SWEDEN AND THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume CXI, Issue 18, 22 January 1916, Page 2

SWEDEN AND THE WAR

POLICY OF NEUTRALITY

RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND,

In view of the reports that Sweden is about to intervene actively in the war on the side of the Central Powers, the Exchange Telegraph Company's Stockholm correspondent obtained . a statement early in December from a. prominent" Swedish . politician, ■ which places the war agitation and the policy of the Swedish Government in their true light. The informant stated that the policy of the Prime Minister, M. Hammarskjold; of-the' Foreign Minister, M. Wallenberg; and of the whole Cabinet, remains a policy of neutrality.! ■ The three Biksdag parties, the Eight, the Liberals, and Social Democrats, continue to give this policy unswerving support. Sweden has no intention of' entering the war because of sympathy with any belligerent, or because she has any. national aims which need. war for their realisation. The vague general considerations of policy urged by certain Swedish groups and- individuals as reasons foivt&king up arms are hot .accepted as valid- by ■ the Cabinet. " ■ Asked further to define Sweden's policy, the politician said : '■ "Sweden's position is identical "with the position of the other neutral States which are not directly interested in the. struggle. The only causes which could compel her to abandon neutrality were •stated by the Prime Minister on 17th." July. ■. M. Hammarskjold.-.then said": that Sweden .would-, -take up. arms in defence of ■ her! territory, or for any "cause of equal- import- ■ ance. This meant, that, in . addition to defending territorial inviolability, Sweden would fight iii defence of vital rights or interests. In this regard Sweden's policy towards the Central Powers and towards the Entente-is. the same. It is a misrepresentation to'imply that Sweden would tolerate, grievances at the hands of one group which she would resent at the hands of the other. This impartial policy is accepted by all Swedes, with the exception of the group known as Activists. These demand that Sweder shall intervene on Germany's side, without waiting for any casus belli from the Entente. THE ACTIVIST AGITATION!

"The out-and-out Activists are not numerous. Their ■ agitation. is mostly anonymous, and they control no daily newspaper. They publish a monthly review, 'The New Sweden. The editor is a lawyer named Molin, who has not much influence. There are some Activists' books and pamphlets. The Activist war-at-any-price agitators create . alarm abroad, because they are mistakenlyidentified with the much .larger force of Swedish politicians who have .emphatic pro-German sentiments. I could not say whether Sweden is predominenfly pro-' German or anti-German. .Roughly, the Right (Conservative) Party is counted pro-German and the Liberals and Social Democrats are counted anti-German. In' the SecondXOhamber of the Riksdag are 86 Eight, 57 'Liberals, and 87 Social Democrats. \This- implies a pro-Entente majority. But many Liberals and Socialists are pro-German.. The Right predominate in. military and naval circles, control, with- a few exceptions, the more important newspapers, and generally give tone to foreign policy The Right profess to support the Cabinet's'neutral-: ity policy, but their antagonism ■ against' the Liberal and Socialist neutrality agitation is stronger than their antagonism against the Activists, -with' whom " they have the common bond of ' pro-German-ism. The Stockholm Right newspapers attack the neutralist agitations as bad patriots and • 'Little. Swedes.'. These newspapers persistently .praise .German achievements in the field - and in the organisation of the occupied enemy.territories, and they proclaim that the Central Powers -will win. In effect, : the Right press .and most Right -politicians give the Activists support. . :

CAUSES OF PRO-GERMANISM. 1 "What is the cause of: the Right's pro-Germanism?" :-

"Domestic politics on the lines determined long before the war. For decades Sweden's chief internal question has been national defence The real political division has not been into Right, Liberals, and Socialists, but into socalled Defence Friends and Defence Nihilists. Six months before the war the question became critical. Thirty thousand Defence Friendly farmers marched to the Palace and expressed to the King their zeal to bear sacrifices for national safety. This led to a Cabinet crisis, and the present-Premier, M. Hammarskjold, with an armaments I programme, .came to power; The controI versy was at its height, when war broke out." As the Defence -Friends founded their agitation for armaments on" mistrust of Russia, they inevitably took | sides against Russia and-her- Allies in the; war,-and the'anti-armaments party, ■which all along condemned' alarmism against Russia; championed the Entente. Swedish pro-Germanism is therefore not' primarily a condemnation of the Entente's cause. The rights and wrongs of the. war play practically no role. As a result of. the conciliatory Russian policy, and of constant friction with England, pro-Germanism here has now an anti-English colour,' and the original cause-—distrust .of Russia—has1 fallen into the background. The Government is strictly neutral. But being supported mainly by pro-German partisans, its position is not easy." .'■••.-•■■ "And the army and navy?" . ■ . ■ . . "Sweden is a constitutional country, and the stories printed abroad about the army rushing the: country into war are, absurd. Over foreign. policy ; Swe-. den's Army , and Navy have 'no more control ihan England's. Also, they have no desire to play a role. Undoubtedly in. both army and navy, there is some, war sentiment. /In a slight degree this is pro-Germanism. Nine-tenths -of it is the'professional instinct of fighting men, the desire for adventure and desire' to show the so-called Defence Nihilists that. the army and navy are not superfluous. TEMPOR4.RY TROUBLES.

"A few Swedish officers" went'to Berlin and offered their, services, but.there are also Swedes serving in Franco's. army and, I believe, in England's. If a crisis arose involving the question of peace or war the Swedish officers corps would not in the least influence the. decision. How willingly the officers obey the Cabinet's order to preserve strict impartiality is shown by the commander of our torpedo boat "Pollux, who threatened to fire on a Gorman warship which threatened the British steamer Thelma in . Swedish territorial waters. The Right Press unanimously , approved of Lieutenant Budberg's action,' for, even with the pro-German Right, the chief motive is regard for " Sweden's honour and right. The chance that Sweden may be drawn into the war exists, but if Sweden is drawn in the.Activist war agitation will not bo the cause. Activism alone is too weak. ' The cause will be a grievance against some belligerent too serious for Sweden to put up with. In that. ease the Liberals and Socialists will ".'certainly support the Government, and the- present division between parties will disappear.

''The fact, that' Sweden seems more likely to be drawn into, conflict with the Entente than with Germany is .not due to Swedish official partiality. It is due to the i'act that we have a chronic serious

difference with England, while with Germany we have only temporary troubles, due to breaches of neutrality, which the Germans get out of by apologising1. Our Right Press keeps up a continual.agitation against England, and persistently urges the ■ Government to retaliate. The complaints concern England's treatment of Swedish shipping and , cargoes, ■■ the attempt to control Swedish foreign trade, the trade espionage, and so on. Personally, I understand the compulsion put upon England in the interests of her national defence, but the Swedish circles which desire a German victory naturally are not willing to see Sweden suffering for the sake of British victory.; M. Hammarskjold's Cabinet holds out stoutly against the- war-at-any-price Activists, even though most of- these' are its own supporters. It is harder to hold out against the supporters1 who demand retaliation against England, the stoppage ■of the Russian mails, the more. active employment of convoy warships; and, olher measures which might provoke a collision. Sweden's relations with the Entente Powers are good, but relations with England will not be satisfactory as long as Swedes hold they have serious grievances." ■