THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume CXI, Issue 17, 21 January 1916, Page 6

THE WAR

German newspaper efforts to detach Russia and Italy from the Entente coatinue. ,Italy is taunted with the alleged disappearance of her Balkan ambitions, and with the triumph of her rival, Austria, also of Bulgaria and Turkey, with whom the Frankfurter Zeitung significantly brackets Greece. Eussia is told that the withdrawal from Gallipoli demonstrates finally that Russia shall not have Constantinople, and that the Entente cannot serve Russian interests. But the German campaign has a persuasive as well as a critical side; it not only points out the badness of present courses, but offers inducements to follow new ones more adaptable to German interests. The inducement held out to Italy, secretly, is that Italy, by force of arms, has not made very much progress towards Istria, and could even now make a better bargain by amicable arrangements with Austria, Austria being compensated in the conquered Balkan territories. There is less secrecy about the inducement offered to Russia; it is an outlet on the Persian Gulf. Such an outlet, says the German press, would remove "Russia's organic motive for the war." This motive, the Germans consider, is an ice-fsee port; and they think to detach Russia from the Entente by assuring her that the Entente cannot win Constantinople, but that Germany can give Russia a Persian Gulf port. Both contentions are unsound, the latter highly so. But the German plan is founded on a still worse misconception, a fundamental one. Russia's organic motive for tho war is not an ice-free port in the Persian Gulf. Russia's motive is to get rid of the German canker in Russia—the system of Gcrmanisalion whereby the Germans really govern.the Russians in their own

country. Russia has been moved by something much nearer to hand than the Persian Gulf; her movement is intellectual as well as material, and numerous writers testify to a certain spiritual force which is going to carry Piussia to her goal, despite temporary defeats. Italy is not a signatory of the no-separate-peace Declaration, but Russian honour is pledged, and will probably prove as staunch as that of France, whose reputation for frivolity has been swallowed up in a great wave of national resolution.

Russia has been assisting the AngloIndian Mesopotamian expedition in two ways. The previously-noted movement of Russian forces in Persia from Hamadan towards the Turco-Persian border has some value as a. diversion; at any rate, it compelled' the Turks to occupy Kermanshah, a Persian town lying in the course of any column attempting to march ..from Hamadan to the Tigris. But the more important Russian movement is the advance in the Caucasus, where a, sudden blow dislodged the Central Turkish army and forced it back with great losses. Constantinople prepared the world for this news by an equivocal report (probably worded by a German) stating that "our troops in" the Caucasus are offering an heroic resistance to attacks which the enemy is delivering with superior forces," etc. This message (received on Wednesday night) was clearly intended to pave the way for news of a reverse—news which has since been sup plied from the other side. Petrograd now reports that several Turkish units were almost annihilated, and that th© Russians have occupied Koprukeni, about 30 miles east of Erzerum, near the west branch of the Euphrates. Whether Russia is sufficiently equipped to carry on a double offensive (in the Caucasus and in Bukowina-Galicia) may be doubted, but the "sudden blow" cannot fail to do good as a diversion, hampering Turkish efforts to concentrate on the Tigris. Suspicion that Turkey's German controllers have planned such a concentration grows steadily. Instead of a. chorus of testimony concerning a big offensive at Salonika or at the Suez Canal, wildly conflicting messages now come from these parts. The people who were positive are now not so positive, and may have been merely the channels of Germanspread rumours. There is little doubt that, in 'the Near East, the Tigris position is the weakest from the Entente point of view, and Field Marshal "Yon der Goltz would hardly fail to profit by the fact. The Daily Mail's Salonika correspondent now declares that the Bulgar attitude is defensive rather than offensive ; and there is evidence from Italy that Britain has very powerfully fortified the Suez Canal.

One of the leading critics declared the other day that Russia had suffered very heavily and that it was idle to expect her to win the war. "To win the war" is not expected of Russia alone, nor of Britain alone, but the value of Russia as an Ally is thus assessed by another critic of at least equal authority: "We hear of fresh Russian, armies being organised at Petrogfad, Smolensk, and Kief in preparation for the spring campaign. Russia's resources jn men are practically inexhaustible. Allowing for a permanent loss of four million killed, disabled, and prisoners, there still remain from seven to eight millions, of men between the ages of 20 'and 44, who are now either in the fighting lino or being trained at the depots. Then there is the Opolochenie, or Imperial Militia, the final Russian reserve, which has not been drawn upon at all as yet, but which would yield at least ten million men of the fighting age when required. As far as men are concerned Russia can continue the war long after attrition has done its fell work among the armies of the two Central Powers. If the Russian. Government can cope with the equipment difficulty during the winter months, we may look forward with confidence to the results of next year's campaign. The German Emperor /must on no account reckon on detaching Russia, from the Quadruple Alliance, for the Russian people were never more determined than they now are to continue the war down to its appointed end." Everything turns on the matter of equipment. In this connection, an interesting letter on conditions in the White Sea and at Archangel appeared on page 3 of Tuesday's Post. It indicates that, to hamper the enormous Archangel imports during the ice-free part of the year, the enemy mined, the. White Sea, the mine-sowers being probably Swedish vessels carrying G-erman officers. Two ships fell victims to the mines. The letter shows that Russia imports via Archangel not only equipment but men for technical services. Technical men are probably scarce in Russia, and one ship carried a thousand Belgians for the motor and aerial corps.

