—after British seamen had bought, their experience—the German submarines ceased to be effective against warships at all. In British waters they also had some initial success as com-merce-destroyers, but Here again they have ceased to be a dangerous factor; and though they have worked ■ some havoc lately in. : the Mediterranean, they are as far off as ever from exercising a decisive influence either against warships or against merchantmen. With the exception of the ill-fated Riga adventure, Germany's battle fleet has on no occasion been an offensive weapon; •the most to be said for it is that it may at some future time become offensive, and that' while it preserves ite existence it monopolises the attention of Britain's Grand Fleet, and it maintains German supremacy in the -Baltic. There is no more than this to be put to the credit of the. German Admiralty, except the raids of cruisers like the Emden, which .are a closed chapter. Probably the greatest blunder made by Grand Admiral yon Tixpitz was his failure to have on the high sea* twenty or thirty Emdens (instead of half a dozen) when the war broke out. In saying that raids by German cruisers constitute a .closed chapter, a reservation must be made. In the Dutch East Indies and in American ports there are some interned German liners. Also, in various countries, particularly South America, there are ships and men who might be bought with German gold. If no fast steamer has been fitted up in any of the American or East Indies ports, and smuggled away to 'sea. on piratical business, then that negative state of things is a tribute to the alertness of neutral authorities and of the British and Japanese Navies; perhaps more to the Allied navies than to the neutral authorities. Recently cabled statements show that a sharp look-out is maintained off certain ports in Mexico and elsewhere. Considering the facilities which the wide world offers for piratical or privateering ventures, the safety of the seas is a remarkable tribute to the efficiency of the Navy; and the toll levied on Allied shipping by all the enemy's marine forces (above and ' below the surface) is comparatively small. .