THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XC, Issue 146, 17 December 1915, Page 6

THE WAR

Mr. Hilaire Belloc estimates that Germany has already exhausted her efficient reserves., and that her uncalled reserves will yield only 800,005" men. This estimate—arrived at by elaborate calculations which there is not space to outline—is consistent with symptoms of declining man-power that have lately been plain to any observer. ■ Germany has been doing all these things which would be done by a belligerent anxious to husband his human resources. On the front which is peculiarly her own—the west— Gormany has launched no big offensive ifolii ollS !*B^l .Qn jthe pastern fvont^

which she holds jointly with, the Au»tnans, her central armie6 have long been marking time, and even her northern armies, facing the unconquered Dvma, have subsided into quiescefice. She has also tried to hold her defensive lines with a- minimum of men, endeavouring to make up for this with machine guns and elaborate technical equipment; but there is a limit below which the human factor, even in the trenches, must not fall, and sundry squeezes on the western front have taught Germany not to take risks. To improve the technical equipment is one way of economising your men; another way is to get other men to fight for you. That undoubtedly is one of the reasons for the German"Austnan offensive in the Balkans. Russia and France offered a. prospect of deadly and expensive combat; the Balkans campaign presented an easier 6uccess and the additional lure of picking up allies. Germany calculated that success in the Balkans would mean the consolidation of existing allies (Turkey and Bulgaria), ajid the impressing of doubtful neutrals, Greece and Rumania. In other words, the linking-up with 600,000 to 1,000,000 Turks and 300 000 to 400,000 Bulgarians; perhaps, also," with 400,000 Rumanians and 300 000 Greeks. Thuf. the Bvdkan campaign, besides opening the road to Constantinople, and ultimately to Suez, was designed to relieve Germany in the matter ol man-power. And so -far tie German aesign has not failed. The Bulga,rs and Turks have linked up, and the price paid (the conquest of Servia) has fallen much more on the 'shoulders of Austria a,nd Bulgaria than on those of Germany. In the Balkan casualty list Berlin astuteness is seen at its best.

But.the resources of the four Powers —Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey—are not equal to the task of a fight to the finish with the Entente. The addition of the Bulgars and Turks will prolong, but will not decide, the war. Even the addition of Greeece and Rumania to the Central League would not even up the scales; but it would give Germany more time, and the gaining of tune would bring with it the hope of converting other jneutrals, or of some other piece of luck "turning up." To use Mr. Belloc's words, the enemy is "gambling on his power to hold "out, gradually increasing his proportion of inefflcients, until accident brings in further neutrals. The addition of Greece and Rumania would temporarily relieve the enemy." At the same time, the enemy knows that the reserves of the Entente Powers are ultimately overwhelming. In the meantime he hopes that the continued non-success of Anglo-French offensives in the Middle East will further damage Entente prestige, and will create political effects favourable to the securing of new allies for Germany. This hope cannot be said to be groundless; but its realisation would not place the decision in German hands. It would, however, help Germany in her play for a drawn game.

The element of mystery which surrounds the position of Italy is touched upon by Mr. Belloc. Germany, he says, "relies on the limitation of the Italian forces to Italy, who has not even declared war on Germany." This absence of a state of war between Germany ancL Italy has always appeared as a weak point in the solidarity of the Quadruple Entente. Would a compromise by Austria place Italy once more among the neutrals? To people who had been asking themselves 'this question, the spirit of the recent address by the Italian Foreign Minister brought a. feeling of reassurance ; and that feeling is deepened by an Italian communique, published to-day, announcing the transport of Italian troops—with some losses —to Albania. Presumably the communique is official. If so, the Italian troops are no longer limited to Italy, and Italy's participation in the Balkan land campaign has become not only a promise but a fact. It is to be hoped that, from a military point of view Albania will be kinder to Italy than Macedonia has been to her Allies: but, in any case, the Italian actioa has a political value in that it sives greater reality to the Quadruple Entente. The more Italy co-operates externally with her Allies, the less chance there is that Italy will provide one of those changes m the wind anxiously waited for by German diplomacy.

The ordinary war ea'ble-grammer delights in the use of superlative words, and the declaration that Salonika has been made "impregnable" must not be swallowed without inspection. The town has a natural defence, composed partly of hills and partly of the River Vardar, but it could hardly be converted in a few days into a Port Arthur. Anotlier message states that heavy guns are now being landed by the Entente. The statement that the Greeks have abandoned to the Entente practically the whole of Eastern Macedonia appears to be inconsistent with the report of a withdrawal of the Greek Army eastward to Seres! It is not likely that Greece would leave her eastern corner open to the Bulgars —unless Bulgaria and Greece have, contrary to King Constantine's plighted word, a secret agreement. The question whether the Bulgars have crossed the Greek border is still in doubt. It would appear that in France the man behind the idea of an offensive based on Salonika, and aimed at the Danube, was M. Briand. The conception was a big one; and, if practicable, certainly valuable. But the measures taken to car,ry it ont,_if they were taken for that purpose, were ridiculous. They failed before the first real blow struck by the Bulgarians. It is reported that M. Delcasse was convinced that the idea of a Balkan campaign on the large scale was beyond the immediate powers of France and Britain; hence his disappearance from the French Foreign Office.

If, as Holland reports, Germany contemplates a decisive offensive on the western front, this is a gambler's throw. It will cost men, and, for reasons given above, Germany is not likely to throw away men unless shortage of material has become ari even greater danger than shortage of men. Impending shortage of some vital war commodity, or impending bankruptcy, might warrant a desperate effort to pull the war out of the fire. Otherwise, a grand offensive is not in key with Germany's general policy. Nor would it suit the Entente to stake the whole issue until the British new armies are seasoned and tho-Russian rearmament is complete.