With regard to yesterday's remarks concerning Italy's influence on the war, it may be worth while examining in detail her territorial gains. They are insignificant when compared with the German-Austrian advance in Russia, but they compare with the restricted FrancoBritish progress in the Champagne and Artois. The New York Nation details the Italian gains as follows :—"On the Tyrol front the Italians have occupied a strip about forty miles long by ten miles wide along both shores of the Lago di Garda, with Riva and Rovereto as their objective. On the Isonzo front they have occupied a zone about fifty miles long and fifteen miles wide at its southern extremity on the Adriatic, narrowing to less than five miles at Plava to the north of Gorizia and five, miles at Tolmino. Of important places they hold Monfalcone, Gradisca. and Plava-, some six or seven miles to the north of Gorizia and on the eastern bank of the Isonzo. On the heights of Podgora they are almost at the gates of Gorizia, .vhi.-d by this time must be denuded of its civilian population. ... In Italy's operations, both in the Tyrol and along the Isonzo, tho usual advantages of the defensive have been enormously enhanced by the nature of the country- It has been a case either of mountain fighting or of frontal attacks on trenches cut in the solid rock." These statements again give rise. t<> the question touched on yesterday : Why has not Italy sought a more open field of action beyond her shores ?

General Cadorna, the Italian Commander, is understood to be firmly opposed to "any policy of adventure out-, side of- Italy." It is believed that he holds that more decisive results can b© won by operations from a near/ base directed against the flank of the enemyj in other words, that, despite the enormous difficulty of forcing the Austrian front, it represents for Italy the best opportunity. But General Joffre, according to an increasing volume of evidence, does not hold such a view. Frenchmen and Britons have been declaring that the war must be decided in the West; Italians, following the lead of Genei'al Cadorna, have been equally declaring that, for Italy, the Italian front contains the decisive point. Probably General Joffre is not inclined to quarrel with the view that the ultimate decision will bo in the West, but for the present he strongly supports a policy of action outside France; probably because such outside action gives greater scope, and will, by attrition, hasten the day when the German steel wall in the West, can be battered in. A good deal of light is thrown by recent statements concerning the British Government's "wobble" over the Salonika expedition. It is stated that early' in October the hand of Ministers unsy_inpathetic .with tha.ez-'

peditioh was strengthened by a memorandum from the General Staff, the gist of which was that sufficient troops could not be sent to Sarvia without depleting Sir John French's reserves, and that as France was the "main theatre of war" till available strength should be concentrated there, instead.of being diverted to another and subsidiary sphere of operations. Now, if there was one man to whom this argument might have been expected to appeal, it was the man in charge of the "main theatre of war"; that is, to Joffre, the French Generalissimo. Instead of that, General Joffre took the opposite view. He crossed the Channel in order to persuade Lord Kitchener and the General Staff that at the existing stage and in the existing circumstances it. was necessary to go to Salonika, and that to enter the Balkans via Salonika, in 1915 was the surest way to enter Germany, via. France, later on.

On this subject the usually well-in-formed war-writer in the Fortnightly Review states :—"What conversations took place between General Jofire and Lord Kitchener we do not know, but so strongly did he feel the urgency of sending prompt aid to the Servian army that he is reported to have said that if we transferred half a million of men from France to Servia, he was prepared to defend the present Anglo-French front with French troops alone." So the British, idea of concentrating on the support of Joffre did not appeal to Joffre himself. At the same time, in the light of later events, it is hard to believe that General Joffre hoped, at the eleventh hour, to save the Servian army. Probably he aimed at securing an impregnable position at Salonika—a foothold, from which, at a later- stage, to reconquer the Balkans. And that is the direction in which the Entente plans are now shaping. General Joffre apparently holds that, in order that the enemy may be beaten, he should be fought in the Balkans as well as in France and Eussia. General Cadorna apparently holds that Italy should concentrate on Italy.. Strategically; the question turns to a large extent on resources of men and material. Jofire considers that Franco-British resoui'ces warrant an expedition to.Salonika. Cadorna considers that Italian resources do not. Cadorna's view does not seem to be flattering, to a nation of 35 millions in population. Moreover, it is not consistent with the undefined Italian operations in Albania.

If the differing views represented by Joffre and Cadorna could be reconciled, the Entente would fight much more effectively. Unfortunately, however, there is no .evidence that any Italian representative took part in the latest Angk^French War Council in London. If the Quadruple Alliance is ; to realise its highest purpose, 't must represent equality of effort (according to circumstances), and co-ordination thereof. It may be wise for a neutral like Greece to "keep her army intact for the final liquidation." But if everybody tries to do that, there may be no liquidation. Besides, even with an mtact army, Greece may miss the prize. Prizes should go to those who fight for them, and in proportion as they fight for them. To assure* victory, the Quadruple Entente should be truly and fully cooperative.